global police force to administer the postnational constellation, but for the abolition of the prison-industrial and military/police complex, as the materialist way of delivering global justice (see her 2016 book, *Freedom is a Constant Struggle*). Or take Bolívar Echeverría's way of dialectically synthesizing Walter Benjamin's anarchist embrace of the general strike—Benjamin is another notable absence in Ibsen's account—with Indigenous peoples' political practices of survival against European colonization in his 1998 book, *La modernidad de lo barroco.* Inspired by Benjamin, Echeverría theorizes a globally more pluralistic baroque modernity, one which is resonant with Enrique Dussel's transmodernity, and capable of realizing the ecologically emancipatory promise of the neo-technic revolution—a promise effectively denied by the accumulation of capital under "actually existing" Eurocentric modernity (*Modernity and 'Whiteness*,*'* 2019, 16).

The truth is that Ibsen doesn't ever leave the parochial imaginary of the "West," even when he is engaging with its critics. Why are French poststructuralism (Foucault) and American liberalism (John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel) the main interlocutors for the Frankfurt School's global theory of justice, rather than the Black radical tradition (W. E. B. DuBois, C. L. R. James, Cedric Robinson, etc.) or decolonial theory (Aníbal Quijano, Sylvia Wynter, Maria Lugones, Santiago Castro-Gómez, etc.)? The latter both engage with the totality of global capitalism as a world-historical system whose absence Ibsen laments in poststructuralist and liberal thinkers. This decision is even more shocking given that Ibsen seems genuinely concerned by Allen's critique of the Frankfurt School's Eurocentrism, which reappears in every single chapter he devotes to the limitations of each paradigm. Alternatively, why not reorient critical theory in the direction of Spinoza, rather than Kant, given Ibsen's spot-on understanding of climate disaster as "the definite struggle of our time." (351). And if that is the case, why are not Donna Haraway, Jason Moore, and Kohei Saito, among others, not more important interlocutors for the critical theory of the Frankfurt School?

Ibsen conceives of a critical theory of world society as "an inherently *cooperative* effort" (348), vindicating Horkheimer's original paradigm of critical theory as a "*materialist programme of interdisciplinary social research*, in which [European] philosophy is assigned the mediating role of integrating insights won in the fragmented social-scientific disciplines" (29). Since the emergence of the Black radical tradition, decolonial theory, settler colonial critique, queer of color critique, intersectional Black feminism, indigenous criticism, decolonial feminism, and more, European philosophy has no longer served as the sole mediator of that effort, and rightly so. For a critical theory of world society to begin, such a project must pluralize the philosophical discourses it uses as mediation. *A Critical Theory of Global Justice* is undoubtedly an excellent book on the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. But it is also a demonstration of how far we still are from any real cooperation at the level of critical theory, in the plural and in the global.

Response to Andres Henao Castro's Review of *A Critical Theory of Global Justice: The Frankfurt School and World Society.*

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— Malte Frøslee Ibsen

I must admit to have struggled with how to respond to Andres Henao Castro's review of my book. On the one hand, I agree with several of Henao Castro's objections. On the other, I see some of these concerns as fully congruent with my motivation for writing the book. I agree with Henao Castro that the Frankfurt School tradition is Eurocentric, and, indeed, "Germano-centric and andro-centric." I agree that "European philosophy" can "no longer serve as the sole mediator" of critical theory's efforts to integrate social-scientific knowledge in a global context. I agree too that the book's efforts to engage with the vast and increasingly pluralistic postcolonial literature falls short of what I would ideally have liked in both scope and depth. Yet I am surprised about the extent to which Henao Castro seems to misread the book's basic project. Notwithstanding its title, the book's aim is quite explicitly "not to develop a full-fledged critical theory of [global justice], but rather to think about what such a project might mean" (5). As I emphasize, the global context requires us to reconceive of critical theory as "an open-ended and intercultural platform for the critique of the pathologies and injustices of global capitalist modernity" (348). The book aspires to offer a contribution to such a global critique from a perspective expressly embedded within European philosophy. But it does not claim a superior position from which to adjudicate claims within this discourse; it enters the discourse as an equal partner in a common project of theoretically enabling emancipation from global injustices.

It is true that the book does insist on a—perhaps somewhat unfashionable—Kantian point that we must understand claims about emancipation from domination as speaking to *injustices*: as claims about human relationships that are universally wrong. It is also true that the book approvingly charts a learning process, beginning *with* Horkheimer and Adorno, through which critical theorists conclude that revolutionary struggle in the Marxist sense is a too restrictive way to conceive of emancipation. Henao Castro's objections to these claims cause me no great concern. What is of concern to me is his claim that I only pay lip service to Amy Allen's contextualist paradigm of normativity, which borders on the disingenuous. My argument is precisely that a critical theory of global justice

must integrate *both* a Kantian universalism and Allen's self-problematizing critique to "denaturalize and uncover forms of exclusion and domination at the more subterranean level of subjection, such as the gender or racial norms that introduce domination into the foundations of subjectivity" (345).

I profoundly agree with Henao Castro that if critical theory is to retain intellectual relevance—and, even more emphatically, hope to redeem its emancipatory promise—in a world where European philosophy is and must be irrevocably decentered, then it must engage in "real cooperation" in "the plural and in the global". My intention in writing this book on the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory is not to anticipate such a global cooperative engagement, which, I feel, would be presumptuous. It is, rather, to undertake the logically antecedent step of laying bare the tradition's enduring theoretical resources, which might, when wrested from their parochial limitations, justify its legitimate place in this unfolding global conversation.

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