

lovely pictures to be found anywhere in the country. Salisbury has yet another claim to distinction as being the home of the liturgical Use of Sarum which, first compiled by St Osmund at the end of the eleventh century, was eventually adopted throughout the province of Canterbury and spread even to Ireland and Scotland.

It was in 1219 that Bishop Poore, authorised by a Papal Bull, removed the seat of the diocese from the cramped and unsuitable setting or Old Sarum to a meadow near the Avon and the following year laid the foundation stone of the present cathedral which was consecrated in 1258. In the fourteenth century the tower and spire were added.

Though the actual fabric suffered comparatively little from reformers and puritans it was far otherwise at the end of the eighteenth century when James Wyatt was let loose on the building under the guise of effecting 'improvements'. This vandal architect destroyed the detached bell-tower, the chantries flanking the Lady Chapel and the beautiful thirteenth-century pulpitum. Sir Gilbert Scott's restoration in the sixties was decidedly drastic and most people nowadays will consider that Wyatt's screen made up of mediaeval bits and pieces was more pleasing than the metal horror which took its place.

It is gratifying to note that the author emphasises the true purpose of the cathedral—as indeed of all Christian cathedrals—when he says (p. 45):—'The supreme act of worship in the cathedral was the celebration of High Mass which took place every morning at 9 or 10 at the altar of the Assumption of the Blessed Mary in the sanctuary'. There are three plans, one of which shows the position of the various mediaeval altars from which we learn that the high altar stood considerably further west than does the present holy table.

E. T. LONG

THE CHRISTIAN IN PHILOSOPHY. By J. V. Langmead Casserley. (Faber 18s.)

Philosophy has been defined as the science of reality in terms of ultimate causes gained by the light of natural reason. The word 'ultimate' is important since it indicates that the conclusions reached by philosophers in their investigation of reality should be final and not provisional. Wisdom demands a definitive solution of the problems of experienced reality—a philosopher should not be content with suggestions as to how things may have been caused or about possible ends for which they may conceivably exist; rather he needs to know the actual causes, both final and efficient, which explain adequately the universe in which he lives. For a philosopher, then, the supernatural constitutes something of a problem, partly because it involves the

presence in reality of elements which he can never come to know by unaided reason, and partly because it makes his explanations of the reality he does know, to some extent provisional. To say that his explanations are provisional does not imply of course that they may turn out to be wrong since there cannot be 'two truths', but it does mean that the philosophical explanation of reality is essentially imperfect—a partial apprehension of truth.

For a Christian, in consequence, philosophy is the search for an essentially imperfect understanding of reality and the question naturally arises as to how this can be a search for wisdom. Is not wisdom a completely satisfying and universal understanding of reality? Distinctions can of course be made. It can be said that philosophical understanding is satisfactory at the level of human reason, that it enables us to understand nature to the extent to which nature is intrinsically intelligible, that it constitutes the 'whole truth' within natural limits. On the other hand the supernatural is above the natural and knowledge of it or ignorance does not intrinsically affect our knowledge of the natural universe. This kind of distinction leads to a fairly clear-cut distinction between the natural and the supernatural and a consequent distinction of philosophy from theology. It has however one practical drawback since its acceptance can lead to the view of reality as a collection of natures complete in themselves to which the supernatural has been added as a kind of metaphysical accident, and for which, in the natures themselves, there exists no natural potentiality. Without some potentiality in nature for the supernatural there can of course be no real continuity and to avoid this difficulty 'obediential potentiality' is invoked. As far as can be seen this kind of potentiality is a capacity but not a tendency, a negation but not a privation, it has reference to a cause of infinite power which is creative, not merely 'eductive'. The same distinction applied to natural and supernatural truth would seem to imply that philosophical understanding is capable of being perfected by revealed wisdom, but has no natural demand or tendency to such perfecting. Since wisdom as knowledge is essentially conscious this might lead to the view that there can be no conscious articulation of natural with supernatural truth.

On the other hand, if some such distinction is not made it is almost inevitable that philosophy will either merge with or conflict with revealed truth. Conflict will take place if philosophical understanding lays claim to universality and adequateness—the supra-reasonable will be rejected as the unreasonable. Merging will take place where revealed truth is accepted as unique wisdom and philosophy will appear as an unsatisfying alternative to divine wisdom.

As might be surmised from the title, the author of the present book

sets out to discuss these problems. The first part of the book is devoted to a résumé of the opinions of Christian thinkers on this particular point. The three tendencies already alluded to will be found exemplified in the development of Christian thought. This part of the book is of great interest and well done. The author's sympathies on the whole would appear to be with the Augustine tradition—his judgment on St Thomas is that he was the Christian apologist *par excellence*, his one serious error was the rejection of the ontological argument, and that 'in turning philosophy into a rationalistic prelude to theology and the life of faith, St Thomas overlooked the essential truth of the Augustinian insistence that, so far as human thought and experience are concerned, faith precedes rational inquiry'. (p. 81.)

In the second part of the book the author presents his own thoughts on the present opportunity of the Christian in philosophy. He believes that the Christian in philosophy is 'a Christian man trying to see life steadily and whole, seeking a comprehensive vision of all the facts, natural, aesthetic, moral and social, by interpreting them as the constituents of a Christian universe, best, because most profoundly, comprehensively and stimulating, explained in terms of analogies drawn from the experience of Christian personality in Christian history. The function of the Christian philosopher is not primarily apologetic at all. He is not in any sense an organ of an evangelical church, but a philosopher seeking to interpret life and reality. His aim is to proclaim and illustrate the truth as he sees it'. (p. 252-253.)

While the reader will probably find a number of points upon which he disagrees with the author, a reading of the book is to be recommended since it is both informative and stimulating. It has moreover the advantage of being well and clearly written.

GEORGE EKBERY

MY PHILOSOPHY. And other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of our time. By Benedetto Croce. Selected by R. Klibansky. Translated by E. F. Carritt. (Allen and Unwin 15s.)

The main title of this book is merely the title of the first essay, a brief retrospect of ten pages in which Croce considers the factors which have moulded his thought. Hence the reader must not be led to expect any summary statement or restatement of Croce's system, nor will he find anything of a kind that Croce has not said before. It is true that there are ten pages on 'Why we cannot help calling ourselves Christians', which show a more positive appreciation of Christianity than we have hitherto associated with the author, but the Christianity is still of a very vague and general sort. The book is really a pious gathering of some of Croce's more recent jottings, varying in length from a single page to