

returns to Cicero's relationship with Caesar and Pompey by exploring the orator's efforts to deliver speeches on behalf of supporters of the triumvirs. *Pro Balbo* and *Pro Marcello* receive the most attention in this chapter. A brief general conclusion sums up the main arguments of the book.

The book is well researched, and its extensive bibliography is an invaluable starting point for further research on Ciceronian oratory. K. makes a good case for reading the neglected speeches of the 50s and 40s BCE, such as *Pro Balbo*, *Pro Plancio*, *Pro Ligario* and *Pro Marcello*, with fresh eyes. Since the book focuses on thematic readings and oratorical techniques and does not provide extensive introductions to its source material, it will be of primary interest to specialists in the study of Cicero and Roman oratory. These scholars will doubtlessly profit from K.'s thorough survey of what the study of self-fashioning can contribute to our understanding of Cicero's late oratorical works.

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VOLUNTAS IN CICERO

PAULSON (L.) *Cicero and the People's Will. Philosophy and Power at the End of the Roman Republic*. Pp. xvi + 269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023. Cased, £75, US\$99.99. ISBN: 978-1-316-51411-5.

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P.'s monograph traces the use of the term *voluntas* in Cicero's extant works, with a view to understanding how Cicero conceived of the individual human 'will' and the 'will' of the *populus Romanus*.

Part 1 (Chapters 1–5, dealing with the practice of *voluntas*) argues that, in relation to the individual will, Cicero substantially extended the reach of the term *voluntas*, so that, in addition to its use to denote a wish or intention *simpliciter*, it might denote more specifically a rationally-derived will to act in a particular way or a durable disposition entailing, for example, goodwill towards a particular person or cause. In discussing individual *voluntas*, P. draws substantially on *De inventione*, on Cicero's speeches and on his private letters. He notes that Cicero also applied the term *voluntas populi* to the collective will of the *populus Romanus*. P. finds in Cicero's speeches of the 50s BCE and in *De re publica* and *De legibus* a novel account of how the *libertas* of the people could be reconciled with limits on its political rights, and, in this regard, P. attaches significance to the role of *voluntas populi* in Cicero's thought.

In Part 2 (Chapters 6–8, dealing with the philosophy of *voluntas*) P.'s focus shifts to *Tusculanae disputationes*, *Academica*, *De fato*, *De finibus* and *De officiis*. P. finds that Cicero proposed a different account of the functioning of the soul from those advanced by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Indeed, P. suggests that Cicero effectively invented the idea of the individual will. And, P. notes, Cicero explored the possibility of free will, using the phrase *libera voluntas*. Finally, Cicero proposed in *De officiis* that, of the various *personae* (roles) that a single individual fulfils in life, whilst some derive from an individual's circumstances, one is chosen according to individual *voluntas*. An epilogue

discusses Cicero's influence on later philosophical treatments of the will and free will, from Augustine to the founding fathers of the USA.

There is much to commend in P.'s work: its exploration of the tension between Cicero's principled attachment to Rome's republican institutions and the pressure he apparently felt to resort to less principled means to protect them; its attractive account of the way in which Cicero's life and career shaped the evolution of his moral and political understanding; and its compelling account of the subtleties of relationships among the senatorial elite in the late republic, invoking modern conceptions of 'powermapping' to explain Cicero's attempts to identify and utilise the *voluntas* of those who wielded political power or influence.

P. also draws on a commendably wide range of texts to support his case and offers insightful analyses of various individual passages. For example, in comparing Cicero's *De inventione* to the contemporary *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, P. offers a particularly good account of the superiority of Cicero's treatment of the arguments available to an orator who wishes to contend that a legal text should be interpreted according to its written terms (*scriptum*) or, alternatively, its draftsman's intention (*voluntas*).

Yet P.'s overall methodology raises various concerns. His focus on examining the use of just one word, *voluntas* (and occasionally its cognates *voluntarius* and *velle*), risks investing too much in this one word. Often Cicero couples *voluntas* with other nouns. Most often *voluntas* signifies simply a wish or an intention (what a person wishes or intends to do or see done), while the coupling of *voluntas* with *iudicium* or *consilium* discloses the kind of *voluntas* involved: a *voluntas* shaped by judgement or entailing commitment to a project or plan. P.'s focus on *voluntas* risks obscuring the significance of other terms in conveying the totality of Cicero's meaning. A similar risk arises where individual texts are read in isolation from their legal context. As P. notes, the *voluntas* expressed in a *testamentum* outlasts the testator's death. But the lasting effect of a testamentary expression of *voluntas* derives from its operating within a legal system in which validly executed, unrevoked *testamenta* are given effect after the testator's death as the binding expression of his *voluntas* in relation to the disposition of his estate. Similarly, a *lex* of general application takes effect, within a wider legal system, as the legislator's formal pronouncement as to how all future cases falling within its scope should be determined, thereby conferring lasting effect on the legislator's *voluntas*. But these usages of *voluntas* do not warrant an inference that, in other contexts, *voluntas* will also carry a suggestion of the durability of a wish or intention, the rationality or planning that underlies it, or its imposition of obligations on others to observe it.

P. also appears to attach unwarranted significance to *voluntas populi* in the argument of *De re publica*. Cicero's model *res publica* is characterised by the optimal balance (*aequabilitas*) it strikes among magistrates, senate and people, so that government is entrusted to those best suited to it, while the people enjoy such rights as will confer on them just enough *libertas* to ensure their continued support for the system. P. provides a compelling account of the extent of the *libertas* that the generality of Roman citizens will enjoy by virtue of their right to elect magistrates, the structuring of the electoral assembly in a way that gives greater weight to the votes of citizens of higher rank, and the expectation that magistrates, once elected, will act wisely in pursuit of the people's interests: what is done by magistrates in the people's name is done in pursuance of the people's *voluntas*. But the terminology of *voluntas populi* plays a relatively small part in Cicero's presentation: other terms are used more often than *voluntas/velle* to denote the people's expression of its will. They include, for example, *deligere*, *permittere*, *ferre*, *flagitare*, *asciscere*, *iubere*, *creare*, *concedere*, *cedere*, *pati* and *parere*. Moreover, the people's *libertas* is also protected by mechanisms that are arguably somewhat removed

from the expression of *voluntas populi*: citizens enjoy individual rights of *provocatio* and the protection of *tribuni plebis*, as key elements of the *consensus iuris* that holds the *res publica* together, by making the whole acceptable to citizens generally. By its focus on *voluntas populi* P.'s analysis risks elevating the significance of this term and diminishing the significance of other aspects of *libertas*.

In Part 2's examination of Cicero's philosophy of the human soul, P. finds in *Tusculanae disputationes* a novel conception of 'willpower'. Cicero adopts the term *voluntas* to translate the Stoic βούλησις. P. suggests that, in doing so, Cicero imports attributes of *voluntas* that P. has identified as attaching to it in Cicero's other works and in earlier Latin texts. Thus P. earlier found in *voluntas* an on-rushing quality: it is desire-in-motion. P. cites Varro's etymology of *voluntas*, which drew an association with *volare* ('to fly'). Accordingly, P. argues that Cicero's statement at *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.12 (*voluntas est quae quid cum ratione desiderat*) is to be read as suggesting that *voluntas* is not merely a belief, but a power – willpower – a durable force-in-motion. But the notion of a motive force of some kind was arguably already implicit in the Stoic βούλησις (M. Frede, *A Free Will* [2011], pp. 20–1). Cicero's reasoning here is obscure and potentially incoherent (M. Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions* [2002], pp. 134–9). P. cites alternative analyses of this passage, but could usefully have addressed them more fully in advancing his own interpretation.

In short, P.'s monograph offers much that is of great interest and great value, but its overall method is arguably not always ideally suited to its object.

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CICERO'S *DE NATURA DEORUM* REVISITED

DIEZ (C.), SCHUBERT (C.) (edd.) *Zwischen Skepsis und Staatskult. Neue Perspektiven auf Ciceros De natura deorum*. (Palingenesia 134.) Pp. 277, figs. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2022. Cased, €60. ISBN: 978-3-515-13326-5.

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The book under review, which originates from a conference held at Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg in 2018, is a valuable contribution to the study of Cicero's *De natura deorum* (henceforth *ND*). The eleven chapters that make up the volume – mostly in German, except for one chapter in French and two in English – address central issues in the analysis of this Ciceronian text from different perspectives.

The collection is organised into four main sections of two or three contributions each, on different topics and perspectives, such as Roman religion and *ND*, *Quellenforschung*, the study of rhetorical and literary aspects of the text, and the reception and tradition of Ciceronian philosophy in ancient and modern times.

After the introduction, in which the editors present the volume and summarise its contents, the first chapter, by W. Stroh, provides a comprehensive analysis of the importance of Roman religion both in Cicero's life and texts, especially between 62 and 56 BCE. This is undoubtedly one of the finest contributions in the volume. After considering Cicero's