

I think this is what lies behind Aquinas's distinction between 'created' and 'uncreated' happiness (in II, Q.III, i.). If this is so then Aquinas is not misusing the distinction between happiness and the possession of happiness as Durrant says he is (p. 31).

Durrant's objections to the formula (and indeed the doctrine) of the Trinity, in the second part of his book, rest on an analysis of the use of the terms 'substance' and 'hypostasis' in the Greek fathers. He tries to show that the Fathers misused the Aristotelean concepts in such a way as to involve themselves in logically illicit manoeuvres. They tend to think of 'substance' as some kind of underlying reality which individuals share, or alternatively as a characteristic which different individuals possess in common, and without this misuse of Aristotle, the Trinitarian formula cannot even 'get off the ground' (Durrant's unfortunate choice of phrase, not mine). Similarly, the formula misuses the concept of 'person' by supposing that the predicate '— is a person' gives a criterion of identity and thus a basis for enumeration, such that it is possible to speak of Father, Son and Holy Ghost as three persons in one and the same substance. Durrant argues that the concept person cannot be so interpreted for the purposes that the theological tradition requires, and that therefore the formula, and indeed the doctrine of the Trinity, is unintelligible. Further, since it is essentially unintelligible, there is no question of 'reinterpreting' it in other terms. You cannot reinterpret something which has no sense in it anyway—for there is nothing to reinterpret.

I have no space, nor indeed competence, to dispute Durrant's arguments in detail here. But one general point can be made about the kind of problem posed by a book of this sort. Where an argument is very intricate and runs against the grain of a long and massively significant tradition, the reader is bound to ask himself the question, which is the more likely, that the whole tradition is wrong or that there is a flaw somewhere in this man's argument?

Thus, if my bank manager produced a set of sums which seemed to prove that I was a millionaire, I would be more inclined to say

that he (or his computer) had gone wrong somewhere, even though I couldn't see exactly where, than to accept his assertion contrary to everything I believe to be the case about my own finances and those of my family. Similarly, I ask myself whether it is really possible that the whole of Christian tradition can be as wrong as Durrant says and in the way he says. Of course, in the abstract there is nothing inherently impossible about such a thought. But we aren't dealing with something merely abstract (though Durrant's treatment might suppose we were), but with something that has been believed and lived by a countless millions of highly intelligent people. Now this argument in no way shows that there is something wrong with Durrant's reasoning: but it is a caution not to jump to hasty conclusions. And it has some force when we look at Durrant's treatment of the objection, raised by Professor Mackinnon, that the argument presented in his book takes no note of the historical context of the questions which the Trinitarian formula was designed to answer. Durrant simply replies that if a proposition is logically unintelligible, there is no need to look outside it to the context, since it cannot be the answer to anything. This seems to me to be dangerously over-confident. After all, in an earlier volume in this series Anthony Kenny attributed a view to Aquinas which a reference to the larger context of Aquinas's thought would have shown to be impossible. (See Professor Geach's review of *The Five Ways in Philosophical Quarterly*, July 1970, pp. 311-2). Similarly, without some analysis of the historical context of the Trinitarian controversies we cannot be sure that the logical fallacies attributed by Durrant to St. Augustine and the rest are in fact there, since we cannot be sure that the conceptual framework in which the fallacies arise is the framework they were using. If historians of ideas can often be accused of shying away from the questions of truth which, in the end, matter most to us, logicians can equally often be accused of only producing logical maps of territories nobody actually inhabits. We need both a sense of logic and a sense of history: neither will suffice without the other.

BRIAN WICKER

THE OLD TESTAMENT FOR MODERN READERS, by D. B. J. Campbell. John Murray, London, 1972. 136 pp. £1.50 (70p paperback).

Miss Campbell has endeavoured to bridge the gap between the Old Testament world and the modern reader by patient and simple explanation. She ranges from the Hebrew view of history and of God, through a discussion of the different literary genres in the Old Testa-

ment, to an item by item account of 'primitive' religious beliefs, Jewish festivals and concepts of sacrifice. The book would be particularly useful for schools and students as it brings together information which must otherwise be extracted piecemeal from Bible

dictionaries, atlases, and the more solid Old Testament introductions. Yet it is not in itself a complete and adequate introduction—it is at best only a supplementary aid and is in no way a substitute for a well-informed teacher or substantial introduction. The gap between the Old Testament and the modern reader cannot be bridged in 136 pages, as Miss Campbell would no doubt agree.

There are some features which mar the value of the book. In the area of fact: the Settlement is described solely as an 'invasion' and no reference is made to the well-established arguments of Alt and Noth for there also being a long period of peaceful infiltration. The Sinai Covenant is not distinguished from Yahweh's election of Israel, a distinction reflected in the Old Testament's use of *hesed* (covenant-love) and *'ahabah* (election-love) (cf. N. H. Snaith, *Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament*; London, 1944; pp. 131ff.).

And it is extraordinary that in the discussion of Jewish views of the after-life physical resurrection is scarcely mentioned. In the area of interpretation: it is unreasonable to dismiss consistently ideas of God and morality which differ from our own as 'primitive', meaning undeveloped and wrong. It is doubtful, too, whether one can allow the New Testament to be the sole criterion of what is and what is not valid in the Old Testament in the way in which Miss Campbell wishes; the New Testament must itself be measured against the living spirit of the Gospel (cf. J. L. Houlden, *Ethics and the New Testament*; London, 1973).

This almost naive approach to both facts and interpretation points to a failure to enter sympathetically into the thought-world of the Old Testament—and if Miss Campbell has not managed to do that, it is doubtful whether her modern reader will. The gap remains.

RICHARD PEARCE

THE RECOVERY OF PAUL'S LETTER TO THE GALATIANS, by J. C. O'Neill. S.P.C.K. London, 1972. 87 pp. £2.60.

How clear, consecutive and logical can one expect Paul to be? Dr. O'Neill thinks that one can expect a good deal higher a standard than is offered by the present text of the letter to the Galatians. The impetus to his detailed study of the text is given by two considerations, the inability of eminent commentators to agree on any solution to a number of problems raised by the text, and some strangely unexpected attitudes shown towards the Jews. His solution is that at various times scribes have glossed the text, inserting explanations in the margin which have later crept into the text itself, making minor alterations to clarify points which to them were obscure or incorrect; at times also larger insertions were made, explanations and expansions sometimes a whole paragraph in length. Thus almost all O'Neill's alterations to the text are excisions, though occasionally there is a choice of a comparatively obscure or ill-attested MS reading, usually to fit in with another alteration.

Any number of the author's suggestions are attractive, and often they do clear up obscurities and straighten out little difficulties. But a number of important and well-known passages are also cut out or altered. For instance, 1. 13—14, 22—24 are cut out as 'an edifying reminiscence of the conversion of St. Paul' (p. 27), and with them all information of Paul's previous persecution of the Church from the pen of the apostle himself. Strictly speaking O'Neill is correct that Paul's previous Judaism and the opinion of the Jewish churches about him are irrelevant to his present point, that he was directly commissioned by God. But on the other hand the strength

of his previous aversion to Christianity does show the force of the call he received (much as Joseph's hesitation in taking Mary to be his wife underlines that his eventual adoption of Jesus must have had a divine warrant). It is all a question of how much strict logic you can demand. Another excision removes 4.1—3, 8—10; since 3.23—25 also disappears the whole image of the Law as a pedagogue, and of the son who is under tutors until the coming of Christ, is lost. 3.23—25 is 'a profound commentary on Paul, but commentary' (p. 54). The later passage is censured because the two images of the heir being in subjection like a slave, and the real slave ransomed, are 'incompatible' (p. 56). Similarly 4.19 must be doctored: Paul cannot be in birth-pangs 'until Christ is formed in you', because (p. 62) 'formation in the womb cannot follow birth-pangs'. Obviously someone did not mind mixing a metaphor, but I fail to see why one should be less willing to lay the charge at Paul's feet than at those of an anonymous glossator. Finally the whole of 5.13—6.10 has to go, for it is a collection of miscellaneous moral and ethical advice which has no bearing on Paul's theme in Galatians, added by someone who thought that such a letter *should* have a moral section. But who is to say they were wrong? Perhaps Paul thought so too?

On the whole, however, O'Neill remains remarkably sober, avoiding the wild conjectures which are only too often associated with this sort of method. However his suggestions would change the character of the letter considerably, as well as eliminating ideas which we have come to value. The basic question is