

plotting thoroughly the existing Russian memoir literature, the author in effect becomes editor and allows the "witnesses" of the events described to relate the story themselves, interjecting himself only to offer comment or analysis. In general the results of this rather unusual methodology are gratifying. Thus, for example, the author sheds new light on the celebrated Dogger Bank incident and also on the enigmatic personality of the Russian commander, Rozhdestvensky. Equally valuable are Westwood's conclusions on the causes of Russia's defeat, which he attributes primarily to the strategic inferiority of the Second Pacific Squadron and the greater speed of the Japanese fleet.

In view of the book's generally superb illustrations, the absence of any route or battle maps is surprising and regrettable. Much more serious, however, is the cumbersome arrangement of the reference notes, which are combined in an appendix with an otherwise excellent note on sources. Finally, there is a certain inevitable imbalance to the book because of its almost exclusive reliance on Russian materials. To offset this, interested readers may now consult the recent complementary study of Tsushima by N. F. Busch (New York, 1969) which is based substantially on Japanese sources.

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AUSSENPOLITISCHE FRAGEN VOR DER VIERTEN DUMA: EIN BEITRAG ZUR GESCHICHTE DES RUSSISCHEN PARTEIWESENS IN DER KONSTITUTIONELLEN MONARCHIE, INSBESONDERE DER STELLUNG ZUR AUSSENPOLITIK WÄHREND DES ERSTEN WELTKRIEGES. By *Margarete Wolters*. *Hamburger Historische Studien*, 1. Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag, 1969. 253 pp. Paper.

Professor Wolters's study makes two contributions to students of the political parties in the Dumas: (1) it provides an annotated bibliography of the major monographs on the subject by German, American, English, and Soviet scholars (29 pp.), and (2) it furnishes an extensive series of charts, maps, diagrams, and brief descriptions of the political parties in the Fourth Duma (37 pp.). Both will be found useful for ready reference. The substantive text—about 155 pages—is not as important.

The author begins by posing the two basic questions of what groups of Russians were interested in participating in governing Russia through their representatives in the Dumas, and whether the Duma played the role legally prescribed for it by the October Manifesto. Having stated the "basic questions," she never really comes to grips with them. The first question was, in fact, pretty effectively settled in the first three Dumas, primarily on domestic issues. The answer to the second question was largely determined by Stolypin's electoral coup, the use of section 87, and situations inherent in or developing because of World War I.

Professor Wolters, in addressing herself to foreign policy questions during the war period, somehow manages to avoid the distinction between foreign policy and military policy. The limits of the Duma's competence in military affairs were pretty well established in the Third Duma. It was the effects of Sukhomlinov's policy (or inaction) concerning the fortifications on the Vistula—rather than any desire by the Kadets or their opponents—which made a defensive operation impossible. This

is made abundantly clear in the August 1915 report to the tsar by the War-Navy Commission of the State Duma, as well as in other sources.

The author obviously has studied carefully the debates on foreign policy that took place in the Duma between December 18, 1912, and March 9, 1917. Her reporting of these is useful per se and also indicates some of the thoughts and feelings of the elements of Russian society represented in the Fourth Duma.

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THE RUSSIAN SEARCH FOR PEACE: FEBRUARY–OCTOBER 1917. By
Rex A. Wade. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969. vii, 196 pp. \$6.50.

The tragic story Professor Wade recounts has been told before, but never with such lucidity. Hewing admirably to his central theme—"the leadership of the Petrograd Soviet after the February revolution and the leaders' struggle to evolve a peace program, to get it accepted as government policy and to implement it internationally"—he narrates dispassionately the sad tale of hope and frustration, idealism and naïveté that transpired. Rejecting the solution of a separate peace, the Soviet elaborated a program for a general negotiated peace. But Russia's Allies and Imperial Germany were by 1917 resolved to continue the war to a decisive military victory. The commitment of the Provisional Government to the Soviet formula after the formation of the First Coalition in May was vacillating. Even the Allied Socialists wavered in their support of Russian Revolutionary Defensism, variously unwilling to accept wholeheartedly the Soviet proposals or unable to force their governments to consider the revision of war aims. The call to convene an international conference of socialists at Stockholm was abortive. Nor were the Soviet leaders vouchsafed the benefit of time to advance their cause at home or abroad. The Russian people's overwhelming desire for peace would tolerate no delay. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks, capitalizing on the paralysis of their opponents' efforts to end the war and on the popular impatience for immediate domestic reform, seized upon each successive internal crisis to build their following and undermine confidence in the government.

Whether or not the moderate socialists could have held the line against Lenin without the complication of the war issue will, of course, never be known. But with it their cause was doomed. In their fateful struggle were all the elements of high tragedy.

Wade's documentation is impressive, and his summation is judicious. A series of remarkably fine sketches of the revolutionary leaders made by Iu. K. Artsybushev at the Moscow State Conference in August 1917 adds to the appeal of this small but authoritative volume.

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KRONSTADT 1921. By *Paul Avrigh*. Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 271 pp. \$8.50.

In March 1921 the years of revolution, civil war, and foreign intervention in Russia came to a close. The rationalizations for the Bolshevik monopoly of power in wartime no longer applied, and oppositional elements agitated for restoration of the Soviet democracy of 1917. In his clear and energetic narrative Paul Avrigh de-