

OCCUPATION AND VOTE IN URBAN ARGENTINA: THE MARCH 1973 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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In March 1973, for the first time since the military coup of 1966, a presidential election was held in Argentina. It also was the first time since 1955 that Peronist parties were allowed to present candidates in every province. The present note originated in an initiative by Darío Canton to collect occupational and electoral data from polling places in several Argentine cities. He had the cooperation of Beba Balvé and Lucía Osvaldo of the Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales, Buenos Aires. The three were responsible for gathering data in Buenos Aires (Canton), Rosario (Balvé), and La Matanza (Osvaldo). Subsequently, collaboration with researchers Jorge R. Jorrat and Héctor Caldelari from interior provinces made it possible to include comparisons with data from Córdoba and Tucumán. The analysis of the data and, ultimately, this note are the sole responsibility of the two authors whose names appear above.

SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH AND VARIABLES

The initial purpose of this study was to test whether Peronism, whose emergence in the political arena was accompanied by greater class consciousness and massive voting along class lines than ever before in Argentina, was still backed by a majority of the working class. The March 1973 electoral contest also offered the opportunity to document the actual strength of the link between workers and Peronism after seven years of electoral moratorium and the many limitations placed upon the Peronist party for nearly two decades. Finally, it provided a chance to explore the ties between other political parties and the occupational spectrum.¹ We were dealing, then, with what in a very loose sense can be labeled as "electoral behavior,"² and we decided to study it in five urban areas that were among the most highly developed in the country: Buenos Aires, La Matanza, Córdoba, San Miguel de Tucumán, and Rosario.³

Seeking to minimize the hazards of "ecological fallacy,"⁴ the unit of analysis selected was the smallest electoral subdivision for which data were available, i.e., a *mesa*, a section of voters from the national register, about 250–300 citizens scheduled to cast their vote in one urn (registration in Argentina is automatic after age 18; voting is compulsory). Data on the list of voters are: name and address, sex, age (only for males), literacy, place of registration at 18 (and hence

“migration”), and occupation. Voters’ sex, although taken into consideration, gave small returns, so much so that we would have been much better off had we taken all data from male voters. Breaks by age did not show anything significant, while literacy, or rather illiteracy, appeared only in Rosario.⁵ The study of migration was discarded from the start for lack of time, money, and staff.

We were, finally, left with occupation, our crucial variable. After listing the occupations appearing in all zones (more than 500), the first step was to group them in nearly twenty categories. After several tryouts they were reduced later to the following twelve:⁶ production process workers and laborers (*obreros, jornaleros, operarios*, etc.); craftsmen, or those with a name for their occupation (*alfarero, bordador*, etc.); own account workers (*diariero, gasista, lechero*, etc.); technical workers, with nonuniversity training (*enfermero, fotógrafo, locutor*, etc.); employees (clerical and sales workers, public and administrative); traders (*comerciante, comisionista, confeccionista, contratista de obras*, etc.); professionals and students; proprietors; retired; housewives; domestic service workers; and occupations connected with agriculture. Dependent variables were the percentage of votes obtained by each major party, calculated on the total number of votes cast (including blank votes). They were four: FREJULI (*Frente Justicialista de Liberación*), UCR (*Unión Cívica Radical*), APF (*Alianza Popular Federalista*), and APR (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria*).

FREJULI was a federation of parties allied to Peronism, whose candidate was Hector J. Cámpora. Other parties were: MID (*Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo*), headed by former President Arturo Frondizi; PCP (*Partido Conservador Popular*), with Vicente Solano Lima; and a fragment of the Christian Democrats. UCR, whose candidate was Ricardo Balbín, maintained its liberal, middle-of-the-road position, made no alliances with other political parties, and went to the polls on its own. APF, headed by Francisco Manrique, gathered supporters from different conservative groups, including sectors of the PDP (*Partido Demócrata Progresista*), and some “populist” groups from the interior which did not join FREJULI. Finally, APR was a “front” which attempted to be the spokesman for the left. Its candidate was Oscar Alende of the PI (*Partido Intransigente*), an outgrowth of the old UCR (just as the MID, of which Alende was initially an important figure—Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires). Other members came from the most radical sectors of the Christian Democrats. APR also had the backing of the Communist party. Other (minor) parties (mentioned in table 3 below) are FUP (*Frente Único del Pueblo*) in Tucumán, and PJ (*Partido Justicialista*) in Rosario. Both are factions within Peronism but with different stands: FUP was the most leftist sector in Tucumán; PJ, a conservative Peronist faction, did not give their support to the official candidate for Governor in Santa Fé, an MID man.

DATA GATHERING

The selection of electoral subdivisions in each of the urban areas chosen was guided by our concern to get a fair representation of high, middle, and low social strata, with two subdivisions each, whenever possible. For instance, in

Buenos Aires, for the lower stratum, we tried to get some mesas where the voters were primarily factory workers, and some where the voters were primarily people from the *villas miseria*. Electoral subdivisions and mesas were chosen in Buenos Aires, La Matanza, and Rosario on the basis of suggestions from colleagues who had done fieldwork, evidence gathered by experts from the INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos), and electoral and other data compiled by Canton. In Córdoba, although the selection of five subzones also was done with the aid of experts, mesas were chosen at random. In Tucumán a different criterion was used—a stratified sample, using as variable of stratification the vote obtained by Peronism (or FREJULI plus FUP) in March. Thus, data from eighteen male and eighteen female mesas were gathered in Buenos Aires; fourteen and thirteen, in the same order, in La Matanza; twelve from each sex in Rosario; fifteen from each sex in Córdoba; and thirty from each sex in Tucumán.

Since we lacked the means to control the percentages of occupational categories found in each zone (there are no data on occupational distribution by electoral units and the results from the 1970 Census are not readily comparable because they are available only for larger units), we tried to see how far our voting data were from those actually obtained in some larger unit to which our mesas belonged. The method—simultaneous confidence intervals for the multinomial distribution—showed that our parties' votes from Córdoba tended to fall within confidence intervals, a situation that was somewhat less frequent in Buenos Aires. We could not control the cases of La Matanza and Rosario for lack of official information on relevant electoral units. Lastly, Tucumán did not lend itself to this type of check, since the selection of mesas had been done differently. Tables 1 and 2 show, respectively, the mean values of occupational categories found in our mesas, and the percentage of votes for every party as compared to official data from larger (and not always the same) units.

THE FINDINGS

The rank order correlation values between occupations and parties for all zones considered are given in table 3. In our comments below we will only pay attention to those categories whose case numbers are not too small. In addition, we have grouped under the heading of workers categories (1) production process workers and laborers and (2) craftsmen, since they behaved quite similarly. Peronism, represented in this election by FREJULI, shows a strong, positive association with workers in every zone, with the exception of Rosario, where its values are lower.⁸ The behavior of own account workers is less uniform, even though they tend to follow the path of association seen for workers, particularly in Buenos Aires, La Matanza, and Córdoba. The association practically disappears in Tucumán and Rosario. The relationship found between employees and Peronist vote varies from positive in Buenos Aires and Córdoba to negative correlations in all zones, save again in Rosario, with lower values.⁹

UCR exhibits a negative association with workers everywhere, especially in La Matanza and Tucumán. With own account workers, the negative values, also present everywhere, are lower. Employees are positively associated with

UCR's vote in every zone except Córdoba. Higher values are found in La Matanza and Rosario. There is a positive correlation with professionals and students, which is stronger in La Matanza and Tucumán.

APF is negatively associated with workers in all zones, particularly so in Buenos Aires, La Matanza, and Tucumán. Own account workers show negative correlations in Buenos Aires and Córdoba, while there is no association in the other zones. Employees are more erratic: negative in Córdoba and Buenos Aires, positive in the rest, notably in La Matanza. There is a strong, positive correlation with professionals and students everywhere, particularly in Buenos Aires and Tucumán.

APR shows a positive correlation with workers in Buenos Aires and Rosario and a negative one in the rest, especially in La Matanza and Tucumán. With respect to own account workers, the correlations are positive in Buenos Aires and Rosario, nil in Córdoba and Tucumán, and negative in La Matanza. Employees show a positive association in La Matanza, Tucumán, and Buenos Aires, and a negative one in Córdoba and Rosario. There is an important positive correlation with professionals and students in Tucumán, La Matanza, and Córdoba; it is negative with those from Buenos Aires and Rosario. Looking at the table from another perspective, we can observe:

a. A regular pattern in workers' behavior, which seems to "support" Peronism in all zones and "reject" all the other parties, with the exception of APR in Buenos Aires and Rosario, presumably due to the backing of the Communist party and the Christian Democrats, both having at least some union following.¹⁰

b. An also regular but less pronounced pattern among own account workers, valid for Buenos Aires, La Matanza, and Córdoba.

c. An irregular pattern among employees. In La Matanza we see a neat division: Peronism (negative) on the one side; the rest of the parties (positive), on the other. The same holds true, although with lower values, for Tucumán. With lower values, Córdoba offers the reverse: this time Peronism is on the positive side and the other parties are negatively associated. Buenos Aires and Rosario show no clear pattern.

d. A regular pattern, which is exactly the other side of the workers' coin, among professionals and students.¹¹ This similarity includes the same exception: APR in Buenos Aires and Rosario.

In order to take a closer look at the relationship between workers and FREJULI, we prepared table 4 showing how Peronist votes vary with the increase of workers in mesas from different zones. In spite of (a) different occupational profiles (Córdoba does not go beyond the 40 percent workers' limit while Buenos Aires and Rosario do not surpass 50 percent), (b) the fact that there are intervals without representation (in La Matanza and Córdoba), and (c) the diverse number of mesas that fall within each cell, there is a close relationship between an increase in workers' percentage and a parallel increase in Peronist votes. In Buenos Aires, La Matanza, and Córdoba the movement is perfect: Peronist vote increases as the percentage of workers becomes larger. Tucumán and Rosario show one exception each.

Looking at table 4, we can see that at the 0–9.9 percent workers-per-mesa level, with the exception of Rosario, there is practically no difference among Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Tucumán. At the 10–19.9 percent level, Buenos Aires and Tucumán again behave similarly, while Rosario offers unusually high Peronist votes. At the 20–29.9 percent level, the only one at which we have mesas from every zone, all districts show similar voting patterns, with Córdoba in the lead. At the 30–39.9 percent level, Buenos Aires ranks with Tucumán while Córdoba and Rosario stand together. However, both groups are not very far apart and offer reasonable uniformity, especially when compared with the following interval, 40–49.9 percent. In this case, Buenos Aires and Rosario are more or less in the same situation, a result now not only of Buenos Aires “normalcy” all along the line, but also of Rosario’s “anomalies”; Tucumán shows wide differences with both. The following levels, with 50 percent workers and more, are represented by mesas from La Matanza and Tucumán; they show the largest Peronist votes.¹² For the higher percentages of Peronist vote to be reached, the “critical” intervals seem to be the 30–39.9 percent and the 50–59.9 percent. The former in order to get 50 percent of the vote (note the exception of Córdoba), and the latter to get about 70 percent of the vote (the exception being Tucumán).

The above data are restricted to men’s votes in the March 1973 presidential election. What differences can be found examining female votes or other parliamentary elections? The results among women show patterns of association similar to those found in men, although with somewhat lower values. There are small differences between the “profiles” of UCR and APF obtained through presidential or senatorial elections, due to the fact that both parties attract (collect) minor parties’ votes.¹³ If we looked at the September presidential election returns, when Juan D. Perón himself was the Peronist candidate, we would find practically no change in the values of correlations with occupational categories among political parties which ran for both elections (March and September). There’s never a change of sign; most of the figures are practically the same; there are a few cases where the negative or positive relationship increases lightly.

APR’s absence from the polls does not seem to have altered the other parties’ fate either by reason of the proportionate distribution of their followers among them or because their following was not large enough. Our conclusions are: (1) workers stood strongly behind Peronism in March 1973; (2) whether due to sheer numbers (workers’ concentration), type of working class, history of labor unionism, or political/electoral past, workers showed themselves stronger for Peronism in some places than in others (notably La Matanza and Tucumán); (3) parties’ occupational profiles did not change much between 1946 and March 1973. There was still Peronism on one side and the rest of the parties on the other, basically attracting members from the same audience (with some internal transfers like those which seemingly took place between UCR and APF); (4) on rare occasions, two parties (APR and APF) seem to have made small inroads within Peronist “territory” (just like the Communist party in Buenos Aires in 1948, according to Germani’s data); (5) it is sometimes possible to distinguish, within Peronism, sectors that are clearly related to different occupational strata; and (6) from a methodological point of view, the classification of occupations

made possible by the sources at hand, although far from being a refined and/or completely reliable one, seems to lend itself to some use and offers consistent, if inevitably limited, findings through time.¹⁴

A caveat now. Our initial contention, which we believe we have been able to support, that the Peronist party had the backing of the majority of the workers in March 1973, does not prevent us from considering the issue from another angle. Workers do not account for the whole of the Peronist vote, nor are they always the majority of it.¹⁵ If we admit for the moment the following three assumptions—(a) that our data reflect reality reasonably well, (b) that absenteeism is the same for workers and nonworkers, and (c) that *all* workers voted Peronist—we can readily observe that in the city of Córdoba, for instance, the composition of the Peronist vote *demands* a 52 percent vote by nonworkers in order to reach the total Peronist vote.¹⁶ In Buenos Aires a 46 percent vote from nonworkers is necessary; in Tucumán and Rosario 35 percent, and in La Matanza, 28 percent. According to this, Buenos Aires and Córdoba do need about 50 percent of the nonworkers vote to reach the total Peronist votes, while the three remaining cities need about 30 percent, given the fact that we could include people in agriculture (*agricultores*) among workers in Tucumán and Rosario, getting these cities closer to La Matanza. In other words, although a majority of workers back Peronism, it does not necessarily mean that Peronism is in every electoral subdivision (province or whatever unit) largely a working-class party.

TABLE 1 Percentages of Occupations Held by Male Voters in Selected Mesas from Each Urban Area (Calculated Means)

Occupation	Buenos				
	Aires	La Matanza	Córdoba	Tucumán	Rosario
Workers	20.79	46.96	23.00	32.00	32.24
Own account workers	8.41	11.87	14.65	8.16	13.77
Technicians	4.96	3.39	3.54	3.22	2.25
Employees	28.35	18.75	22.64	19.90	20.42
Traders	8.04	8.21	5.66	4.49	3.77
Professionals and students	25.79	6.44	22.33	24.07	19.00
Proprietors	1.91	0.69	0.51	0.13	0.24
People in agriculture			5.18	5.14	6.37
Other*	1.75	3.69	2.49	2.89	1.94
N	5096	4200	4221	8366	3355

*None, unclassified, retired, etc.

TABLE 2 *Electoral Returns by Party in Five Urban Areas, Controlling for Sex whenever Feasible: Official Figures and Mean Values of Our "Samples"*

	Buenos Aires Men		La Matanza Men		Córdoba Both	
	Official	Authors	Official	Authors	Official	Authors
FREJULI	38.7	39.0	68.4	64.6	44.5	48.4
UCR	23.7	19.2	10.8	12.8	34.2	32.3
APF	14.6	16.6	6.1	6.7	10.4	9.3
APR	14.7	12.9	9.3	10.6	3.8	3.4
Votes	845,578	4,452	129,812	3,586	425,432	7,389

	Tucumán Both		Rosario Both	
	Official	Authors	Official	Authors
FREJULI	48.4	49.3	51.7	46.8
UCR	9.8	10.5	10.4	11.1
APF	30.0	28.8	30.9	35.4
APR	4.5	5.0	1.8	2.1
Votes	162,516	13,456	472,076	5,984

March 1973 presidential election, except in Rosario, votes for governor. The reader should bear in mind that we do not have a sample in a strictly statistical sense. Given the fact that we have calculated the vote for political parties as a percentage of the total sum of votes (including blank and similar votes), we have recalculated official figures according to the same criterion. In Córdoba, Tucumán, and Rosario we were not able to compare our figures with official ones since we could not get the latter by sex. We offer here, however, our data for male voting in those districts so that comparisons can be made in the future: Córdoba (47.9; 33.2; 9.2; 3.3; 3,642), Tucumán (48.6; 12.4; 26.5; 5.1; 6,727), Rosario (50.4; 12.2; 31.4; 2.2; 2,915).

TABLE 3 Rank Order Correlations (Spearman) between Men's Occupations and Vote in Selected Mesas from Five Urban Areas

	<i>Own Account</i>			
	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Workers</i>	<i>Technicians</i>	<i>Employees</i>
<i>Buenos Aires</i>				
FREJULI	.94	.85	-.51	.25
UCR	-.44	-.24	.52	.32
APF	-.81	-.84	.42	-.38
APR	.53	.47	-.05	.45
<i>La Matanza</i>				
FREJULI	.85	.62	-.72	-.86
UCR	-.87	-.38	.75	.81
APF	-.79	-.17	.66	.75
APR	-.91	-.40	.66	.76
<i>Córdoba</i>				
FREJULI	.86	.40	-.43	.43
UCR	-.73	-.43	.30	-.40
APF	-.48	-.33	.46	-.53
APR	-.38	-.03	.46	-.38
<i>Tucumán</i>				
FREJULI	.93	.07	-.71	-.57
FUP	.71	.15	-.52	-.27
PERONISM	.94	.04	-.72	-.56
UCR	-.84	-.15	.68	.42
APF	-.92	.17	.70	.60
APR	-.84	-.03	.57	.58
<i>Rosario</i>				
MID	.45	-.03	-.05	-.40
P.JUSTIC.	.03	.46	.32	-.22
PERONISM	.26	.12	.20	-.35
UCR	-.42	-.19	-.04	.56
APF	-.32	-.01	-.10	.31
APR	.54	.22	-.38	-.36

Table 3 (continued)

	Traders	Professionals and Students	Proprietors	People in Agriculture
<i>Buenos Aires</i>				
FREJULI	.11	-.94	-.66	
UCR	-.02	.38	.17	
APF	-.08	.84	.46	
APR	-.06	-.55	-.22	
<i>La Matanza</i>				
FREJULI	-.56	-.87	-.78	
UCR	.42	.79	.83	
APF	.62	.59	.65	
APR	.72	.81	.72	
<i>Córdoba</i>				
FREJULI	-.19	-.87	-.66	.42
UCR	.23	.66	.48	-.40
APF	.14	.59	.44	-.38
APR	-.09	.62	.17	-.25
<i>Tucumán</i>				
FREJULI	-.82	-.94		.88
FUP	-.64	-.71		.74
PERONISM	-.84	-.95		.86
UCR	.69	.83		-.82
APF	.82	.89		-.82
APR	.69	.87		-.80
<i>Rosario</i>				
MID	-.30	-.51		.78
P.JUSTIC.	-.30	-.12		.55
PERONISM	-.34	-.31		.78
UCR	.35	.43		-.75
APF	.31	.41		-.76
APR	.23	-.41		-.06

March 1973 presidential election, except in Rosario, vote for governor. Blanks indicate absence of a category or very few cases. APR is represented in Rosario by PRC (*Partido Revolucionario Cristiano*). Significant Spearman values, at 5 percent level, for each zone: Buenos Aires, .47; La Matanza, .53; Córdoba, .51; Tucumán, .36; Rosario, .59.

TABLE 4 Percentage of Peronist Vote in Men's Mesas according to Proportion of Workers in the Voting Population, in Five Urban Areas

%Workers	Buenos				
	Aires	La Matanza	Córdoba	Tucumán	Rosario
0-9.9	22.6 (6)		22.3 (3)	22.8 (6)	32.8 (2)
10-19.9	34.8 (3)			33.8 (6)	47.8 (1)
20-29.9	46.1 (3)	45.0 (5)	53.3 (10)	43.7 (1)	47.3 (1)
30-39.9	52.2 (5)		59.1 (2)	53.2 (6)	62.0 (3)
40-49.9	57.1 (1)			70.0 (4)	50.7 (5)
50-59.9		75.0 (5)		64.3 (3)	
60-69.9		77.1 (4)		77.3 (2)	
70-79.9				77.8 (2)	
Total mesas	18	14	15	30	12

March 1973 presidential election, except in Rosario, votes for governor. Figures in parentheses refer to number of mesas within each cell.

NOTES

1. This is part of a larger, ongoing research by both authors on 1973 Argentine presidential elections (Cámpora and Perón). See J. R. Jorrat, "Algunas notas sobre la correlación negativa entre voto al Frejuli y clase obrera," *Desarrollo Económico* 59, vol. 15 (1975); D. Canton, J. R. Jorrat, and E. Juárez, "Un intento de estimación de las celdas interiores de una tabla de contingencia (2×2) basado en el análisis de regresión: el caso de las elecciones presidenciales argentinas de 1946 y marzo de 1973," *Desarrollo Económico* 63, vol. 16 (1976). For another approach to the same subject, see M. Mora y Araujo, "La estructura social del peronismo: un análisis electoral interprovincial," *Desarrollo Económico* 56, vol. 14 (1975).
2. We worked with ecological correlations—based on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient—which only allow statements like the following: "In zones (polling places, electoral districts, etc.) with higher/lower presence of an occupational group, there is a higher/lower presence of votes for a specific party." The limitations of this tool are well known but new and old empirical findings may allow us to speak of "electoral behavior." It must be pointed out that we also made use of Pearson's coefficient, and that results were systematically consistent with Spearman's values. As Spearman's is an assumption-free coefficient, it will be used exclusively to present our results in this paper.
3. Zones were chosen because of their theoretical interest as well as for practical reasons. Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Córdoba are the most populated and industrialized cities in the country. La Matanza was selected not only because it is the most densely populated *partido* from the Buenos Aires suburban area (Gran Buenos Aires), but also on account of its very large working class concentration. Finally, Tucumán was included in preference to other equally important cities, like La Plata and Mendoza, because it had had—as Córdoba and Rosario—considerable social unrest in the years before the electoral contest.
4. We have had the opportunity, on another occasion, to address ourselves to the issue of the ecological fallacy (Canton, Jorrat, and Juárez, "Un intento") by using a methodological alternative to estimate the percentage of workers voting for Peronism. Other results, obtained by the same method, are presented later (see note 16). Another attempt was to use multiple regression analysis in order to investigate

- electoral tendencies as a function of the presence (or absence) of different occupational groups, but inevitable methodological problems, such as that of “multicolineality”—high correlation between the independent variables—conspired against it. As a matter of fact we do not work with several independent variables, but with several categories of a single one: occupation.
5. “Illiterate” zones had a high, positive correlation with Peronism, and an equally high, negative one with UCR and APF.
 6. We are greatly indebted to our colleague Miguel Murmis for the classification of occupations, to which he contributed a detailed knowledge of the 1960 and 1970 Censuses and of Argentina’s social stratification.
 7. See Rupert G. Miller, Jr., *Simultaneous Statistical Inference* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 216.
 8. Two different reasons might account for this, in part at least: (1) the peculiar situation of Peronism in Santa Fé, where two bitterly opposed factions fought, first, for their recognition as *the* official party’s candidates in the district, and second, once the issue was decided, for the favor of the electorate amid all sorts of legal maneuverings and verbal attacks (see *La Nación*, 9 March 1973, p. 10); (2) discrepancies between official data and ours, which could contribute to the “lowering” of correlations otherwise uniformly high between workers and Peronism. It is interesting to note, however, that if we add people in agriculture to workers, the correlation coefficient rises to .41, and the individual correlation between people in agriculture and Peronism mounts to .78, a value closer to these found with workers in the rest of the zones.
 9. Professionals and students were put together because we thought they belonged to the same occupational status; furthermore, when considered separately, no differences were found between their voting patterns. We even divided students by age groups (three), again no difference: the younger ones—presumably the “real” students—behaved like older ones—presumably professionals, whose occupational status had not been modified in the voters’ registers by graduation time. Even though this finding is far from conclusive, it calls our attention to the generalized assumption that younger students were a relevant electoral force in the Peronist victory of March 1973.
 10. Incidentally, the two Peronist factions present in Tucumán and Rosario showed different patterns of correlation with workers: FUP (Tucumán), considered a radical faction, .71; PJ (Rosario), a conservative sector, .03.
 11. The reader may have noticed that according to their voting patterns, voters could easily be separated in two large polar groups: workers, to which people in agriculture seem to gravitate naturally, form one. Professionals and students, joined by technicians (not in Rosario), proprietors, and traders (not in Buenos Aires or Córdoba) form the other. In fact, from this observation we can surmise that the category of *agricultores*, which we have translated as people in agriculture, is formed by a majority of rural workers.
 12. Calculations made in order to find out the *minimum* workers’ support under the assumption that all nonworkers had voted Peronist in March, gave an average of 58.7 percent in 9 out of 14 mesas from La Matanza, and 42.0 percent in 12 out of 30 mesas from Tucumán.
 13. It is worth pointing out that, in the case of Buenos Aires, the “truer” UCR vote is the one for senator, while in Córdoba the contrary holds good: it is in the vote for president that the “real” UCR can be found.
 14. The early work by Gino Germani is the first example of these attempts, when he correlated census and electoral data (*Estructura social de la Argentina* [Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1946]). Pedro Huerta Palau, who worked along the same lines shown here, coincided with him (*Análisis electoral de una ciudad en desarrollo: Córdoba, 1929–1957–1963* [Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, 1963]). See also Walter Little, “Electoral Aspects of Peronism, 1946–1954,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 15, no. 3 (August 1973). For a presentation showing that the association between workers and “populist” parties—UCR first, Peronism afterwards—is a feature that becomes stronger in Argentine electoral contests as we move from the Sáenz Peña

- Law (1912) on to the mid-century and after, see D. Canton, *Elecciones y partidos políticos en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973), especially chap. 6.
15. As an additional element we have estimated the proportion of workers who would have backed Peronism in March 1973, according to our mesas' data. Assumptions required by the method have not always been met, so that their value is merely indicative. The estimated proportion of workers voting Peronism in each zone were: Buenos Aires, 73 percent; La Matanza, 83 percent; Córdoba, 55 percent; Tucumán, 77 percent; Rosario, 77 percent. All zones, 79 percent. Córdoba, which has the lowest value, was where our data showed a poor fit when drawing a regression line between percent workers and percent Peronist vote from each mesa.
 16. Calculations were made thus: we divide people in each mesa (or zone) according to the dichotomy workers/nonworkers; then those figures are proportionally adjusted to the percentage of absenteeism in each mesa (or zone); finally, we calculate the percentage of each category as part of the total number of votes received by the Peronist party. The reader must bear in mind the operational definition of workers used here, which gives us a figure we believe rather plays down its real numerical strength. Lines between workers and nonworkers drawn from different perspectives could lead to other conclusions.