

notion of all-inclusiveness (124).

The conclusion of the book is that the volitional subject must review his system of values in the light of an absolutely-objective knowledge-content, namely, God or the totality of reality (140).

Anyone acquainted with philosophy will have no difficulty in recognizing this anthology of once-fashionable mistakes, culled in fairly equal proportions from Descartes, Hume, Kant and Hegel. The theology will be equally familiar to any reader of *Pascendi*. The jargon is at first disconcerting (within two pages we get the following hyphenations: 'knowledge-process', 'axiologically-loaded knowledge-contents', 'thought-structure', 'value-free', 'generically-objective', 'generically-human') but one soon learns to translate, e.g., 'axiologically-loaded' into 'biased' and 'knowledge-content' into 'belief'.

Amid this thicket of errors, there are some acute observations and interesting discussions, such as that of the temporal priority of emotive over factual discourse in a child's history (p.11), and that of the three types of values, human, social and individual (pp.88ff).

But to an English reader, the major interest of the book is in the constant references to South Africa (pp.31,36,56,90,94). Not that South Africa is expressly mentioned—we read instead of 'a suppositional individual A who lives in a multi-racial and multi-lingual country'—but it seems clear that what originally interested the author in his subject were the attempts made by practising Christians to rationalize their support for *apartheid*. To write even guardedly on these topics in South Africa at this time may well call for real courage. It is much to be regretted that Professor Pistorius' philosophical qualifications were not adequate to his high intentions.

ANTHONY KENNY

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, by D. W. Hamlyn; Routledge; 25s.

The preface suggests that a historical survey of a particular philosophical problem may provide an illumination not available in general histories. The history of the treatment of sensation and perception, extending from the pre-Socratics to the present day, has as its guiding thread an excellent refinement of Reid's distinction between the two, and the result is certainly better than I would have thought possible before reading this book, although still not entirely free from those pseudomorphisms which are the standard curse of stock-story general history: the field is still too large, in spite of the restriction of topic. Yet the treatment of the modern and contemporary period, and the general discussion contained in its last chapter, are quite irreplaceable, and endow the work with a value which goes well beyond its obvious minimal use as a starting point for discussion.

Throughout, the epistemological, the logical (conceptual) and the psychological (factual) strands of theories are meticulously distinguished, with the

usual assumption that the last two of the three shall never meet. On this basis the author is able to accuse Aquinas of turning Aristotle's conceptual analyses into psychological explanations. Should it turn out, however, that (as I think) Aquinas quite consciously renounces this divorce, at least in the form in which our contemporaries accept it, then the accusation needs to be modified. Incidentally, Aquinas' commentary (Lib. III, lect. 2) on *De Anima* suggests at least one way of removing Hamlyn's puzzlement (pp. 22-23) about Aristotle's statements on the mutual implication of hearing and sounding: 'actual' sounding would then be interpreted as *heard* sounding. True, the resulting conceptual co-ordinates are queer to our way of thinking, but this would be just another reminder of the necessity for that awareness of such distortions which Hamlyn is quite capable of displaying elsewhere.

The discussion on pp. 72-73 would have been improved if it had been made clear that for Descartes the divine guarantee applied to the Teaching of Nature (the instinctive impulse to believe) only insofar as it was incorrigible by the Natural Light (the faculty of clear and distinct ideas). As things stand, these pages suggest that Descartes held that God guaranteed the Teaching of Nature *tout court*, so that Descartes would be committed to holding that secondary qualities are in physical objects were it not for the fact that he considered God's veracity to be a 'weak consideration' (p. 73) at this point. In fact that veracity is, for Descartes, a *strong* consideration in showing that secondary qualities are *not* in bodies, and this insofar as the Natural Light, as opposed to the Teaching of Nature, is the object of divine guarantee. Again (p. 93), Berkeley did *not* reject the 'metaphysical notion' of 'substance', but only that of material substance, retaining spiritual substance. On the fifth line from the foot of p. x, 'perpetual' should surely read 'perceptual,' the 'fo' on p. 173 ought to be 'for,' and on line 28 of p. 195 one should, I think, read 'application of a scheme of concepts'.

DESMOND PAUL HENRY

THE WRITER'S DILEMMA, introduced by Stephen Spender; Oxford University Press; 12s. 6d.

This collection of essays originally appeared in *The Times Literary Supplement* under the non-committal title of 'The Limits of Control'. A number of writers were asked to assess their role in a society which values technological progress more highly than the good of the individual. The contributors included novelists such as John Bowen, Lawrence Durrell, Nathalie Sarraute, William Golding, Arthur Calder-Marshall, Saul Bellow and Alan Sillitoe; a philosopher, Richard Wollheim; a pontiff, Arnold Toynbee; and Gerald Heard, whose classification escapes me. The book is introduced with a rather limp essay by Stephen Spender (surely a more elegant way could be found of saying that one of the contributors writes both prose and verse than by calling him 'half novelist, half poet'), followed by a reprinted *TLS* editorial, written in the