RESEARCH METHODS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF DOMINANT CLASSES:
The Case of Landlords and Capitalists in Chile*

Maurice Zeitlin, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*
Richard Earl Ratcliff, *Washington University, St. Louis*

Capitalism is profoundly conditioned by the types of landed property and agrarian classes it confronts in its development, thereby determining fundamental features of the historically specific "social formation" that emerges in a given capitalist country. Such a social formation is not merely split into the constituent classes unique to the capitalist mode of production, but also incorporates, as Marx wrote of Western European capitalism, "strata of society which, though belonging to the antiquated mode of production, continue to exist side by side with it in gradual decay" (1967, vol. 1, p. 765). Or, as Joseph Schumpeter—certainly no Marxist—put it: "Any theory of class structure, in dealing with a given historical period, must include prior class structures among its data; . . . any theory of classes and class formation must explain the fact that classes coexisting at any given time bear the marks of different centuries on their brow" (1955, p. 111). Every concrete social class, therefore, is also an historical class, not a mere social category or analytic abstraction, and its existence depends on the particular history of the society of which it is a decisive constituent; and in that history, the protracted presence of agrarian elements has often been critical.

LANDLORDS AND CAPITALISTS

A century ago, Marx wrote that "wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social classes" which, "together and in

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their mutual opposition, [form] the framework of modern society" (1967, vol. 3, pp. 886 , 618). Japan and Germany are well-recognized instances, though often incorrectly understood, of the generic role of landowners in the process whereby the "upper" or "dominant" class under capitalism is formed. If Marx thought of the British dominant class as an "antiquated compromise" between landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and the Prussian as one which, by subordinating itself to the "representatives of ancient society: the monarchy and the nobility . . ., had degenerated into a kind of estate" (1953, p. 410; 1958, vol. 1, p. 69), the analysis of the development of capitalism elsewhere also reveals the enormous significance of landowners in the class structure. Even in France, large landowners, despite their formal abolition as an "estate" in the Revolution of 1789, continued to be at the core of her dominant class throughout the subsequent century; and in the United States, with its absence of a feudal past, capitalism, nonetheless, had to absorb an agrarian slaveholding aristocracy, whose descendants left their own peculiar stamp on America's dominant class. If, therefore, the manifold process whereby "economic" classes become "social" classes is a core *problematique* in class theory (cf. Giddens 1973), the relationships between and interpenetration of landlords and capitalists is one of the most important problems in the analysis of the structure of contemporary dominant classes. This, of course, is particularly important for our understanding of the nature of Latin America's dominant classes.

Furthermore, such an analysis bears directly on another set of complex theoretical issues and substantive questions. For there can be no doubt that in the course of the development of capitalism, the agrarian question and the specific nature of its resolution, particularly the cleavages and contradictions, coalitions and conflicts that have arisen among and between landlords and capitalists, has had far reaching historical reverberations. Varying in duration and timing from one country to another, there was a period during which these two dominant classes engaged in more or less continual struggle for social and political supremacy. They represented, as Max Weber wrote, "two social tendencies resting upon entirely heterogeneous bases . . . [wrestling] with each other" (1946, p. 373). Depending on the concrete historical conditions in each country, i.e., the particular pace, timing, and phase of capitalist development, its impact on the specific historical forms of landed property and agrarian relations, and how this coincided with the level of organization and political consciousness attained by workers and peasants, in a given international situation, the resolution of the struggle of these contending classes for social hegemony has had differing, but always profound significance. It has simultaneously shaped the particular nature of capitalist development itself, and the form taken, authoritarian or democratic, by the state (cf. Bendix 1964; Moore 1966; Neumann 1944; Norman 1940; Smith 1961; Zeitlin 1968). The advent of fascism in Chile is only the most recent verification of the fateful significance for democracy of a coalition between landlords and capitalists against the peasants and workers.

LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT THEORIES

Theories of development in Latin America, in varying degrees and differing phraseology, largely derive from their own specific imagery of the historic process we have been discussing. For the thesis prevails among Communist, Aprista, and Social Democratic parties, as well as liberal academic social scientists, that Latin America needs an "agrarian, antifeudal and national revolution." As Victor Alba, himself a Social Democratic proponent of the thesis, has put it: "What the Latin American who speaks of revolution would like to do is to establish a regime that is fundamentally *capitalistic* (that is, *opposed to the feudal regime of the landholding oligarchy*), politically democratic, economically mixed (with both public and private investment, and state planning), and socially capable of integrating the inhabitants of each country into a national entity" (1969, p. 314, italics added; also see pp. 141, 151–52, 191). Communist theoreticians in Latin America have argued that eliminating "the remnants (or predominance) of feudal relations of production in the majority of the countries of Latin America" (Mora 1966, p. 45) is the critical revolutionary objective. "The struggle against feudal survivals," it is explained, "is taken on by the proletariat from the standpoint of its own revolutionary aims, and this attitude explains why the national bourgeoisie must become an ally of the proletariat and not the reverse." The struggle, therefore, is not against "the bourgeoisie in general" as certain "ultra-leftists" maintain, but against "the fundamental enemy—imperialism and the large landowning oligarchy" (Giudici 1966, pp. 30; 41). Liberal theoreticians and academic social scientists have their own variants of the thesis. Typically, however, the urge toward "development" or "modernization" is said to come from unspecified "modern" groups or "sectors" or "marginal" or " new elites." Reference is made to actual social groups or collectivities in only the vaguest terms, as in the following formulation by Rostow: "The take-off usually witnesses a definitive social, political, and cultural victory of those who would mobilize the economy over those who would either cling to the traditional society or seek other goals. . . . The victory can assume forms of mutual accommodation, rather than the destruction of the traditional groups by the more modern" (1971, p. 58). This vague reference to real social actors is often transmogrified completely into an opposition between disembodied forms of "traditionality" and "modernity" (Hoselitz 1960; Nash 1963), normal vs. deviant psychological states (Hagen 1962) or ascriptive vs. "achievement" motivations (McLelland 1961). Rarely, though, there is at least the scantest reference to a concrete group: "A new elite—a new leadership—must emerge and be given scope to begin the building of a modern industrial society. . . . Sociologically, this new elite must—to a degree—supersede in social and political authority the old land-based elite" (Rostow 1971, p. 26). In its typical formulation, academic social scientists have argued that the "middle sectors" must challenge the landed oligarchy and seek to reorganize the social and economic structure in accordance with their modern values (Johnson 1958; Whitaker 1964). Celso Furtado has expressed another variant of the thesis in the following words: "The leading elements of industrial capitalism have not realized that the parasitism of the semi-feudal agrarian sector tends to hamper the industrialization process. . . . Since the industrial class has failed to become aware of its conflicts with the agarian class, it has no reason to judge this class on an independent scale of values" (1965, p. 118).

Similarly, John Gillin refers to a "social revolution underway in Latin America" (1958, p. 14) in which a decisive role is played "in most countries [by] two upper classes. . . . One of these comprises the members of the old landowning aristocracy or its remnants. . . . The other is what may be called a new upper class, composed mainly of self-made men and their families and descendants. . . . This new upper class runs or owns most of the larger business enterprises not controlled by foreign corporations. . . . The landed and the monied upper classes are often opposed in many of their interests. . . . In general, the new upper class is much more open to innovation from the outside world than is the landed upper class" (pp. 22–23). Federico Gil (1966) has specifically argued that this situation characterizes the class structure of Chile, the focus of our case study; here, in his view, coexisting alongside the landowning class, is a "new upper class, not nearly so tightly closed as the landowners," and to which many of its interests are opposed. This new class favors "higher living standards and the increase of the population's ability to consume," and is "much more receptive to innovations and appreciative of technology than the old aristocracy." The latter, Gil argues, "is chiefly concerned with the preservation of the semi-feudalistic *latifundio* system" (p. 24). Similarly, José Cademartori, then a leading theoretician of Chile's Communist party, and a member of the Chamber of Deputies, argued that "the working masses, the new middle strata, the *national bourgeoisie*, the *oligarchy*, and imperialism" constituted "the most adequate social categories" for the analysis of Chilean society (1968, p. 277, italics added). In answer to the question, "What type of revolution is necessary (*se plantea*) in Chile?" Cademartori answered: "An anti-feudal, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist revolution" (1968, p. 292). The Communists continued to hold this theory throughout Allende's presidency. For instance, Miereya Baltra, on the Communist party's central committee, referred (in November 1972) to the Unidad Popular program as one that "marks an anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic, anti-feudal transitional stage" (Baltra 1973, p. 2073, as quoted in Plotke 1973).[1]

Thus, otherwise antagonistic theories of development in Latin America frequently share similar, if not identical, premises concerning the class structure, and in particular, the common assumption that there are, in fact, two distinguishable upper or dominant classes, variously called "semi-feudal," "agrarian," "landowning oligarchy" or "land-based elite," on the one hand, or "national bourgeoisie," "middle sectors," "a new elite," "industrial class," "new upper class," or "monied upper class," on the other. In contrast, certain theorists, usually non-Communist Marxists, have argued almost precisely the contrary. Thus, Rodolfo Stavenhagen has written: "Although the latifundist aristocracy was eliminated by revolutionary means in some Latin American countries (however, always by the people, never by the bourgeoisie), there does not seem to be a conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie and the oligarchy in the other countries. On the contrary, the agricultural, financial, and industrial interests are often found in the same economic groups, in the same companies, and even the same families" (1968, p. 22). Similarly, Luis Vitale argues:

> The Latin American bourgeoisie was associated from the beginning with landholders. . . . Latin America is not a copy of nineteenth-century Europe, in which the new rising middle class had to overthrow feudalism to initiate the cycle of democratic-bourgeois revolutions. . . . The Latin America that gained its independence from Spain was governed, not by a feudal oligarchy, but by a bourgeoisie that, through its dependence on the world market, has contributed to the backwardness of the continent. This bourgeoisie is incapable of fulfilling the aims of democracy. . . . It is neither able nor desirous of achieving agrarian reform because all of the dominant classes are committed to the holding of land (1968, pp. 42–43).

To the question—"What . . . is the class structure in Latin America and how is the anti-colonial and class struggle to proceed to socialism?" —Andre Gunder Frank replies: "The latifundia 'oligarchy' has no independent existence and . . . we must in fact question the extent to which it is even identifiably separate from the commercial and now also industrial bourgeoisie" (1969, pp. 393–94). Frank, therefore, poses these questions: "Far from asking how isolated and 'feudal' this rural 'oligarchy' is, we must inquire how commercially the latifundista bourgeoisie (if it is rural at all) is tied to the major urban commercial and industrial monopolies; to what extent in fact landed monopoly is owned by the same persons, families, or corporations as commercial and industrial monopoly" (1969, p. 399). These are essentially the leading questions of this study, to which we attempt to provide relatively precise answers, based on a detailed empirical analysis of the relationships between landlords and capitalists in Chile in the mid-1960s. Further, precisely because this study is of such generic interest to Latin American specialists, and is directly relevant to central issues in theories of class structure and development, we shall present a detailed exposition of our research techniques and methods of analysis so that others may attempt replication of this study elsewhere in Latin America.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CLASSES

Underlying our study is the view that classes and class conflict are decisive elements in historical development, an understanding of which requires empirical analysis of these classes, related to the actual historic processes within which they have been formed. Our presentation here, nevertheless, cannot focus on these historic processes, which has been the subject of another study (Ratcliff 1973). Our quantitative analysis "freezes" social relationships which, in reality, are in constant social flux. Class formation is a process; classes are constantly implicated in both a given phase or "moment" of economic development that tends to constrict, stabilize, or spur their reproduction, and in struggles that shape and realign both their internal segments and the manifold relationships between them. Nevertheless, all social analysis requires us to abstract from certain processes, in order to permit us to isolate specific, essential, aspects of social reality for empirical investigation. We believe that knowledge of historically specific social classes, particularly of dominant classes, their concrete relationships and internal differentiation, is sufficiently scant to warrant our quantitative analysis of specific types of social relationships between landlords and capitalists in Chile, 1964–66. We are aware that by itself, as Barrington Moore, Jr., has argued, a quantitative measure "tells us little about social anatomy and its workings":

> In nineteenth-century Prussia the members of the bourgeoisie who became connected with the aristocracy generally absorbed the latter's habits and outlook. Rather the opposite relationship held in England. Thus if we did have a technically perfect measure of mobility that gave an identical numerical reading for the amount of fusion in England and Prussia, we would make a disastrous mistake in saying that the two countries were alike on this score. Statistics are misleading traps for the unwary reader when they abstract from the essence of the situation the whole structural context in which social osmosis takes place (1966, p. 37).

The truth in this admonition should be obvious. If we found considerable numbers of capitalists whose families owned large agrarian estates, our interpretation of this finding would depend not only on the absolute numbers of such ties, but also on their substantive nature. Their meaning would differ considerably if those estates, instead of being enduring and profitable economic enterprises which continue to be the basis of both economic and political power in Chile, were merely unproductive, status-yielding appendages of a stratum primarily devoted to industry. Still, it is important to determine the prevalence of certain phenomena in order to interpret their analytic importance. Instances of structural unions between landlords and capitalists which seem fraught with significance have varying theoretical relevance if they are infrequent exceptions or represent the general pattern.[2]

CHILE: RELEVANT SOCIAL CONTOURS

This study of the relationships between landlords and capitalists was undertaken in Chile because of her special theoretical relevance. Until the 11 September 1973 *putsch*, Chile had been a relatively stable parliamentary democracy. Chile had been ruled by parliamentary government, with neither foreign control nor the intervention of the military as a relatively *autonomous* social force, for over a century. Her "record of representative government [was] unsurpassed in Latin America" (Johnson 1958, pp. 72, 92); indeed, it was unsurpassed by few countries anywhere. Although foreign investments had a momentous impact on Chile's development, her class structure was not massively distorted and its principal contours have approximated the Western European pattern. Chile has had a "rather well diversified industrial structure" (Ehrman 1966, p. xix; also see Bohan and Pomeranz 1960, p. 3); and the proportion of her labor force employed in manufacturing is comparable to that in Italy and Japan, and not substantially smaller than other important industrialized countries of the early 1950s. Compared to Japan and Italy in the 1950s, Chile had a relatively smaller agricultural labor force, and was on a par with France.[3] Chile is predominantly urban and the mass of the population are urban wage workers and nonmanual employees (Petras 1969, p. 31).

The penetration and consolidation of foreign (first British, then American) capital in the nitrate and copper mines[4] severely affected Chile's development and limited the potential range and power of national capital. Nevertheless, Chilean capitalists were able to secure an independent economic base and maintain their social hegemony, largely because their formation as a class had preceded the ascendance of foreign

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capital. As early as the 1850s, as the economist William Glade has written, "a Chilean national bourgeoisie had come into being" (1969, p. 326). National capital (1964–66)—reinforced by selective state investment—controlled most nonmining industry, commerce, agriculture, and private banking.

The vast majority of productive property, outside of agriculture, was owned by corporations rather than other types of business enterprises; and, whether viewed in terms of overall aggregate economic concentration among all nonfinancial corporations, or on an industry-by-industry level, the Chilean economy, during the period encompassed by our study, was not unlike the "highly concentrated capitalist economies" (Bain 1966, p. 102) of other Western countries and Japan (see Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1975).[5] Indeed, Peter Nehemkis, writing as a member of the International Committee of the Chambers of Commerce of the United States, refers to Chilean businessmen as "members of that select company of men who are part of the mainstream of twentieth-century capitalism" (1964, p. 220). How, therefore, such "representatives of enlightened Latin American capitalism" (p. 220) are intertwined with the large landowners of their country, is of particular theoretical relevance.

In agriculture, the large landed estate dominated the Central Valley, whereas independent farming was predominant in the near south, and sheep and cattle ranching virtually comprised all agricultural activity in the deep south. In the early 1960s, Chile reportedly had one of the highest concentrations of land ownership in the world (Sternberg 1962, p. 34; CIDA 1966, p. 337). Official data (ICIRA 1966) on the holdings of the 1,067 largest agrarian estates in Chile's Central Valley (nine provinces from Aconcagua to Nuble), of 150 hectares or larger, measured in equivalent units of first class agricultural land, indicate the following: These 1,067 estates (*fundos de gran potencial*, or FGP), owned by 968 legally independent proprietors, constituted 1.7 percent of all farm holdings (*predios*) in the Central Valley but included nearly half of the valley's best agricultural land. That is, of 714,405 hectares in units of first class agricultural land in all holdings of one hectare or larger in the Central Valley, the 1,067 FGP estates held 46.9 percent. The Central Valley contains 29 percent of the nation's total agricultural land, 39 percent of the arable land, and 76 percent of the irrigated land (CIDA 1966, p. 44).

A NOTE ON THE HISTORICAL FORMS OF LANDED PROPERTY AND THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION IN CHILE

Our study of Chilean social economic history reveals no enduring fundamental cleavages between the dominant propertied families in the various economic "sectors." As the accumulation of capital led to immense fortunes for mine owners, bankers, industrialists, and commercial capitalists in the second half of the nineteenth century, business and political alliances and extensive intermarriage among these elements and large landowners overcame potential cleavages.

Furthermore, Chilean agriculture has neither a feudal present nor a feudal past. It was from its inception an agrarian system of production for national and international markets; yet it was not primarily capitalist production through the employment of wage-labor. Nor was the basic agrarian relationship between the direct producer and the landowner a "feudal survival." Rather, it developed in direct response to the intensification of production for the market, particularly of international grain markets, during the middle and late nineteenth century. The nineteenth-century enrichment and the continuing dominance of the large landowners was based on a particular historical form of exploitation of the agrarian labor force, primarily through "extra-economic coercion" and direct appropriation of the surplus product of agrarian labor. The exploitation of wage laborers was a secondary aspect of the agrarian class structure. Protecting this system of production has been an enduring primary aim and unavoidable objective for large landowners. It was necessary over the past century to attempt to maintain the social and political isolation of the resident agricultural labor force, secure state economic subsidies and specific exemptions from labor legislation, and above all, to prevent serious agrarian reform. Only in recent years did the largest landowners experience significant political setbacks in these efforts.

The recent deterioration in the relative political power of large landowners was preceded by a half century or more of deepening stagnation in agricultural production, whose causes we cannot probe here, which had a significant negative impact on the growth of the economy as a whole. Nonetheless, the particularly secure productive base in agriculture occupied by large landowners assured their continuing share in political power as a segment of the dominant class—even as they were increasingly challenged in recent decades by reform elements, some drawn from their own ranks, and the emergence of a significant working class movement led by Communists and Socialists (Ratcliff 1973, pp. 2–236).

THE DATA

Classes, unlike strata (by occupation, income, education, prestige, etc.) do not have precise boundaries. How are we to select capitalists and landowners for study? Substantively, our main interest is in their decisive

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segments: We want to know what the nature of the web of social relationships is between the principal capitalists and landlords. The size of the capital and land controlled is usually indicative of relative economic power and relative centrality in the political economy. On this assumption, we selected the universes for analysis as follows: (1) The officers (president, vice-president, general manager) and directors of the forty-eight largest nonfinancial corporations in Chile, measured by net capital assets, in 1964 (N = 284); (2) the officers and directors of the six largest banks, measured either by net capital assets or deposits, in 1964 (N = 69); (3) the largest individual owners of capital in these forty-eight corporations and the sixteen largest commercial banks, by criteria explained below, whom we also refer to here as "top investors" (N = 502); and (4) the owners of the 1,067 largest estates in the Central Valley, by criteria explained below (N = 968); these data were supplemented by data on the ownership of the 1,848 estates with the highest tax-assessed valuations in the country; (5) a sample of the "top landowners" in the country (N = 132), drawn from the two lists of "large landowners," selected by criteria explained below.

On the first two and fifth universes (i.e., the officers and directors of the forty-eight largest nonfinancial corporations and the six largest commercial banks, and the top landowners) systematic 1964 data were obtained on (a) the number and market value of the shares each held in these corporations and sixteen largest commercial banks; (b) the names of the bilateral relatives of each individual (primary through tertiary, and even more distant); the sources of kinship information and methods of analysis are explained in detail below; (c) a number of standard biographical and demographic attributes on each individual, primarily from various editions of the *Diccionario Biográfico de Chile*; and (d) the number of large estates (FGP) owned by each, or his relatives, in the Central Valley or elsewhere; and the total hectares in units of first class agricultural land each owned in these Central Valley estates. The other two universes (i.e., the top investors and large landowners) were treated differently. The kinship links of both to the bank and corporation executives were researched, as were the links between top investors and top landowners. We also obtained the market worth of the stock owned by each top investor, and the number of hectares owned by each large landowner who was related to any of the officers and directors in the bank, corporate, and top landowner universes.

No official list of the largest corporations in Chile was available when this study was initiated in 1966. There were 1,406 nonfinancial corporations registered with the Superintendencia de Cias. de Seguro, Sociedades Anónimas y Bolsas de Comercio de Santiago, for the year

1964, the most recent year for which reasonably complete data were available. The cost of reviewing the annual reports of all these corporations in order to obtain assets figures so as to select a group of the largest ones for study would have been prohibitive—especially given the disorganized conditions then prevailing in the files of the Superintendencia, many of which were incomplete. Therefore, the procedure utilized was as follows: From the 290 large corporations listed in the study of "economic groups" by Lagos (1961), the 50 largest were selected and ranked by their 1964 assets. Subsequently, it was discovered that two of these corporations dissolved after 1964; they were replaced to bring the number to 50 again. Research disclosed that necessary 1964 stockholder information was not available on four of these corporations; these were dropped. When 1966 data became available several years later on two of these firms, they were reincorporated in the study. Eleven of the 48 corporations were majority-owned by foreign investors. An official list of the two hundred largest firms became available in 1966; a comparison of our firms with this list showed a close fit, details of which are available on request.

What are the appropriate criteria by which to select the principal individual owners of capital? The major studies of the concentration of stockownership in the largest corporations in the United States and England (Goldsmith and Parmelee 1940; Gordon 1966; Florence 1961) focused on the twenty largest shareholders of record. In this sense, then, the largest owners of capital are those whose shareholdings rank among the twenty largest in *any* of the largest corporations. However, while an individual may *rank* among the principal shareowners of one corporation, the actual market worth of his holdings may be less than that of an individual in another corporation who does not rank among the principal shareowners. The situation is further complicated by the fact that an individual may have small blocks of stock in many corporations, whose aggregate market value may exceed that of any principal shareowner or individual with a large block of shares in just one (or a few) of the large corporations. This required us to have another criterion (aside from principal shareownership) by which to select the largest individual owners of capital.

For practical reasons, and to avoid the all-but-prohibitive research effort that would be required for complete information, we selected the largest individual owners of capital by the following procedures: We calculated the combined market worth (on the Santiago Stock Exchange in the last quarter of 1964) of the shareholdings in the top forty-eight corporations and sixteen largest commercial banks, held in their own name, by two types of individuals: (a) Any individual who held one of the principal shareholdings in these enterprises; (b) any individual who owned a single block of shares worth at least E50,000 in any one of these enterprises (even if it did not rank among the principal shareholdings in that firm). Utilizing these criteria and procedures to identify the largest individual capital owners, there were 502 individuals whose combined stockworth exceeded E100,000 in 1964, whom we defined as the top investors in the largest banks and corporations.

To select the largest landowners in the country, we used two sources: The basic source is the list referred to earlier of all holdings in the Central Valley of 150 hectares or over of first class agricultural land, or its equivalent. This list was compiled by the government's Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en la Reforma Agraria (ICIRA 1966), in collaboration with FAO. It was based on a detailed OAS-sponsored aerial photographic survey of the Central Valley, 1960–63. All the lands were classified into seven categories of cultivable and unarable land and single holdings converted into equivalent units of "basic irrigated hectares" (BIH).

The large landowners in this study, therefore, consist first of the legal proprietors of these FGP. This was supplemented by another list compiled by the Department of Internal Revenue, which listed the tax assessed valuations of all 1,848 agricultural properties of E40,000 or more, by legal proprietor, in the entire country, for 1961 (the most recent year for which such a list was obtainable). These lists were merged to provide us with a basic list of large landowners, but the primary source in our analysis is ICIRA's FGP list, a research source of extraordinary value for a study of class structure. Most estates on the tax list for the entire country were, in fact, located in the Central Valley: Of 1,848 estates of tax assessed valuation exceeding E40,000, 78.2 percent were in this area. Because of the precise estimates of the relative worth of each FGP in units of BIH, we were able to compile sums of the holdings of individuals and families who owned more than one such estate. The government tax list, unfortunately, while probably a relatively accurate listing of large landowners, could not be used with confidence to compile such sums. The internal revenue lists, not unlike the situation with property tax assessments elsewhere, are not reliable estimates of land values, either in absolute terms or relative to other properties in the same jurisdictions (Feder 1960; Sternberg 1962; Fellmeth 1973). Thus, in our analysis, large landowners consist of all legal proprietors of the estates on either the ICIRA or tax list. Estates owned by family partnerships (*comunidades*) were assigned to individuals determined by our research to be the dominant partners. In the tables that follow, ownership of an FGP estate is indicated separately from ownership of an estate on the internal revenue list, and the sum of basic irrigated hectares owned is given. Readers should bear in mind that these are equivalent units rather than real measures of land area, and that the greater the proportion of the estate's land that is in lower categories, the greater the disparity between relative worth and absolute size.

Our figures provide a precise measure of the relative worth of estates but distort the actual size of the estates considerably. Typically, in fact, the number of basic irrigated hectares is considerably less than the actual size of the estate. ICIRA, which calculated an equivalent unit based on seven categories of land, completely excluded all land not considered to be of agricultural use from the calculations. Vast marginal dry lands and hilly regions, which constitute an important aspect of land monopoly, that underlay the social domination of the landlords are not included in the calculations. As an instance, there is the estate of Francisco Bulnes Correa, who was also an officer or director in five of the top forty-eight corporations in the country included in this study. His estate in the municipality of Panquehue in Aconcagua province covered (according to Sternberg 1969, pp. 182ff.) 3,948 hectares (639 of which were irrigated), or 14.7 square miles, but is recorded on the ICIRA list as having only 312 BIH. According to ICIRA, the mean size of the FGP estates was 302.5 BIH, with a population of 227.5 inhabitants. In all, 28 percent of the total rural population of the Central Valley lived on the 1,067 estates belonging to the 968 large landowners listed.

THE TOP LANDOWNERS

We believe that the large landowners universe designated here (that owned an aggregate of at least 46.9 percent of all land in the Central Valley, not counting lands on the tax list located in that area which were not large enough to be included on the ICIRA list) constitute the decisive, indeed, perhaps the majority, "members" of the actual class of large landowners in Chile. Within this class, however, it was necessary, for purposes of analysis, to distinguish a smaller population on which systematic data could be gathered comparable to the universes of officers and directors of the largest banks and corporations. These top landowners were selected by a combination of random and purposive sampling procedures which, we believe, provide a close approximation to the actual universe of top landowners in the country. The methods of selection were quite complex and, particularly because many of the "sampling" problems encountered in compiling the list of top landowners also are of substantive interest, these will be described here in detail.

In Chile, the research began with a sample constructed as follows. From each of the lists, ICIRA's and the Internal Revenue Department's, the one hundred holdings with the highest values in basic irrigated hectares and tax assessed valuations, respectively, were selected. One hundred were then chosen at random from these two hundred holdings. To this sample were added all holdings ranking in the top fifty on each list that had not already been drawn in the sample. Some top holdings appeared on both lists, and some holdings on both lists were owned by the same individual. This yielded a sample of 125 top landowners.

This preliminary group was subsequently refined on the basis of extensive additional investigation of the full ICIRA list of 1,067 estates. The refining process involved the reranking of some of the top landowners and the addition of seven more individuals to the universe. It was in part made possible because of the extensive kinship information available at this later point in the research, which was not available when the original 125 top landowners were chosen.

One part of the investigation to determine the actual identity of the landowners involved an examination of all estates listed as held by a comunidad. In such cases, searches were made in biographical dictionaries and other sources to determine, when possible, which part of a given family, and which particular individuals within the family, claimed ownership of those estates which were listed as being owned by the partnership. Because of the prestige associated with estate ownership, such information is often provided in the biographical sketches. In cases where this information was located, ownership of the estates was assigned to the individual or several individuals (always either siblings or a parent and their children) who claimed ownership.

No attempt was made to assign ownership to individuals when the listed owners of the estates were corporations. The exclusion of corporation-owned estates, as well as those held by other institutional owners, does have an effect on our list of top owners since some of the largest estates are owned by corporations. The main problem that results is, however, one of ranking rather than of the omission of important landowning families. In our analysis of the stock lists of corporations that own estates we have found that most are controlled through either majority or dominant minority stockownership by families which include individual large landowners.

Another step in the refinement of the preliminary top landowner universe involved determining which large landowners owned more than one estate on the ICIRA list and making a sum of the size of each owner's total holdings of FGP estates in equivalent hectares. As already noted, the original sample of 125 was based on the largest single estates. Therefore, this further research increased the sizes of the holdings of some of the top landowners.

Once estates owned under family names had been attributed to individuals and all multiple estates had been identified and combined in a sum total of land holdings for each individual, the need for some other changes in the top landowner universe became apparent. First, some of the individuals originally included among the top landowners only because they owned top estates on the tax list were found to have land totals in the ICIRA FGP estates exceeding the size of the one-hundredth ranking landowner on the original ICIRA top one hundred list. These individuals were then reranked in terms of their ICIRA list holdings. Second, seven individuals were discovered who had been in either, or both, of the top banker and top corporation executive universes, but not among the top landowners, whose actual ICIRA land totals were large enough to rank them above the original one-hundredth ranking landowner. It was decided to classify these individuals as top landowners.

With the addition of these new data the final top landowner universe thus includes 132 individuals. All top landowners with Central Valley holdings, regardless of the list from which they were actually drawn, have been reranked according to the total size, in equivalent hectares, of all FGP estates they own. Ranked in this manner the universe contains 105 landowners whose total holdings are larger than the one-hundredth ranking individually owned single estate on the original ICIRA top one hundred list.[6] In addition there are 27 top landowners who had been included in the universe because they owned estates among the largest on the tax list but who either did not own FGP estates or else owned ones not large enough to rank them among the top 105 just mentioned. Only 5 of these 27 actually owned estates outside of the Central Valley. Of the 22 who did own estates in the Central Valley, 18 were found to own FGP estates of sizes ranking below the original one-hundredth ranking landowner. For unknown reasons, no FGP estates were found for the other four even though the tax list indicated that they were the owners of large Central Valley estates.

THE KINSHIP DATA

For substantive reasons explained below, kinship data are of profound importance in tracing the web of social relationships among landlords and capitalists. In a sense, the kinship analysis is one of the major elements of our study, and, therefore, it is useful to describe the actual research process and the formidable amount of work involved in gathering the kinship data. Referring to genealogical research as essential in the analysis of class formation, Schumpeter (1955) argued that "under capitalism, the lack of genealogical material becomes even more keenly felt" than for the analysis of precapitalist classes. "The lack of zeal with which social scientists gather and evaluate this material is in lamentable contrast," Schumpeter emphasized, "to the fact that it alone can provide a reliable knowledge of the structure and life processes of capitalist society" (p. 129). Original kinship data were collected on each of the officers and directors of the 48 top corporations and six largest commercial banks, and on the 132 top landownders.

Our kinship investigations, in collaboration with Lynda Ann Ewen, identified well over six thousand relatives of the 438 bankers, corporation executives, and top landowners. As might be expected, these relatives were very unevenly distributed among the individuals in the study, with some having large numbers of identified relatives, others having only their parents, wives, or siblings, and others having no identified relatives at all. However, in most cases some information was found. At least one relative was found for 388 of the 438 individuals. In terms of the separate universes, basic kinship information was located for 84.1 percent of the top landowners, 97.1 percent of bankers, and 90.5 percent of the corporation executives. Basic kinship information was found for *all* of the forty-three individuals who appeared in more than one of these three universes.[7]

Once the identification of relatives appeared relatively complete, we investigated the stockownership of the relatives themselves in the sixteen largest commercial banks and forty-eight corporations, and also determined if they were executives in these corporations or banks. We also attempted to determine all FGP estates that these relatives owned. We recorded the sum total of such landholdings and the basic irrigated hectares owned, either in single or in multiple large estates, by each landowning relative.

LANDOWNERSHIP BY THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF THE LARGEST BANKS AND CORPORATIONS

We begin with a simple question: Which of the bankers and corporation executives are themselves "top" or "large" landowners? When only the top landowners are considered, the number of landowners among bankers and corporate executives is rather limited. Of the 284 corporation executives, 13 (4.6 percent) were top landowners; of the 69 bankers, 7 (10.1 percent) were top landowners. Viewed alternatively, 16 of the 132 top landowners (12.1 percent) were also either top bankers, corporation executives, or both.

These findings are altered significantly when we consider their ownership of "large" estates. Table 1 shows all large estates owned by the top bankers and top corporation executives. For those who owned FGP estates, the total size of these holdings, in equivalent basic irrigated hectares, is presented. For individuals who owned only estates on the all-Chile internal revenue list, the fact of such ownership is indicated. However, all estates recorded in table 1, and in all tables that follow in the study, fall into the categories we have defined as "large."

TABLE 1 *The Value (BIH)*[1] of Land in Large Estates Owned by Bankers and *Corporation Executives*

	No Land	*Has Other Estates*[2]	*Number of BIH Owned* *150 –* 499	*500 –* 999	*1000 –* 1499	*1500* Plus	(N)	*Summary: Percentage Owning* Estates
Bankers	76.8	7.2	10.1	4.3	1.4		(69)	23.2
Corporation Executives	88.7	2.8	5.6	1.1	1.8		(284)	11.3

[1]Equivalent basic irrigated hectares, the standardized units used in the ICIRA study to represent the values of FGP estates.
[2]The "Has Other Estates" category includes those bankers and corporation executives who did not own any FGP estates but who did own "large" estates that were included on the all-Chile internal revenue list.

These data reveal that when the ownership of large estates is considered, over twice as many bankers and corporation executives are found to be large landowners. Among the corporation executives there were 11.3 percent who owned large estates. The bankers remain twice as likely (23.3 percent) as corporation executives to own large estates.

BEYOND INDIVIDUALS: THE FAMILY AS THE BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS

Based on the data in table 1, describing the bankers and corporation executives as either "considerably" or "minimally" tied to agricultural wealth would be largely a matter of qualitative judgment. However, it would be premature to make such a judgment at this point, since these data present only a severely limited perspective of social class integration. In fact, taken by itself, table 1 represents a typical analytical difficulty posed by quantitative research.

In the analysis so far the focus has been on the extent to which individual officers and directors were personally owners of agrarian estates. This has shorn them of their social context—of the intimate social relations in which they were involved—and has, therefore, provided us with only a highly limited glimpse of the social reality of class. Such atomizing of individuals can produce significant errors. For example, it would be clearly misleading to suggest that a corporation executive was not tied to agricultural wealth simply because he was not personally an estate owner, if in fact, he had close relatives who owned large estates. Including the close relatives in the analysis would obviously yield a more accurate picture of the individual's class situation. The importance of data on family context is widely recognized by social scientists. Typically, however, this awareness has led only to the inclusion of "variables" on "father's occupation," "father's education" or some composite measure based solely on the characteristics of one's parents. Such a research strategy may yield very inaccurate measures of class situation. In addition to cases where a father has pursued an occupational career that is ambiguous in class terms, there is the more general problem that in many families the wealth and prominence of one "father" is a poor indicator of the wealth and prominence of the family as a whole. Accurate determinations will remain elusive until data on family wealth and the occupations and other economic characteristics of each individual's immediate family and other close relatives are considered. It is not merely a question of concentrating solely on the attributes of individuals rather than seeking out the attributes of other members of their families. Such a distinction is artificial. An individual's ensemble of social relations is certainly an essential aspect of his life situation, just as are his occupation, his personal wealth and other of his "personal" characteristics. The task of the researcher is to specify as fully and as accurately as possible the aspects of the individual's family unit that are relevant to the analytic questions at issue.

For the *individual* can no more be considered the unit of class membership than his conduct can be understood in isolation from the ensemble of social relations, of which the family is the core, in which his experience is mediated and his peculiar individuality shaped. The individual's "class membership," as Schumpeter rightly argued, "is not individual at all. . . . The family, not the physical person, is the true unit of class and class theory" (1955, p. 113). Not only is the individual "born into a given class situation," as Schumpeter argued, but even when there is a radical shift in his class situation, through personal social mobility, that new situation is secured and his class membership certified by appropriate marriage for himself or his sons and daughters. The individual's own pattern of relations with others is decisively affected by the relationships in which his family is involved. Since families similarly located economically are likely to associate with each other more freely than with others, and therefore, to freely intermarry, "families and their mutual relations are . . . the stuff of a class system" (Sweezy 1953, p. 124). Social classes, therefore, "are constituted of freely intermarrying families variously located in the social process of production and system of property relations" (Zeitlin 1974, p. 1109).

This reasoning is particularly appropriate to understanding the internal differentiation and integration of "upper" or dominant classes. Everywhere, the United States included, dominant classes tend to have an extensive and tightly organized network of kin relations (see Goode 1963; Cavan 1963; Goode, *et al*. 1971). The families "at the top of the social class hierarchy," as Baltzell notes, "are brought up together, are friends, and are intermarried one with another. . . . The tap root of any upper class, that which nourishes each contemporary generation with a sense of tradition and historical continuity, is a small group of families who were born to that class, and whose ancestors have been 'to the manor born' for several generations" (1958, pp. 7, 9).

A variety of institutions specific to dominant classes, as we have noted elsewhere, "from debutante balls to select social clubs, resorts, and assorted watering places, as well as the 'proper' schools, colleges (fraternities, sororities, and 'living groups'), assure their commingling and psychological compatibility—and, therefore, differential propensity to intermarry. Protection of the family's property (and 'good name'), which injects a further note of caution in the selection of proper marriage partners, merely increases this 'natural' social tendency" (Zeitlin 1974, p. 1109). On those rare occasions when wealth does not marry wealth, as Lundberg remarks, "it is front page news" (1968, p. 25). Extensive intermarriage among propertied families is not only a consequence of close mutual interaction but also serves to create reciprocal obligations and loyalties and to buttress the economic foundation of class unity.

In the dominant class, individual and family status are virtually inseparable, for whether it is a landed or capital-owning family, the individual may "own" land or capital only insofar as he is a member of the family. Often, this is formalized, so that family property is held in common through family foundations, holding companies, trusts, and estates and, perhaps, a variety of eleemosynary arrangements; but even where much of the family's capital is legally dispersed among persons, individual members of the family "in good standing" benefit from the fortune as a whole, and are potential heirs of each others' personal holdings, which are each "a slice from a single source" (Lundberg 1968, p. 163). By necessity, individual members of the family have a common stake in the family's combined interests; and "there is an intertwining of interests and controls that give pragmatic nourishment to the emotional ties that already exist" (McKinley 1964, p. 24). The very boundaries of the "family" may not be clear in the dominant class, as is particularly evident from the precision with which inheritance rights are defined in the legal systems of capitalist countries, extending as far as quinary relatives, by consanguinity or affinity, and beyond (Rheinstein 1967). For this reason, it may not only be "quite arbitrary in many cases to speak of a person as representing a single fortune," as Lundberg has correctly pointed out, but also equally arbitrary to see the nuclear family as the basic kinship unit in the dominant class.

Writing of the "upper-upper class family" in the United States, Cavan (1963, pp. 96–97) has made this clear:

> The upper-upper class family has not only historical continuity but also functioning lateral relationships. It consists of nuclear units closely interconnected by blood ties, marriage, the past history, and present joint ownership of property. The great family thus includes uncles, aunts, and cousins of various degrees of closeness, organized into conventional nuclear units but functioning also as a large kinship family. Moreover, the tendency of members of the small upper-upper class to marry within the class—even within the larger family, as cousin with cousin—has created a complicated system of relationships, so that it often may be truthfully said that the entire upper-upper class in a given community tends to be a related kinship group. . . .
>
> In the kinship family, the ties of loyalty are very strong. *One is a member of the kinship family first, of the small-family unit second*. Family organization therefore tends to be on a kinship rather than a marital basis, with the headship resting in the oldest person or in a group of collateral elders. . . . The elders wield great power over both adult and youthful descendants, often determining such matters as type and place of education, occupation, and selection of the spouse. If, as often happens, they hold the joint family property and wealth, they possess an enormous authority since they may control the amount of income of younger members. The middle-aged men who, in other social classes, would be independent heads of their small families and control their own social and economic destinies, in the upper-upper class may still play the role of dependent sons to their old parents (italics added).

It should be evident, then, that a method of analysis and types of data are necessary which allow us to identify the extent of the relationships between large landowners, principal owners of capital, and the officers and directors of the largest corporations, by considering them not as individuals alone, but as members of families and larger kinship units. If they are joined by a multiplicity of kinship ties, we ignore such analysis at the risk of profound distortion of the actual (and potential) relationships that bind the top bank and corporation officers and directors and principal owners of land and capital into a relativley cohesive social class. Decades ago, Lundberg wrote that "the wealthiest Americans, with few exceptions, are already joined by a multiplicity of family ties, just as they are joined by interlocking directorates and mutual participations in economic and social undertakings. The 'community of interest' of the rich to which the elder J. P. Morgan made profound public obeisance has become, to a startling degree, a joint family interest" (1946, p. 9). That important observation on the structure of the American capitalist class has yet to be followed up by a systematic empirical study, though many social scientists have permitted themselves, without evidence, to claim that this class has disintegrated through the combined effects of undisciplined romantic love, taxation, and stock dispersion. One reason for the absence of such a study is clear: It would be enormously difficult, tedious, and time-consuming (as was our own).

As Lundberg observed, kinship relationships among wealthy families "are so numerous, and intertwine at so many points with one another, that to survey them all would turn this into a genealogical study" (1946, p. 12). In our effort to provide a precise and unambiguous criterion of common class membership in the extent to which bankers, corporation executives, and the principal owners of capital and land in Chile were intermarried, it was, in fact, necessary, at least in part, to do just that. We conceptualized each individual as being at the center of a web of kinship relations; there is a measurable distance between him and each relative, and between all relatives, in kinship "links." As Murdock (1949, p. 94) explains: "Every normal adult individual in any society belongs to two nuclear families, the family of orientation in which he was born and reared and the family of procreation which he establishes by marriage." This means that the individual "forms a link" between these two nuclear families, and a "ramifying series of such links binds numbers of individuals to one another through kinship ties." In measuring the kinship relationships of the officers and directors of the largest banks and corporations and the principal owners of land and capital, we have followed this terminology. In many cases, given the marital maze, any two individuals may be united in kinship through several different individuals, so that the number of kinship links between them would vary, depending on the path traced. Therefore, the kinship "distance" between any two individuals in this study has been stated as the *minimum* number of kinship links between them.

We shall use the terms "immediate family" and "primary relatives" interchangeably to refer to those who are in a particular individual's two nuclear families: Parents and siblings in the family of orientation, and spouse and sons and daughters in the family of procreation. The kinship distance between Ego and any primary relative is, of course, one link, which means that relationships established through marriage (as with one's spouse) are equated, by this method of measurement, with relationships through common descent. Each primary relative also has primary relatives, most of whom are not Ego's own primary relatives (only unmarried siblings have the identical set of primary relatives). These are Ego's "secondary relatives," at two kinship links distance: Grandparents, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces, in-laws, and grandchildren. Each secondary relative, in turn, has primary relatives who are neither Ego's primary nor secondary relatives, and whom we term "tertiary relatives," at three kinship links distance. These include Ego's first cousins, great grandparents, great grandchildren, great aunts and uncles, the parents of the spouses of one's children, the spouses of uncles, aunts, nieces and nephews, etc. The system of linkages can be continued systematically to distinguish quarternary relatives (like first cousins once-removed) and quinary relatives (like second cousins). Following Murdock, we refer to "all who are more remote than tertiary relatives as distant relatives" (1949, p. 95); and we shall use the term "close relatives" or "close family" to designate all relatives within three kinship links. We might also note that it not only facilitates exposition but our method also makes it quite permissible to speak of the individual and the family in terms of each other, if not interchangeably. For instance, a given individual who is personally a large landowner may be said, for that reason, to "belong" to a large landowning family, just as, even if he were not personally a large landowner but one or more of his primary relatives was, it would be equally correct to speak of him as belonging to a large landowning family.

A hypothetical illustration of how the kinship and economic data have been combined is provided in diagram 1. Here the focus is on one male member of the family, Ego. The number within the symbol of each relative (e.g. △3 or ②) indicates the minimum number of kinship links that separate that individual from Ego.

Our intention has been to determine the individual's class situation and the kinship data make it possible to examine the centralization of capital and land ownership within the family structure—a centralization that might not be at all apparent were we only to look at individuals. Our methods for clearly defining both the center and the outer limits of each family unit permit us to carry out a precise empirical examination of the degree of centralization of ownership of the means of production within different families. As will be demonstrated below, such centralization can be studied within the immediate family, among secondary relatives, and among all close relatives. This method of kinship analysis also makes possible a comparison, using basic multivariate techniques, of the families of all members of each universe. Such a comparison would not be possible if relatives were included without regard to the distance of the kinship relationships. The result would be family units that were not comparable. We would be led to the rather uninformative finding that larger family groups tend to own more economic resources. For example, in *Los Que Mandan*, José Luis de Imaz (1970) identifies eighty-two "family groups" among the largest landowners in Argentina which are apparently defined

Diagram 1 Illustration of Kinship Relations, Measured in Kinship Links, Between Hypothetical Individual (Ego) and Selected Relatives in Each Universe



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only on the basis of "basic surnames." While acknowledging the imprecision of his methods ("members of the groups may be only distantly related") he nevertheless uses these "basic family groups" as a means to analyze the integration of agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises.

KINSHIP RELATIONS BETWEEN LARGE LANDOWNERS AND BANK AND CORPORATE EXECUTIVES

We have seen that 11.3 percent of the executives of the forty-eight largest corporations and 23.2 percent of the bankers were personally owners of large agrarian estates. Here, landlords and capitalists are precisely the same individuals. The critical analytic problem, however, as we have argued, is to identify the class situation of the bankers and industrialists by locating them within the ensemble of social relationships and overriding commitments of their immediate families and close relatives. The question, in other words, is the extent to which they belong to large landowning families, even if they are not themselves the owners of large estates.

In order to answer this question, two different but directly related sets of variables were constructed to measure the relative proximity of each banker and corporation executive to large Central Valley estates. Both sets of variables are based on the system of kinship links elaborated. For the first set a determination was made of the number of the individual's close relatives (i.e., through tertiary relatives) who were owners of large Central Valley estates. In this variable set, we identify the total number of relatives within a specified number of kinship links who were among the 968 owners of the 1,067 FGP estates.

In the second set of variables, a sum has been made of the total *amount of land* in basic irrigated hectares held by the respondent and by these estate owning relatives. For both sets of measures, duplications in estate ownership that could distort relationships were removed. For instance, in several cases two or more individuals who were brothers jointly owned a single estate or a group of estates. In such instances each of the individuals was credited with owning the total amount of land included in the estate or estates, but the same land and its co-owner were not counted again as being one link away from each of the joint owners. That is, each of these individuals appears as an estate owner, but *without any estate owning relatives*, unless, of course, they actually had other relatives who owned estates. In instances of estates jointly owned by two or more close relatives of a banker or corporation executive, the estates were assigned to the owner who was most closely related to this individual. In the first set of variables, which deal with the number of estate-owning relatives, the number of estates they own is not distinguished. The total amount of land in all of the estates held by such a relative is given in the second set of variables.

These variables are shown in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the number of large landowners who are close relatives of the bankers and corporation executives. Table 3 gives the total amount of land held by the individual and his relatives. In each table the findings are reported for primary, secondary, and tertiary relatives.

We see here a remarkable demonstration of the necessity of investigating an individual's kinship relations in order to understand his actual class situation, and of the extent to which propertied families have an economic base that spans agriculture and industry. Taking account of kinship relations makes a profound difference in the extent of observable social integration between the functionaries of capital in large banks and corporations and large landowners. Thus, the earlier tentative finding is significantly altered by our kinship analysis. For example, whereas, as we have seen, 11.2 percent of the corporation executives owned large agricultural estates, we now see that many of these same landowning corporation executives also had close relatives who were landowners, and most important, many corporation executives, who personally did not own large estates, did have estate owners within their close families. The increase in observable social integration with large landowners is modest when only primary relatives are considered, but rises as more relatives are included. Among the top corporation executives, 16.2 percent had estates in their immediate families. Among the top bankers, the figure is 27.5 percent. Including data for secondary relatives, the figures are respectively, 22.5 percent and 34.7 percent; and, including the full range of close relatives, we find that 30.6 percent of the corporation executives and 42.0 percent of the bankers were in large landowning families.

It should be noted that some bankers and corporation executives were closely related not merely to one but several large landowners. Thus, 20 percent of the bankers and 13 percent of the corporate executives had three or more large landowners within their close families.

The distribution of the vast amounts of land in BIH owned by the close landowning relatives of the bankers and corporation executives is shown in table 3. Considering close relatives, 14.4 percent of the corporation executives were in families that owned at least 1,000 BIH. Among bankers, there were 21.7 percent with close family land totals over 1,000 BIH. Thus, we find that a sizable minority of the principal functionaries of capital in the largest banks and corporations are bound by a web of kinship relationships to the heights of landowning wealth.

It should be emphasized that focusing too narrowly on the literal

TABLE 2 The Number of Close Relatives of Bankers and Corporation Executives Who Were Large Landowners, by Kinship Distance

	Number of Relatives within Immediate Family Who Were Large Landowners[1]						
	No Land	Ind. Only has Estates[1]	1–2	3–4	5 Plus	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land Ties[2]
Bankers	72.5	17.4	10.1			(69)	27.5
Corporation Executives	83.8	8.1	7.4	.7		(284)	16.2

	Number of Relatives within Secondary Family Who Were Large Landowners[1]						
	No Land	Ind. Only has Estates[1]	1–2	3–4	5 Plus	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land Ties[2]
Bankers	65.2	13.0	14.5	7.2		(69)	34.7
Corporation Executives	77.5	5.6	12.7	3.9	.4	(284)	22.5

	Number of Relatives within Close Family Who Were Large Landowners[1]						
	No Land	Ind. Only has Estates[1]	1–2	3–4	5 Plus	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land Ties[2]
Bankers	58.0	8.7	13.0	10.1	10.1	(69)	42.0
Corporation Executives	69.4	3.9	13.7	8.8	4.2	(284)	30.6

[1]These data indicate the number of relatives of bankers and corporation executives who own large estates. In addition, the data indicate which bankers and corporation executives do not have close relatives at the specified distance who own land but who nevertheless own large estates themselves. These individuals are listed in the "Individual Only Has Estate" category. However, if secondary or tertiary large-landowning relatives are located, the top individuals are then recategorized according to the number of such relatives.
[2]The "Summary: Percentage with Land Ties" includes all bankers or corporation executives who either own a large estate themselves or have one or more relatives at the specified distance who own large FGP estates.

TABLE 3 *The Value (BIH)[1] of Land in Large Estates Owned by Bankers and Corporation Executives and Their Close Relatives*

	Agricultural Wealth within Immediate Family[1]						
	No Land	*Ind. Has Other Estate*[2]	*150 – 999*	*1000 – 1999*	*2000 Plus*	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land Ties*[3]
Bankers	72.5	7.2	15.9	2.9	1.4	(69)	27.5
Corporation Executives	83.8	2.5	10.2	3.2	.4	(284)	16.2

	Agricultural Wealth within Secondary Family[1]						
	No Land	*Ind. Has Other Estate*[2]	*150 – 999*	*1000 – 1999*	*2000 Plus*	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land Ties*[3]
Bankers	65.2	5.8	20.3	4.3	4.3	(69)	34.7
Corporation Executives	77.5	1.8	13.4	4.6	2.8	(284)	22.5

	Agricultural Wealth within Close Family[1]						
	No Land	*Ind. Has Other Estate*[2]	*150 – 999*	*1000 – 1999*	*2000 Plus*	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land Ties*[3]
Bankers	58.0	4.3	15.9	8.7	13.0	(69)	42.0
Corporation Executives	69.4	.7	15.5	7.4	7.0	(284)	30.6

[1]Agricultural wealth is measured in equivalent BIH and is equal to the total value of all FGP estates owned by the individual and his close relatives who are within the specified distance (that is, within either one, two, or three kinship links) from him.
[2]See note 2, table 1.
[3]The "Summary: Percentage with Land Ties" includes all bankers and corporation executives who either own a large estate themselves or who have one or more relatives within the specified distance who own large FGP estates.

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landowners. Tabular presentation of such findings scarcely communicates the fine weave of relationships that bind them. For around each of the officers' and directors' close relatives who were large landowners, there was ordinarily another set of close relatives who, by that criterion, were therefore also close relatives of a large landowner, whatever their personal ownership of land. Thus, even the statement that an officer or director had as many as three close relatives who were personally large landowners considerably understates the actual number of his close relatives who had a stake in the protection and advancement of the common interests of landowners and capitalists.

This also indicates that limiting the range of our analysis to tertiary relatives may arbitrarily exclude other relatives whose membership in the individual's kindred is critical. The fact is that our method of computing the distance between relatives in kinship links is *more restrictive* than the method ordinarily employed in common or canon law. While our links and their degrees coincide for lineal relationships, they do not for collateral relationships. For instance, a first cousin is three links from ego in our system but only two degrees from ego in common and canon law. A second cousin is *five* links from ego in our system (and, therefore, *excluded* in our analysis) but only *three* degrees in common and canon law. Thus, collateral relatives who are customarily considered close in these formal codifications for purposes of determining proper lines of inheritance and intermarriage proscriptions in the West are defined by our system as distant. Therefore, our findings are a *minimal* estimate of the extent of the integration through kinship of the officers and directors of the largest banks and corporations and large landowners into the same social class.

An increasing number of close landowning relatives demonstrates, with growing certainty, the important position of an individual's family among large landowning families. It might be that we should interpret the measure as having an underlying exponential function. If an individual owned a large estate personally or had a single estate-owning relative, it might be argued that the family's one landowner might be the result of the "success" and social mobility of just that one individual. However, as the number of large estate owners in a single family increases, even to two or three, it becomes increasingly obvious, given the size and decisive significance of these large agrarian estates, that the family unit has a major, broadly based economic stake in large landed property.

It should also be emphasized that although these variables are cumulative measures of family landholdings there are no intrinsic methodological reasons why the number of large estate owners in a family should increase as the network is extended through tertiary relatives unless there is, in fact, an extensive web of kinship relationships between the officers and directors of the top banks and corporations and the largest landowners in the country. We are, after all, investigating only a limited number of principal functionaries of capital to see whether they are related to *less than 2 percent* of all landowners—the largest in the country. By increasing the distance within which relatives are considered, we might merely be including more relatives and not more relatives who were also large landowners.

In contrast to the image of a fundamental social cleavage between two upper classes, one feudal and one capitalist, we have found a sizable number of families that bind them together by intimate social relations—by the most precise and unambiguous criterion of common social class membership, namely, close family connections. Around these connections, certainly, are a host of other common ties and social commitments that unite them and bind them into a cohesive social class. The complex pattern of extensive intermarriage among propertied families both results from, and, in turn, reinforces and extends, a web of social interaction and of mutual obligations and loyalties. Already sharing common interests, based on their common location in the productive process and propertied system, they are, thereby, unified into a social, rather than merely "economic," class.

A critical question not yet dealt with is the extent to which the propertied families themselves are interrelated with each other. Do some of these families belong to relatively distinct clusters of interrelated networks of families? Is there a core or tap root of the class that unites and provides a foundation for the class as a whole?

THE MAXIMUM KINSHIP GROUP

In order to determine the extent of interrelationships among propertied families, their relative positions in their class, we have conceptualized what we refer to as the "maximum kinship group."

By maximum kinship groups within the dominant class, we refer to one or more mutually exclusive sets of interrelated *families*, between whom, although each *individual* may not be a close relative of every other individual, there are close kinship relationships. Relationships linking individuals in the maximum kinship group may be established through the intervening relationships of a series of families of the individuals in the distinct universes. Of course, the maximum kinship group does not incorporate all close relatives of all individuals in the group, but only those who are within a specified distance from any given individual. (We have established the rule that such relatives are included within the maximum kinship group only if they are at most quarternary [within four kinship

TABLE 4 *Maximum Kinship Groups and Their Distribution among Bankers, Corporation Executives, and Top Landowners*

		Distributions within Subuniverse Pure Types							Percentage Distributions within Universes		
Family Names	*Total Number of Top Ind. in Kinship Group*	*Top Landowners Only*	*Bankers Only*	*Corporation Executives Only*	*Bankers and Landowners*	*Corporation Executives and Landowners*	*Bankers And Corporation Executives*	*Bankers, Landowners, And Corporation Executives*	*All Top Landowners*	*All Bankers*	*All Corporation Executives*
Individuals in Unrelated Families	213	48	21	131	2		10	1	38.6%(51)	49.3%(34)	50.0%(142)
Central Core Kinship Group	143	45	8	67	1	5	14	3	40.9%(54)	37.7%(26)	31.3%(89)
Yarur-Said-Hirmas	18			13		4	1		3.0%(4)	1.4%(1)	6.3%(18)
Simonetti-Barbaglia	4			4							1.4%(4)
Sumar	4			4							1.4%(4)
Hott-Hoelck-Buhler	3		3							4.3%(3)	
Murillo-Nebel-Soffia	3			3							1.1%(3)
Vicuña Correa-Donoso[1]	4	3		1					2.3%(3)		.4%(1)
Marin Larrain-Estevez	3	3							2.3%(3)		
Urrutia	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Mardones Restat[1]	2			1			1			1.4%(1)	.7%(2)
Sotta Barros-Rodriguez de la Sotta	2		1	1						1.4%(1)	.4%(1)
Diaz Boneu	2			2							.7%(2)
Fernandez Zegers	2	1		1					.8%(1)		.4%(1)
Gutierrez Alliende-Yrrarazaval Rojas[1]	2			2							.7%(2)

Riesco[1]	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Schmutzer	2			2							.7%(2)
Serrano Mahns-Mahns Choupay–Gilde-meister Becherel[1]	4			4							1.4%(4)
Vidal de la Fuente	2			2							.7%(2)
Catan Davique	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Correa Armanet-Encina Armanet	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Petrinovic Wadsworth	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Ruiz	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Lira Vergara-Ruiz Tagle de Conrads[1]	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Azocar Alvarez-Bustamante Pinto	2	2							1.5%(2)		
Silva Barros-Silva Fernandez	2			2							.7%(2)
Meller Gram	2		1	1						1.4%(1)	.4%(1)
Gellona	2			2							.7%(2)
Garcia Vela-Picó, Cañas-Dominguez Rielo[1]	3		1	1			1			2.9%(2)	.7%(2)
	439	116	35	245	3	9	27	4	(132)	(69)	(284)

[1]Inconclusive kinship information indicates membership in the central core kinship group.

links] relatives of a given individual in any one of the three universes.) Obviously, then, maximum kinship groups may be of vastly different size, in number of actual members included, and of distinct internal structures, i.e., in terms of the types of kinship relationships between its members. There may, in fact, be no kinship ties between the families of a given individual and others in any of the universes considered. For any such individual, the maximum kinship group includes just close relatives, plus other relatives who are exactly within the limit (four kinship links) of kinship distance established. To avoid confusion, these types of kinship groups will be called "unrelated families." "Maximum kinship group" will be used to refer only to kinship groups consisting of two or more interrelated families of individuals in any universe. Our specific definitional procedures for including individuals in a maximum kinship group are as follows: (a) All top landowners, bankers or corporation executives who were found to be related to each other through known and specifiable kinship links, affine or consanguine, within the distances specified below; (b) all of the close relatives of each of the interrelated individuals in the group; (c) any additional quarternary relatives of the interrelated individuals already included. Thus, to be included in a maximum kinship group, each top landowner, banker or corporation executive either had (a) at least one other individual in any of these three universes in the group to whom he was related, within four kinship links, or (b) a relative in common with at least one other individual in the group, with the relative being related to each of the two top individuals within four kinship links.

In accordance with these criteria, we found that, of the 438 individuals in the three overlapping banker, corporate, and top landowner universes, 225 were included in 28 separate maximum kinship groups. The other 213 individuals were found to have no family interrelationships with other individuals in any of the three universes, and, therefore, belonged to "unrelated families." The size and composition of each of these maximum kinship groups are shown in table 4. Each group, except for the largest one, which we term the "central core," is identified by the names of the predominant families included.

The most striking discovery, revealed in table 4, is the monumental size imbalance among the different maximum kinship groups. There is one preeminent maximum kinship group of interrelated families, which includes 31.2 percent of the corporation executives, 37.7 percent of the bankers, and 40.9 percent of the top landowners. All of the other groups are far smaller. Only one other kinship group contains more than four individuals in any one universe.

As noted, the large maximum kinship group has been labeled the "central core" kinship group, a term used in part because the group includes those families that appear, by virtue of their present economic position, to be at the very center of class ownership and control of the means of production, whether land or capital, in the modern era. Moreover, even a brief review of this core group reveals that it incorporates many of the families which, in previous generations, were dominant in the economy. Detailed evidence concerning the historical importance of these families is presented elsewhere (Ratcliff 1973, chap. 11).

MAXIMUM KINSHIP GROUPS AND LANDOWNING WEALTH

Obviously, the central core kinship group includes a large proportion of the top landowners. No other kinship group includes even a tenth as many top landowners. However, in order to understand the central core group's importance among large landowners as a whole, it is necessary to determine how much of Chile's agricultural wealth its members own.

In table 5, extensive data are presented on FGP estates held by the families of the bankers, corporation executives, and top landowners. The only estates represented in this table are ones which were owned by an individual in one of these three universes, or by any of their relatives who belonged to their maximum kinship groups. All estate owners shown here who were not in one of the three universes were no more than four kinship links distant from at least one individual in one of these universes. The overwhelming majority of these FGP estates were owned within the close family of the bankers, corporate executives, and top landowners, rather than by quarternary relatives.[8]

Clearly, the central core contains the bulk (almost 60 percent) of the agricultural wealth owned by families in this study. In part, this preponderance of landholding in the core simply reflects the large number of top landowners in it. Even more significant is that the central core contained so many large landowners who were not top landowners, while the other maximum kinship groups typically had few estates other than those in the top category that originally placed one or more family members in the top landowner universe. The great majority of large landowners not in the top landowner universe were in central core families.

The discovery of this single very large maximum kinship group, which includes from 30 to 40 percent of the members of each of the three universes, is of fundamental importance for our analysis of ties between landowners and capitalists: It indicates clearly that the interrelationships that bind these families together permit of no absolute cleavages between these allegedly distinct classes based in agriculture, banking, and industry. If individual families within the central core have interests that reach

TABLE 5 *Maximum Kinship Groups that Owned More Than 1,000 Equivalent BIH of Central Valley Land Included in FGP Estates*

Main Family Name	*Total Number of Top Individuals in Kinship or Family Group*	*Top Universe Represented in Group*[1]	*Number of Top Landowners in Group Who Are FGP Owners*[2]	*Total Land Held by Top Landowners*	*Number of Other Top Individuals Who Are FGP Owners*[3]	*Total Land Held by Other Top Individuals*[3]
Central Core Kinship Group	143	L-B-C	52	39,192	9	2,104
Marin Larrain-Estevez	3	L	3	3,718		
Urrutia	2	L	2	964		
Donoso-Vicuña Correa[7]	4	L-C	3	2,064		
Lira Vergara-Ruiz Tagle[7]	2	L	1	676		
Riesco[7]	2	L	2	939		
Lopez Lopez, A.	1	L	1	2,303		
Palma Eguiguren, E.[7]	1	L	1	2,121		
Correa Armanet-Encina Armanet	2	L	2	1,778		
Correa Larrain, S.[7]	1	L-B	1	1,373		
Cattan Davique	2	L	2	1,490		
Infante Valdes, P.	1	L	1	734		
Ruiz Tagle	2	L	2	1,545		
Azocar-Bustamante	2	L	2	1,357		
Campos Valenzuela, E.	1	L	1	971		
Prado de Infante, J.	1	L	1	1,236		
Mujica Lopez, H.	1	L	1	705		
Hirmas-Yarur-Said	18	L-B-C	4	1,146		
Pizarro Espinola, J.	1	L	1	1,041		
Nuñez Casanova, M.	1	L	1	520		
Other Kinship groups and unrelated family groups which include FGP landowners but with group land totals of less than 1,000 equivalent hectares.	——	——	39	20,594	3	784
			123	86,567	12	2,888

[1]This column indicates whether the kinship group includes top landowners (L), top bankers (B), or corporation executives (C), or any combination of these.

[2]Some top landowners are not FGP estate owners since they were included in the top landowner universe solely on the basis of estates included on the government tax list and no FGP estates held by them have been found.

TABLE 5—Continued.

Main Family Name	*Number of Other Family Members Who Are FGP Owners*[4]	*Total Land Held by Other Family Members*[4]	*Total Number of FGP Owners in Kinship or Family Group*	*Total Land Held by All FGP Owners in Kinship or Family Group*	*Percentage of All Land in FGP Estates*[5]	*Percentage of All Land Central Valley Estates*[6]
Central Core Kinship Group	131	40,122	192	81,418	24.3	11.4
Marin Larrain-Estevez			3	3,718	1.1	.5
Urrutia	8	2,368	10	3,332	1.0	.5
Donoso-Vicuña Correa[7]	4	1,022	7	3,086	.9	.4
Lira Vergara-Ruiz Tagle[7]	6	1,984	7	2,660	.8	4
Riesco[7]	5	1,436	7	2,375	.7	.3
Lopez Lopez, A.			1	2,303	.7	.3
Palma Eguiguren, E.[7]			1	2,121	.6	3
Correa Armanet-Encina Armanet	1	304	3	2,082	.6	.3
Correa Larrain, S.[7]	2	470	3	1,843	.5	.2
Cattan Davique	1	196	3	1,686	.5	2
Infante Valdes, P.	3	050	4	1,684	.5	.2
Ruiz Tagle			2	1,545	.5	.2
Azocar-Bustamante			2	1,357	.4	.2
Campos Valenzuela, E.	1	301	2	1,272	.4	.2
Prado de Infante, J.			1	1,236	.4	.2
Mujica Lopez, H.	1	376	2	1,181	.3	.2
Hirmas-Yarur-Said			4	1,146	.3	.1
Pizarro Espinola, J.			1	1,041	.3	.1
Nuñez Casanova, M.	1	483	2	1,003	.3	.1
Other Kinship groups and unrelated family groups which include FGP land-owners but with group land totals of less than 1,000 equivalent hectares.	6	1,526	48	22,904	6.3	3.0
	170	51,538	305	140,793	42.0%	19.0%

[3]"Other Top Individuals" are bankers and corporation executives who are not top landowners.

[4]"Other Family Members" are not top individuals themselves but are within four kinship links of at least one top individual.

[5]&[6]See notes 3 and 4 of table 2.

[7]Inconclusive kinship information indicates membership in central core kinship group.

simultaneously into agriculture, banking, and industry, if these families are not merely interrelated but highly intertwined by a cohesive network of kin relations, and if the combined holdings of these families dominate the major sectors of the economy, then we will have shown rather conclusively that they are, in fact, the decisive segments of the same, fundamentally united, dominant class.

Therefore, we wish to investigate the internal structure of the central core maximum kinship group. The methods used to discover and delimit the maximum kinship groups provide us with little a priori knowledge of the internal structure. At one extreme, for example, a large maximum kinship group conceivably might be formed around a single long series of distantly related individuals in the three universes. Such a group of families, though interrelated, would hardly indicate a closely interrelated and cohesive social class. Rather, such a class would consist of a network of families, each of which not only frequently included more than one top landowner, banker, or corporation executive but also had multiple kinship ties with other such families. Furthermore, in such a class, not only would particular families own great concentrations of wealth but they would form part of a network of families who also owned such wealth, or at least participated in the control and benefits derived from it.

Thus, a major question is whether the landowning families, on the one hand, and corporate and banking families, on the other, are closely intertwined within the central core maximum kinship group. Certainly, given its size, it is possible that considerable separation of agrarian and other elements persists despite the overall interrelatedness. The same question, of course, is also relevant to families in the other maximum kinship groups.

The distribution of large landowners within central core families and within other family groups is shown in tables 6 and 7. Here, the bankers and corporation executives who were not in the central core maximum kinship group are divided into two categories: Those in (1) maximum kinship groups that include two or more individuals whose families are related, and (2) unrelated families. Divided this way, we have a clearer view of the differences between the types of families in the small maximum kinship groups and among unrelated families.

Table 6 presents data on the personal large estate holdings of the bankers and corporation executives and on the number of family members who are owners of large FGP estates. Table 7 shows the aggregate amounts of land in equivalent BIH units held by immediate, secondary, and all close relatives of these individuals. We find that large landowners are strikingly pervasive within the families of the bankers and corporation executives in the central core of the class. In marked contrast, however, outside of the central core there are relatively few close family ties between these principal functionaries of capital and large landowners.

It is true that many more of the bankers and corporation executives in the central core group owned estates, compared to those in other groups; but the most profound contrast is in the numbers of large landowners included in these central core families, and in the magnitude of their landholdings. Put simply, most bankers and corporate executives in the central core were in large landowning families, whereas this is true of very few of the families outside the central core. The findings shown in table 7 further substantiate this conclusion. Among the corporation executives in the noncore maximum kinship groups, only 15.1 percent were in close family groups that included large landowners (table 6, part c). Not one of these families included more than two large landowners. Among the corporation executives in unrelated families, only 6.3 percent had large landowners among their close relatives, and, again, none had more than two large landowners among these relatives. Among the bankers in the noncore maximum kinship groups, none owned any large estate or had any large estate owners in his close family. A sizable proportion, 17.6 percent, of the bankers in unrelated failies were in landowning families; but almost all of these "land ties" are limited to the large estates owned personally by the bankers.

Among families in the central core, a vastly different pattern prevails. One half of the bankers and well over a third (37.1 percent) of the corporation executives in the central core had large landowners within their immediate families (table 6, part b). Including secondary relatives, 69.2 percent of the bankers and 56.2 percent of the corporation executives were in landowning families (table 7, part c). Finally, if we include tertiary relatives, nearly all central core bankers and corporation executives had close relatives that were large landowners. Thus, among the bankers, 88.5 percent had close families in which there were large landowners, while the figure was 78.7 percent among corporation executives (table 6, part d).

In addition, large numbers of the families in the central core had *several* large landowners in them. Thus, in table 6, part d, we see that 26.9 percent of the close families of the bankers and 13.5 percent of those of the corporation executives had five or more large landowners in them. A much larger number, 55.8 percent and 41.6 percent, respectively, had three or more close relatives who were large landowners.

The findings presented in table 7, on the aggregate value of each family group's large Central Valley FGP estates (with values expressed in equivalent BIH) show that many of the bankers and corporation executives in the central core families were closely tied to great concentrations

TABLE 6 The Number of Relatives of Bankers and Corporation Executives Who Were Large Landowners in the Central Core and in Other Maximum Kinship Groups and Unrelated Families, by Kinship Distance

	No Land	Ind. Has Other Estate[1]	150–999	1000–1999	2000–Plus	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land
A. TOTAL AMOUNT OF BIH LAND OWNED							
Central Core							
Bankers	61.5	7.7	30.7			(26)	38.5
Corporation Executives	76.4	5.6	16.9	1.1		(89)	23.6
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	90.6		1.9	7.5		(53)	9.4
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	8.8	5.9	2.9		(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	95.8	2.1	2.1			(142)	4.2
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	76.8	7.2	14.4	1.4		(69)	23.2
Corporation Executives	88.7	2.8	6.7	1.8		(284)	11.3

	No Land	Ind. Has Other Estate[1]	1–2	3–4	5+	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land Ties
B. NUMBER OF RELATIVES WITHIN IMMEDIATE FAMILY WHO WERE LARGE LANDOWNERS							
Central Core							
Bankers	50.0	26.9	23.1			(26)	50.0
Corporation Executives	62.9	14.6	20.0	2.2		(89)	37.1
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	88.7	9.4	1.9			(53)	11.3
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	14.7	2.9			(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	95.1	3.5	1.4			(142)	4.9
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	92.5	17.4	10.1			(69)	7.5
Corporation Executives	83.8	8.1	7.4	.7		(284)	16.2

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TABLE 6—Continued.

	No Land	*Ind. Has Other Estate*[1]	*1–2*	*3–4*	*5+*	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land Ties*
C. NUMBER OF RELATIVES WITHIN SECONDARY FAMILY WHO WERE LARGE LANDOWNERS							
Central Core							
Bankers	30.8	15.4	34.6	19.2		(26)	69.2
Corporation Executives	43.8	6.7	35.8	12.4	1.1	(89)	56.2
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	88.7	9.4	1.9			(53)	11.3
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	14.7	2.9			(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	94.4	3.5	2.1			(142)	5.6
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	65.2	13.0	14.5	7.2		(69)	34.8
Corporation Executives	77.5	5.6	12.7	3.9		(284)	22.5
D. NUMBER OF RELATIVES WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY WHO WERE LARGE LANDOWNERS							
Central Core							
Bankers	11.5	3.8	30.8	26.9	26.9	(26)	88.5
Corporation Executives	21.3	2.2	34.4	28.1	13.5	(89)	78.7
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	84.9	9.4	5.7			(53)	15.1
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	14.7	2.9			(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	93.7	2.8	3.5			(142)	6.3
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	58.0	8.7	13.0	10.1	10.1	(69)	42.0
Corporation Executives	69.4	3.9	13.7	8.8	4.2	(284)	30.6

[1]See note 2 of table 3.
[2]See note 1 of table 2.

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TABLE 7 *The Value (BIH) of Land in Large Estates Owned within the Immediate Families and among the Close Relatives of the Bankers and Corporation Executives, in the Central Core and in Other Maximum Kinship Groups and Unrelated Families*

	No Land	*Ind. Has Other Estate*[2]	*150–999*	*1000–1999*	*2000 Plus*	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land Ties*[3]
A. AGRICULTURAL WEALTH WITHIN IMMEDIATE FAMILY[1]							
Central Core							
Bankers	50.0	7.7	34.6	3.8	3.8	(26)	50.0
Corporation Executives	62.9	4.5	25.8	5.6	1.1	(89)	37.1
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	88.7		3.8	7.5		(53)	11.3
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	8.8	5.9	2.9		(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	95.1	2.1	2.8			(142)	4.9
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	72.5	7.2	15.9	2.9	1.4	(69)	27.5
Corporation Executives	83.8	2.5	10.2	3.2	0.4	(284)	16.2
B. AGRICULTURAL WEALTH WITHIN SECONDARY FAMILY[1]							
Central Core							
Bankers	30.8	3.8	46.2	7.7	11.5	(26)	69.2
Corporation Executives	43.8	2.2	34.8	10.1	9.0	(89)	56.2
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	88.7		3.8	7.5		(53)	11.3

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TABLE 7–*Continued.*

	No Land	Ind. Has Other Estate[2]	150–999	1000–1999	2000 Plus	(N)	Summary: Percentage Land Ties[3]
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	8.8	5.9	2.9		(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	94.4	2.1	3.5			(142)	5.6
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	65.2	5.8	20.3	4.3	4.3	(69)	34.8
Corporation Executives	77.5	1.8	13.4	4.6	2.8	(284)	22.5
C. AGRICULTURAL WEALTH WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY[1]							
Central Core							
Bankers	11.5		34.6	19.2	34.6	(26)	88.5
Corporation Executives	21.3		37.1	19.1	22.5	(89)	78.7
Other Kinship Groups							
Bankers	100.0					(9)	00.0
Corporation Executives	84.9		7.5	7.5		(53)	15.1
Unrelated Families							
Bankers	82.4	8.8	5.9	2.9		(34)	17.6
Corporation Executives	93.7	1.4	4.9			(142)	6.3
Total: All Bankers and Corporation Executives							
Bankers	58.0	4.3	15.9	8.6	13.0	(69)	42.0
Corporation Executives	69.4	.7	15.5	7.4	7.0	(284)	30.6

[1]See note 1 of table 2.
[2]See note 2 of table 3.
[3]See note 2 of table 2.

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of valuable landed property. In contrast, the relatively few landowning families among banking and corporate executives outside the central core had much lower concentrations of landed wealth. Considering close relatives, we find that within the central core, 53.8 percent of the bankers' families and 41.6 percent of the corporation executives' families had total holdings greater than 1,000 equivalent BIH (table 7, part c). Outside the central core, similar concentrations of landed wealth in the corporate and banking families are all but absent.

The discovery of the pervasive presence of large landowners among the central core families is particularly significant because the ownership of estates that are "large" but not "top" was not in any way a criterion used to identify and limit the different maximum kinship groups. The close relationships that so many principal functionaries of capital had with large landowners is an extraordinary discovery regarding the families in the central core of the dominant class.

It is also significant that for most of these central core families, landowning is found among relatives at all measured distances from the family centers. Indeed, as we increase the distance of relatives from the family center, we find that the number of large landowners directly and sharply increases among central core families. Presumably, if the kinship distance were further extended, the number of large landowners included in the central core would continue to increase. In contrast, among the families of the bankers and corporation executives outside the central core, including secondary and tertiary relatives merely results in the inclusion of more *relatives* and not of any relatives who were large landowners.

THE PRINCIPAL OWNERS OF CAPITAL AND LARGE LANDOWNERS

Our theme is the social relationship between landlords and capitalists, and we have seen that, particularly in the central core of interrelated families, the overwhelming majority of the officers and directors of the largest banks and corporations were closely related to large landowners, although, among other maximum kinship groups and unrelated families, merely a small minority had such relatives. From one theoretical perspective, reference to the officers and directors of the largest corporations as "capitalists" would be rejected. Managerialists would argue that the executives of the largest corporations are utterly unlike their capitalist predecessors and that the "owners" and "managers" are separate and distinct, even opposing social groups (see Zeitlin 1974). From another perspective, which has been termed "plain Marxist," the officers and directors of the largest corporations and the principal owners of capital are essentially merely differentiated strata or segments—when they are not merely the same individuals—of the same social class. The corporate executives are strategic functionaries of capital and occupy the command posts in the decisive units of capital accumulation in the economy; their personal careers are intricately bound up with the expansion of corporate capital. They and the principal owners of capital probably move in the same intimate social milieu, belong to the same exclusive clubs, enjoy the same summer resorts and winter retreats, send their children to the same private schools and colleges, and, in general, consider each other "the kind of people you visit" and freely interact with socially, while having little to do socially with others beneath their "station." Although the officers and directors are typically not principal shareowners in their corporations, they typically own shares and have investments whose absolute combined worth places them among the top wealth holders in the population. For these reasons, we believe that characterizing the officers and directors of the largest corporations as a segment of the capitalist class is analytically appropriate.

Elsewhere (Zeitlin, Ratcliff, and Ewen 1974), we have shown that in Chile the vast majority of the officers and directors of the largest corporations were, indeed, either personally principal capitalists or closely related to them or to leading bankers. A complex pattern of entangling kinship relationships integrated corporate executives and principal capitalists into the same social class (see also Zeitlin, Ewen, and Ratcliff 1974). Nonetheless, the critical question remains: What is the relationship not only between the principal *functionaries* of capital and large landowners, but between those, in particular, who were also large *owners* of capital and the large landowners. By any valid theoretical conceptualization, the officers and directors of the largest corporations who were also among their principal owners, are unambiguously large "capitalists." We explained earlier the criteria of stockownership and stockworth by which we selected the large owners of capital or top investors in these banks and corporations. They consist of the 502 individuals who, by the criteria described, held blocks of stock whose market worth exceeded E100,000 at the year's end, 1964.

We examine the relationship between these large owners of capital and large landowners in two different ways: (1) We ask whether families with several top investors were more likely to be landowning families; (2) we consider the absolute stockworth of each family's holdings, and compare these totals with the value of the landed estates owned by the same families.

We find that, within the central core, the families that had more top investors also included more large landowners. Central core families, including secondary and other close relatives, that had no top investors were also less likely to contain large landowners than families with one or two top investors, and *much less* likely to contain large landowners than families with three or more top investors. Among close families in the central core (the bottom level of table 8), 59.4 percent of those with no top investors, as compared to 68.4 percent of those with one or two top investors, had large landowners in them. Of the families with three or more top investors, every one (100 percent) included large landowners!

These same general patterns hold when we consider the *number* of large landowners among central core close families. Of corporation executives with no top investors among their close relatives, some 21.9 percent included three or more large landowners. For those having one or two top investors among their close relatives, 52.6 percent also included three or more large landowners, while the figure was 73.7 percent among those with three or more top investors. Thus, we find without question that large concentrations of capital and of land are consistently found within the same central core families.

These large concentrations of bank and corporate stockownership and landownership within the same families were not prevalent outside of the central core. It is true, of course, that families outside the core having no top investors were also consistently least likely to include large landowners, but the vast majority of these families, even those with top investors, did not include any large landowners.

The same pattern is found when we examine the relationship between the value of top investor stockholdings and the amount of landowning among close relatives (table 9). It should be noted that the families that had no top investors are combined in table 9, even if the corporation executive at the family's center owned small blocks of stock. Again, we find a strong convergence of corporate and bank stockownership and the ownership of large landed property in the same families. The central core families whose market worth of stockholding was greatest also were most likely to have large landowners in them. Among executives with no top investor holdings among their primary or secondary relatives, 48.8 percent had large landowners within the same kinship distance (top level, table 9). This compares to 77.8 percent among those with top investor holdings worth over E1,000,000. If we look among all close relatives of the executives (bottom, table 9), we find that 59.4 percent of those whose close relatives held no top investor holdings, but 100 percent of those with E1,000,000 or more, had large landowners among them. The contrasts are even more striking when the number of large landowner relatives is considered. Among central core close families that had no top investors in them, 21.9 percent included three or more large landowners. In contrast, the overwhelming majority, or 85.0 percent of the central core close families whose aggregate stockholdings held by top investors exceeded E1,000,000, had three or more large landowners in them. In general, in the central core, the greater the stockworth held by close relatives who were top investors, the greater the number of close relatives who were large landowners. However, outside the central core, there was no direct relationship between the ownership of land and capital. Nonetheless, the families that had no top investors among them were virtually isolated from large landownership—only 5.9 percent had large landowners in them—while between two and three times as many of the families that did have top investor wealth also had large landowners in them.

It should be emphasized that the central core of closely interrelated families centered around the officers and directors of the largest corporations contained a highly disproportionate number of top investors and held a disproportionate share of the market worth of stockholdings owned by these large owners of capital. Whereas slightly less than a third (31.3 percent) of all corporation executives were in the central core, *half* (49.6 percent) of those who had top investors among their close relatives were in the central core. Looked at differently, within the central core, only 33.5 percent of the executives had no top investor close relatives, whereas among the executives outside the core, over twice as many, or 69.2 percent had no top investors in their close family. In other words, *the overwhelming majority of the corporate executives in the central core were closely related simultaneously to large owners of capital and to large landowners*; whereas, outside the central core, only a minority were closely related to either. And even among the latter noncore executives, it is precisely the ones who were closely related to large owners of capital who were also most likely to be related to large estate owners. Finally, we may simply look at all corporate executives, without distinguishing between those within or outside the central core (bottom, right, table 9). We find that only 16.2 percent of the 167 executives who had no close relatives who were top investors did have ones who were large landowners. In striking contrast, however, among the 117 executives who were closely related to top investors, a clear majority of 51.3 percent were also closely related to large landowners. There can simply be no doubt that large capitalists and large landowners were typically closely related in Chile in recent years, constituting between them the principal segments of the same dominant social class that owned and controlled the decisive units of the means of production in industry and agriculture.[9]

TABLE 8 The Relationship between the Number of Top Investors[1] and the Number of Large Landowners among Families in the Central Core and Other Families of Corporation Executives

	No Land	No. of Large Landowners in Family: 1–2	3–4	5+	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land
CORPORATION EXECUTIVE SECONDARY FAMILY GROUPS[2] BY NUMBER OF TOP INVESTORS WITHIN SECONDARY FAMILY						
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN SECONDARY FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
0	51.2	37.2	11.6		(43)	48.8
1–2	42.9	28.6	20.0	8.6	(35)	57.1
3+	18.2	72.7	9.1		(11)	81.8
Total	43.8	38.2	14.6	3.4	(89)	56.2
All Other Corporation Executive Families						
0	95.7	4.3			(138)	4.3
1–2	87.5	12.5			(32)	12.5
3+	84.0	16.0			(25)	16.0
Total	92.8	7.2			(195)	7.2
All Corporation Executive Families						
0	85.1	12.2	2.8		(181)	14.9
1–2	64.2	20.9	10.4	4.5	(67)	35.8
3+	63.9	33.3	2.8		(36)	36.1
Total	77.5	16.9	4.6	1.1	(284)	22.5
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
0	37.2	32.6	9.3	20.9	(43)	62.8
1–2	8.6	22.9	28.6	40.0	(35)	91.4
3+		27.3	45.5	27.3	(11)	100.0
Total	21.3	28.1	21.3	29.2	(89)	78.7
All Other Corporation Executive Families						
0	94.2	5.8			(138)	5.8
1–2	84.4	12.5	3.1		(32)	15.6
3+	84.0	16.0			(25)	16.0
Total	91.3	8.2	.5		(195)	8.7

TABLE 8–Continued.

		No. of Large Land-owners in Family				*Summary Percentage with*
	Land	*1–2*	*3–4*	*5+*	*(N)*	*Land*
All Corporation Executive Families						
0	80.7	12.2	2.2	5.0	(181)	19.3
1–2	44.8	17.9	16.4	20.9	(67)	55.2
3+	58.3	19.4	13.9	8.3	(36)	41.7
Total	69.4	14.4	7.0	9.2	(284)	30.6
CORPORATION EXECUTIVE CLOSE FAMILY GROUPS[2] BY NUMBER OF TOP INVESTORS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY						
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
0	40.6	37.5	6.3	15.6	(32)	59.4
1–2	31.6	15.8	10.5	42.1	(19)	68.4
3+		26.3	39.5	34.2	(38)	100.0
Total	21.3	28.1	21.3	29.2	(89)	78.7
All Other Corporation Executive Families						
0	94.1	5.9			(135)	5.9
1–2	82.1	14.3	3.6		(28)	17.9
3+	87.5	12.5			(32)	12.5
Total	91.3	8.2	.5		(195)	8.7
All Corporation Executive Families						
0	83.8	12.0	1.2	3.0	(167)	16.2
1–2	61.7	14.9	6.4	17.0	(47)	38.3
3+	40.0	20.0	21.4	18.6	(70)	60.0
Total	69.4	14.4	7.0	9.2	(284)	30.6

[1]Top investors are holders of large blocks of stock in corporations and banks that have a total worth exceeding E100,000. The exact criteria are explained in text. In the top two levels of the table the data are arranged according to the total number of top investors in secondary family groups. In the bottom level, top investors in close family groups are totaled.

[2]In determining the number of top investors in the families of corporation executives the family group has been defined at two different limits. In the top two levels of the table *secondary* family groups are considered while in the bottom level the totals of top investors refer to *close* family groups.

TABLE 9 *The Relationship between the Market Worth of Stock Held by Top Investors among Families in the Central Core and Other Families of Corporation Executives, and the Number of Large Landowners among Close Relatives*

	No Land	*No. of Large Landowners in Family* 1–2	3–4	5+	*(N)*	*Summary: Percentage with Land*
CORPORATION EXECUTIVE SECONDARY FAMILY GROUPS BY TOTAL WORTH OF TOP INVESTOR STOCKHOLDINGS IN SECONDARY FAMILY[1]						
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN SECONDARY FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
None	51.2	37.2	11.6		(43)	48.8
E100,000-499,999	39.1	34.8	21.7	4.3	(23)	60.9
500,000-999,999	42.9	21.4	21.4	14.3	(14)	57.1
1,000,000 Plus	22.2	77.8			(9)	77.8
Total	43.8	38.2	14.6	3.4	(89)	56.2
Other Corporation Executive Families						
None	95.7	4.3			(138)	4.3
E100,000-499,999	81.8	18.2			(22)	18.2
500,000-999,999	100.0				(7)	00.0
1,000,000 Plus	85.7	14.3			(28)	14.3
Total	92.8	7.2			(195)	7.2
All Corporation Executive Families						
None	85.1	12.2	2.8		(181)	14.9
E100,000-499,999	60.0	26.7	11.1	2.2	(45)	40.0
500,000-999,999	61.9	14.3	14.3	9.5	(21)	38.1
1,000,000 Plus	70.3	29.7			(37)	29.7
Total	77.5	16.9	4.6	1.1	(284)	22.5
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
None	37.2	32.6	9.3	20.9	(43)	62.8
E100,000-499,999	8.7	26.1	21.7	43.5	(23)	91.3
500,000-999,999	7.1	28.6	28.6	35.7	(14)	92.9
1,000,000 Plus		11.1	66.7	22.2	(9)	100.0
Total	21.3	28.1	21.3	29.2	(89)	78.7
Other Corporation Executive Families						
None	94.2	5.8			(138)	5.8
E100,000-499,999	81.8	13.6	4.5		(22)	18.2

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TABLE 9 –Continued.

	No Land	No. of Large Landowners in Family 1–2	3–4	5+	(N)	Summary: Percentage with Land
500,000-999,999	85.7	14.3			(7)	14.3
1,000,000 Plus	85.7	14.3			(28)	14.3
Total	91.3	8.2	.5		(195)	8.7
All Corporation Executive Families						
None	80.7	12.2	2.2	5.0	(181)	19.3
E100,000-499,999	44.4	20.0	13.3	22.2	(45)	55.6
500,000-999,999	33.3	23.8	19.0	23.8	(21)	66.7
1,000,000 Plus	64.9	13.5	16.2	5.4	(37)	35.1
Total	69.4	14.4	7.0	9.2	(284)	30.6
CORPORATION EXECUTIVE CLOSE FAMILY GROUPS BY TOTAL WORTH OF TOP INVESTOR STOCKHOLDINGS IN CLOSE FAMILY[1]						
LARGE LANDOWNERS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILY						
Central Core Corporation Executive Families						
None	40.6	37.5	6.3	15.6	(32)	59.4
E100,000-499,999	22.2	22.2	16.7	38.9	(18)	77.8
500,000-999,999	10.5	31.6	36.8	21.1	(19)	89.5
1,000,000 Plus		15.0	35.0	50.0	(20)	100.0
Total	21.3	28.1	21.3	29.2	(89)	78.7
Other Corporation Executive Families						
None	94.1	5.9			(135)	5.9
E100,000-499,999	81.0	14.3	4.8		(21)	19.0
500,000-999,999	88.9	11.1			(9)	11.1
1,000,000 Plus	86.7	13.3			(30)	13.3
Total	91.3	8.2	.5		(195)	8.7
All Corporation Executive Families						
None	83.8	12.0	1.2	3.0	(167)	16.2
E100,000-499,999	53.8	17.9	10.3	17.9	(39)	46.2
500,000-999,999	35.7	25.0	25.0	14.3	(28)	64.3
1,000,000 Plus	52.0	14.0	14.0	20.0	(50)	48.0
Total	69.4	14.4	7.0	9.2	(284)	30.6

[1]In determining the total worth of top investor stockholdings in the families of corporation executives the family group has been defined at two different limits. In the top two levels of the table *secondary* family groups are considered and in the bottom level the totals include the holdings of top investors within *close* family groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis has shown, indeed, that even conceptualizing large landowners and capitalists in Chile as distinctive "class segments" may tend to distort our perception of their inner connections and to reify them as if they were, in fact, *coexisting* rather than *inseparable* elements of a single class. The contradictions between agrarian and industrial capital, and the clashes over state policies affecting them, where these have led to political rivalries within the dominant class in Chile in recent decades, did not arise between separate ontologically "real" class segments of large landowners and capitalists. For *contradictory interests* and *social cleavages* within the dominant class did *not* coincide; rather, the dominant agrarian and industrial elements were internally related, if not "fused," in so complex a pattern that *neither of them possessed a specific autonomy or distinctive social identity* (cf. Poulantzas 1973, p. 237). A theory of traditionalism vs. modernity, or of contradictions between modes of production which posits the exitence of two "upper" classes or of a landed "oligarchy" and "national bourgeoisie" in conflict over the destiny of the nation, had no basis in recent Chilean reality. Therefore, a political strategy based on such false premises would surely lead its adherents to defeat, if not disaster (see Ratcliff 1974).

We must emphasize that the findings of this study concerning the internal relations within the dominant class in Chile are inseparably bound up with our conceptual and methodological innovations—in the selection of the universes for analysis, and, particularly, in the kinship analysis. We systematically organized our data so as to allow an unprecedented quantitative, and substantively meaningful, analysis of the questions at issue. We took seriously the imposing task of identifying all close relatives and determining how they were situated in economic relationships. Our research has demonstrated that it is necessary to go through genealogies and other sources of specific information on kinship in order to identify the interfamily linkages of the dominant class. Neither focusing on individuals nor even nuclear families is sufficient to discover the extent of economic concentration and of internal relations in the dominant class. Also, certain techniques for identifying "families," such as simply grouping all who have similar family names, are not adequate: They neither systematically identify close relatives nor exclude ones distantly related or not related at all. Nor can illustrations, based on a few selected individual families who exhibit one pattern of economic integration or another, suffice. To begin genuinely to penetrate the internal structure of dominant classes, it is necessary to study the *families* of a large number of *individuals* who are located in decisive positions in the process of production. Unless and until these steps are taken, statements about the internal structure of an upper or dominant class are rightly regarded as highly suspect.

The concepts and methods of measurement used here permit us to overcome the infinite complexities and to manage the masses of data involved in studies of kinship relationships. Attention to various types of close relatives, within specified kinship distances of a given individual, permits us to avoid the all too typical tendency of social scientists to base their analyses on atomized individuals. In addition, the linkages between the families of given individuals, of specified types, can be analyzed via procedures and definitions derived from our concept of the maximum kinship group. Finally, our method of standardizing the distance of kinship relationships, by the number of kinship links between given individuals of specified types, allows us to transform kinship data and economic data into a form amenable to quantitative analysis.

Certainly these methods can be applied in other contexts. We refer not merely to other Latin American societies, but to research on the upper or dominant classes of the United States and other developed capitalist countries—about which pseudofacts abound in academic social science (see Zeitlin 1974).

NOTES

1. The Unidad Popular program was quite ambiguous on the question of the dominant class, but, at least, it did not refer, as the Communist party did, to an "anti-feudal stage" of the revolution. It stated, as approved on 17 December 1969 by the parties in the coalition, that "the fundamental task of the People's Government . . . is to end the domination of the imperialists, the monopolies, and the landed oligarchy, and to start the construction of socialism in Chile" (Feinberg 1972, p. 263). Thus, the program implicitly also saw the landowners and monopolists as *structurally independent* of each other, though *allied* politically. Therefore, it permitted its adherents to conceive of the possibility of a "breach" or "rupture" in this alliance, if the "correct" political strategy were adopted by the Left. Even Allende, an extraordinarily astute observer of his society, could say: "We know that the oligarchical groups, the plutocratic groups, the *feudal groups* will try to defend their privileges at all costs." Questioned sharply by Debray, Allende said that "backward forms of 'land capitalism'" was a more precise formulation than "feudal"; and he also conceded that "although *it could be claimed* in very broad terms that [landowners and monopolistic groups] . . . form a single class, . . . there are differences between them as regards the role they play in the workings of Chile's dependent capitalism. This has frequently caused *major political differences*, as in the case of Land Reform" (Debray 1971, pp. 100–101, italics added). Essentially, then, Allende also thought of the "monopolistic groups" and landowners as structurally independent and even opposed politically.
2. Moore's own meaning is not entirely unambiguous, since it might also be read as an objection not merely to the *mis*use but to the use of statistics per se in historical investigation. However, whenever he finds it necessary to dispute historical interpretations that rest on statistical evidence, Moore also utilizes his own such evidence or reinterprets the statistical evidence presented by others. See, particularly, his discussion on pp. 509ff. of statistics and conservative historiography.

3. For example, 18.1 percent of the labor force in Chile in 1960 was in manufacturing, compared to 17.8 percent in Japan, and 22 percent in Italy in the early 1950s; Japan had 41.1 percent, France, 27.2 percent, and Italy, 40 percent employed in agriculture in the early 1950s compared to Chile's 28.6 percent in 1960 (Bain 1966, p. 16; and CORFO 1966, p. 523).
4. British capital became ascendant in nitrates in Chile in the 1880s; American capital displaced national capital in copper after the turn of the century, and then also displaced British capital in nitrates in the 1920s (Bohan and Pomeranz 1960, pp. 86ff. and 95ff.). For an excellent brief overview of Chilean economic history, see Glade 1969.
5. Corporations, which made up 17 percent of registered business enterprises in Chile in 1967 (corporations, limited companies, partnerships, proprietorships), owned 90.4 percent of the total assets held by these enterprises (Garreton and Cisternas 1970, p. 6).
6. The subsequent study of the ICIRA list also revealed the names of a group of thirty-two landowners with land totals (often based on more than one estate) greater than the lowest on the original top one hundred list who had not been included on that list and thus were not selected as top landowners. In most instances these landowners had been overlooked either because their holdings were listed as owned by a family partnership or because they owned two or more smaller estates that were not combined when the original top one hundred list was created. Though the omission of these landowners from the universe of top landowners is unfortunate, there are valid reasons to argue that their omission does not seriously compromise the findings of this study. For one thing, almost half (fifteen out of the thirty-two) were included in the study because they were found to be close relatives of respondents. Thus their land totals and their positions in the kinship structure of the landowners are incorporated in the analysis. Furthermore, the landowners selected as top landowners do include an overwhelming majority of those who, after all phases of this research were completed, were found to be the very largest in the country. When a list of the one hundred largest landowners, based on all FGP estates they own, is formed on the basis of all information now available, it includes eighty-one of the present top landowners, twelve close relatives of individuals in the study and only seven others not now included in that data set either as members of one of the three universes or as relatives of these members.
7. Searches through kinship records occupied a considerable share of the research energies of several people during an interrupted series of investigations that began when Zeitlin was in Chile in 1966 and continued with some intensity until 1971. In Chile, Zeitlin and his assistants relied heavily on two published sources: The seventh (1948–49) and eleventh (1959–61) editions of *Diccionario Biográfico de Chile*, published by Empresa Periodística Chile, and a classic Chilean upper-class genealogical reference work, *Familias Chilenas: Orígen de Doscientos Familias Coloniales de Santiago y Familias Coloniales de Santiago*, by Guillermo de la Cuadra Gormaz (de la Cuadra, 1950). The *Diccionario* is a rough Chilean equivalent of a "Who's Who" and *Familias Chilenas* has large amounts of history and lesser amounts of genealogical information on major upper-class families. In addition to these sources, Zeitlin made use of informants who had close ties to the higher circles of the Chilean upper class.

   In the United States phase of the work three sources were invaluable. The first were the same editions of the *Diccionario Biográfico de Chile* used in Chile plus other editions found in U.S. libraries available in Madison. It was found that these could yield more information than had originally been thought. The second was the five-volume work of Virgilio Figueroa (apparently actually Virgilio Talquino) entitled *Diccionario Histórico, Biográfico y Bibliográfico de Chile*. This work contains a vast amount of information, including a careful detailing of the kinship structures of many important families in Chile from 1800 until about 1930. It also has richly detailed histories of many of these families. A third source, discovered late in the final phase of the kinship investigations, in the library of UCSB, was *Domínguez, 1818–1968: Decendencia de Don Francisco Domínguez Heras*, a privately published work by Arturo Domínguez Barros. While focusing on the many branches of the Domínguez family, this study also contains individual genealogies of differing lengths of 20 of the most prominent Chilean families which married into the Domínguez line during the 150 years after Don Francisco arrived in Chile in 1818 from Spain. This volume, while having little family history, is more rigorously complete in its kinship data than are any of the other sources available. It not only gives the full names of all brides and grooms but also often gives the same information for the in-laws. It should be noted that by "full names" we refer to the Spanish surname system which combines both the individual's father's patronymic surname and mother's patronymic surname.

8. Of the 140,793 equivalent hectares of land represented in table 7, there are 4,788 hectares in estates owned by individuals who are exactly four kinship links from at least one top universe member. There are fifteen such owners and all belong to the central core kinship group.

9. Analyzing "the relations between the industrial bourgeoisie and the established upper classes" in Chile in the mid-1960s, the same period as our own study, Dale Johnson also rejects "the 'struggle for supremacy' thesis flowing from Marxian and traditional sociological doctrines." Nonetheless, he does claim that these *are* distinct classes: "Nor is what might be termed the 'fusion thesis' correct. . . . Industrialists have not fused with the established economic elite to form a new oligarchy or ruling class. . . . Industrialists apparently do not invest extensively in land or marry their daughters to the sons of oligarchical families" (1968–69, p. 175). However, in neither of the published reports of Johnson's study (1967–68; 1968–69) is any evidence presented either on investments in lands or on intermarriage patterns to support this claim. (The one index of social interaction between the industrial managers and "agriculturalists" which is shown, indicates that 55 of the 138 managers interviewed were asked if they had "good friends" in any of several "occupational groupings"; and of the 55, 27 indicated that they did have "good friends" among "agriculturalists" [p. 198]—a finding that indicates significant social ties between them.) Further, Johnson's respondents consisted of the general managers of 69 manufacturing firms employing 50–99 workers, and 69 employing 200 or more. Thus, they were essentially supervisory officials, rather than top corporate executives or principal owners of capital, in firms (even the latter 69 "large" ones) that were not among the 50 largest corporations analyzed in our study.

Although Johnson refers to them as "industrialists," his managers seem more appropriately to fit the still quite relevant category of the "middle sectors," "middle strata," or "small and medium industrial entrepreneurs," who purportedly held progressive views and would support liberal social reform (John Johnson 1958) or even a "popular anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic government"—as the Secretary General of the Chilean Communist party hoped (Corvalan 1971, pp. 197, 227, 324). In contrast with this imagery, Johnson (1968–69) found that the thinking of most of the industrial managers interviewed "simply mirrors the value premises of the staid and conservative, the class prejudices current in the upper ranks of society" (p. 196).

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