

TELEVISION AND VIDEO IN THE TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN RULE IN BRAZIL

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Until now, discussions of theories of media and society or media and the state in the North American literature have been limited. The four theories of the press advanced by Fred Siebert, Wilbur Schramm, and Theodore Peterson cover the main approaches of Western liberal society, the libertarian and social responsibility models, and some aspects of the Eastern bloc in the "totalitarian" model. Under the heading of "authoritarian," however, a number of very diverse systems are lumped together.¹ One major variation seen in Brazil is the continued vitality of the corporatist model of state and society, which has distinct implications for the role of mass media. In particular, aspects of corporatism seem to be combining with aspects of democracy and mass mobilization politics in ways that shed light on the role of the media in constructing or undercutting ideological hegemony in the heterogeneous, class-divided societies of Latin America.

The corporatist model of politics links various groups directly or vertically to the state through structures such as unions, bureaucracies, the military, industries, and other interest groups,² and in some cases, through mass mobilization or ideological socialization by the media. In Brazil the authoritarian military regimes have used corporate organizations and media primarily as a means of control but also to a limited extent for introducing ideological content. Within the "tripod of dependent development" (the combination of national capital, foreign capital, and state interests described by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Peter Evans), it can be argued that further articulation of specific institutional interests has occurred, particularly the rise of media institutions as semi-independent actors of considerable weight.³ In opposition to this hegemonic role of the major mass media, some Brazilian interest groups or "corporate" groups such as trade unions and the Catholic Church have turned to alternative means of communication, including producing and distributing videotapes, to disseminate their protests.

Television in Brazil

Some Brazilian scholars, including R. A. Amaral Vieira, have concluded that the political role of television in Brazil differs somewhat from that in other Latin American countries due to the scale and nature of the media structures that have evolved in Brazil.⁴ Most critical perhaps has been the role of TV Globo, which dominates the Brazilian television industry and has acquired the most influence on government decision making and the molding of public opinion.

TV Globo dominates the audience and ratings thoroughly, capturing 60 to 80 percent of the audience most of the time. The network is owned by Roberto Marinho, who is widely regarded as one of the richest and most powerful men in Brazil. He also owns *O Globo* (one of the two major newspapers in Rio de Janeiro), radio stations, record companies, and magazines, as well as a variety of economic holdings outside the media. Marinho started TV Globo in 1962 with financial and technical support from Time-Life, Incorporated. But his network essentially rose with the Revolution of 1964, which subsidized Marinho's buy-out of Time-Life between 1968 and 1971 and created much of the infrastructure that TV Globo needed to succeed, such as a microwave network and liberal credit for purchasing television sets.⁵

By 1971 TV Globo had achieved network status and consolidated production of both its news programs and its *telenovelas* (evening serials or "soap operas") into the most popular programming in Brazil. One of TV Globo's achievements has been to gradually develop the ability to produce ten to twelve hours of programming per day. In doing so, TV Globo has managed to push out most imported American programs (at least out of prime time) and create a pattern of taste among the audience for its particular style, referred to as the *padrão global de qualidade* (the Globo standard of quality).

The original main Brazilian network, TV Tupi of the *Diários e Emissoras Associados*, was bankrupted by competition from TV Globo, along with internal management problems. Another network, TV Excelsior, was bankrupted by revolutionary government measures during the 1960s. More recently, TV Bandeirantes has slowly achieved national network status by attracting affiliated stations to a program line somewhat oriented toward elite or upper-middle-class viewers. This network is notable for purposes of my analysis because of its concentration on news and public-affairs interviews that were generally more critical than those shown on TV Globo, although they may have been aired for purposes of attracting an audience. A similar strategy has also been adopted by TV Manchete, owned by Adolfo Bloch, who owns *Manchete* magazine and other publishing interests. Both TV Bandeirantes and TV Manchete have tried to break into programming that is oriented more

toward mass audiences, but they have been frustrated in their efforts by audience loyalty to TV Globo. This following endows TV Globo with the financial resources to continue a high level of production to hold its audience. A contrasting strategy aimed at lower-class and lower-middle-class audiences has been adopted by the Sistema Brasileira de Televisão (SBT), owned by Sílvio Santos. SBT's strategy gives greater prominence to variety shows, games, and comedies and much less to news. The Manchete and SBT networks were formed in 1979 and 1980, when the government decided to give out TV Tupi's former licenses or channels in order to foster competition with TV Globo. It appears that despite TV Globo's reputed loyalty to regimes in power since 1964, government officials began to feel uneasy about the degree of power that TV Globo had accumulated over the Brazilian viewing audience.⁶

Television and the State in Brazil

Because of their economic power and value to the elite and the state, large media organizations such as TV Globo may assert independent interests. But even under bureaucratic-authoritarian or corporatist regimes, media become a major tool of government. Media can be used to encourage identification with the elite or "symbolic participation" by the masses. Media can also be used to mobilize mass support when the regime considers it desirable. These possibilities occasion a more subtle interplay of commonly held ideological and hegemonic interests among ruling elites, dominant institutions (including key media), and divergent interests. Some writers on cultural dependency have predicted the development of both conflict and identity of interests between national elites and foreign media, for instance, and some writers on media-state relations perceive much the same interplay of conflict and ideological harmony between national media and the state.⁷

In the case of Brazil, it appears that trends toward media-state interdependence have been accelerated. Yet TV Globo is atypical of Third World mass media in the enormous power it has amassed vis-à-vis the state. The state usually mediates between television and society by using its economic power or regulatory and concessionary control. Also, other economic interests, such as advertisers, often exercise some control in media decisions.

Within Roberto Marinho's empire, however, TV Globo has achieved a remarkable degree of horizontal integration into other industries (radio, music recording, newspapers, and publishing, as well as industries outside the media such as fashion and real estate). TV Globo also has its own vertical integration and controls all aspects of TV production, research, and marketing, an arrangement that endows it with significant economic power. Moreover, TV Globo dominates both

audience ratings and the consequent advertising income, receiving slightly over 60 percent of the money spent on television advertising. The second-ranked network, SBT, claims only 20 percent of the audience and 11 percent of the advertising revenue, while TV Manchete gets 6 percent of the audience and 11 percent of the revenue and TV Bandeirantes, 5 percent of the audience and 10 percent of the revenue.⁸ This distribution has resulted in the audience being highly segmented: TV Globo targets and draws the mass audience, TV Bandeirantes and TV Manchete seek the elite and upper middle class, and SBT aims at the lower-middle and lower classes. The networks other than TV Globo, particularly TV Bandeirantes and TV Manchete, are significant because in targeting more elite audiences, they often set journalistic trends that ripple through other media and through TV Globo itself. What is most striking, however, is the great economic and political power amassed by Roberto Marinho and TV Globo, which results in the state having less mediating power in TV Globo, its program line, and its relationships with other actors.

Consequently, TV Globo has been increasingly able to pursue its own agenda and interests. These interests may at times coincide with other bourgeois interests or with government interests, but not always. For example, TV Globo's editorial line resists the expressed interests of the government and other economic groups by opposing expanded Brazilian relations with Angola.

Television and the Transition from Military to Civilian Rule

The transition from military to civilian rule in Brazil would be expected to have resulted in major changes in the content of television, particularly in the political content of news programs. One would expect the civilian regime, known as the Nova República, to exert noticeably less overt censorship on political and "moral" topics. But continuities remain in the basic political structure of Brazil, the relationship of key groups to the state, and the economic power vested in television's major advertisers (national capital, state-owned corporations, and multinationals). All these continuities suggest that the essential structure and content of television, news as well as the sociopolitical commentary implicit in much nationally produced entertainment, will not change much.

The era of democratic governments, which began in 1945, was ended by the military coup in 1964, and the ensuing Brazilian military regimes used corporatist institutions to assert their legitimacy. They retained some elements of democratic representation by keeping the legislature open and used mass social institutions, like mass media, to mobilize limited amounts of public support.⁹ The resulting model was a

form of corporatism that was more exclusionary than inclusionary (as defined by Alfred Stepan). Such a model violates many of the underlying traditions of the organic-statist model and may lead a society to reject the regime and return to a more inclusionary form of corporatism or perhaps even to pluralism or electoral democracy.¹⁰ This prediction seems to have been borne out in the Brazilian case. The initial military regimes (between 1964 and 1974) were based on exclusionary policies that made it almost impossible for the succeeding military regimes (from 1974 to 1984) to achieve hegemony or consent to rule without continued repression. As Stepan has observed:

. . . though polarization is functional for installation [of corporatist regimes] by exclusionary policies, there are costs for the regime. Precisely because of the societal polarization and the selective targeting of coercion, there is almost no chance, no matter how successful the regime might be in some of its subsequent economic policies, that it could achieve an ideologically hegemonic situation in the Gramscian sense. Given this "birth defect" of the regime, even economic growth and increased economic distribution will not greatly diminish the regime's dependence on visible and credible coercive mechanisms.¹¹

The last two Brazilian military governments, the Geisel and Figueiredo regimes, perceived that they were losing legitimacy, perhaps initially due to faltering economic growth. They apparently tried to compensate by opening the regime to more inclusionary policies, particularly via symbolic inclusion through the media. Several campaigns were conducted to make Brazilians feel positive about the country, reflected in such slogans as "Este é um país que vai para frente." A number of analysts, from neo-Marxists to contributors to the *New York Times*, concluded that TV Globo's telenovelas (prime-time serials) seemed to be written to create a positive image of Brazil and the military regimes' "economic miracle."¹² But the leadership of these regimes were not capable of forging a coalition of support broad enough to achieve ideological hegemony without coercion or the "legitimacy" conferred by economic growth.

The gradual transition to civilian rule in Brazil between 1974 and 1985 seems to represent an effort to build broader "hegemonic" acceptance of key elite goals that were largely related to maintaining economic stability in a state capitalist pattern. In 1984 and 1985, the campaign for direct elections was diverted into a campaign to find a widely acceptable civilian presidential candidate for "indirect" elections by an electoral college, which was made up of the Congress and some state officials. What emerged was a controlled transition to President Tancredo Neves, who died before he could be inaugurated, leaving Vice President José Sarney in power.

Television played a key role in the transition, particularly TV Globo, which was probably indispensable in consolidating the transi-

tion. But this period also revealed the limits on the ability of mass media to create or sustain hegemony when opposed by powerful social movements using other communication systems. These limits were particularly evident in the role played by TV Globo in the original campaign in 1983 and 1984 to get rid of the military regime by immediate direct elections (the *diretas já* campaign). Following a line that seemed consistent with the network's perceived ties to the military government, TV Globo either ignored or gave negative coverage to this campaign by the civilian opposition. The movement grew from various sources of support: the backing of party organizations and state governors, the use by governors and other leaders of local or regional media (including television stations other than Globo), effective street demonstrations in more than a thousand cities during four months, support from major newspapers, and radio coverage.¹³ All this support reflected the public's strong desire for a civilian regime and a change in leadership, as confirmed by several public opinion polls taken during this period.

One example of TV Globo's initial "negative" coverage occurred on 25 January 1984, when its evening news program, *Journal Nacional*, devoted only forty-five seconds to a rally in São Paulo favoring direct elections, treating it merely in the context of a city festival. Public pressure increased, however, and TV Globo soon switched sides, with visible impact on its coverage. In early April 1984, TV Globo gave a major rally for direct elections in Rio one hour's coverage spread throughout the day, including the prime-time 8 p.m. *telenovela* and newscasts. The audience was clearly ready for this kind of coverage. More Brazilians watched the Rio rally in April (83 percent in Rio and 60 percent in São Paulo) than watched the World Soccer Cup games. After this rally, TV Globo assumed a critical role by ignoring censorship warnings and airing live coverage of demonstrations during days and evenings as well as in formal newscasts. The network also "loaned" to the movement its popular sportscaster Osmar Santos, who became the campaign's prime representative and public symbol.¹⁴

TV Globo's Move to Support the Transition

The reasons behind TV Globo's switch to supporting the campaign for direct elections and subsequently throwing its weight behind a civilian candidate in the indirect "elections" reveal a great deal about the role of television in the politics of hegemony in Brazil. TV Globo switched sides at the critical moment, when strong momentum toward civilian rule had already been created and the will to resist—even within the military elite—had waned. When the elite fragmented over the issue of civilian rule, TV Globo managers perceived the direction

that major elements were heading and switched to support a new coalition, thus following its own interests.

According to César Guimarães and R. A. Amaral Vieira, TV Globo President Roberto Marinho followed the move by the moderate military-civilian elite alliance known as the “Castellista” group (those associated with former military Presidents Castello Branco and Geisel). This alliance decided to try to preserve its dominance by dumping an unpopular candidate backed by the military and promoting a moderate conservative.¹⁵

A competing, or perhaps supplementary, hypothesis is that TV Globo was disturbed by the prospect of falling too far behind its audience. Coverage of the campaign for direct elections was becoming “massive” in print media and on other network news programs, a trend that made Globo’s lack of coverage more noticeable. TV Globo film crews and trucks were beginning to encounter rock-throwing on the streets during demonstrations supporting direct elections. This lag contrasted distinctly with TV Globo’s usual ability to anticipate or quickly adapt to new audience interests.¹⁶ For example, earlier in the process of political transition, TV Globo had followed its competitors’ leads fairly quickly in putting on critical interview shows. One *Veja* story on interview news on TV Globo in 1981 concluded that “if it gets ratings, then Globo will do it” (“se da Ibope, a Globo faz”).¹⁷ It must be remembered that although TV Globo contributes greatly to creating consensus by exercising ideological leadership in a variety of widely watched programming, the network is above all a commercial enterprise that could not, or would not, risk alienating much of its audience for a political cause that appeared to be failing.

In addition to suffering public criticism of its hesitance to support the campaign for direct elections, the management of TV Globo apparently suffered a good deal of internal criticism as well. Several journalists and academics interviewed in 1986 noted that a number of TV Globo journalists were highly critical of the station’s position and may even have threatened to strike if Globo did not begin to support the campaign for direct elections.¹⁸

There is also some evidence that specific actions by the Figueiredo military regime had alienated Globo’s management. They were annoyed with recurrent censorship, particularly the government’s attempts to censor television coverage of the congressional vote on direct elections, for which Globo had made expensive preparations. Globo management were also displeased with the granting of several television station licenses to the Manchete Group, which looked like a potentially strong competitor. Perhaps most important, Marinho was very opposed to the official civilian presidential candidate of the government party, Paulo Maluf of the Partido Democrático Social. Several academics

and journalists interviewed in 1986 concluded that Globo news coverage was clearly slanted against Maluf, as evidenced by taking remarks out of context, editing remarks, and looking for mistakes.

Above all, TV Globo's leadership has always been pragmatic and business-oriented. The early steps to organize TV Globo, including some special favors granted in TV Globo's then-tentative joint venture with Time-Life, were taken under the premilitary government of João Goulart.¹⁹ Although Roberto Marinho apparently has some lasting political enemies (like Leonel Brizola and Paulo Maluf), he is generally pragmatic where politicians are concerned. This observation is admittedly somewhat at odds with the idea that Marinho and TV Globo have been loyal to the military "Castellista" group.

A more easily defensible hypothesis is that TV Globo followed its own interests as well as a shift in the underlying elite consensus. This shift took place after the strength of the direct elections campaign became clear, reflecting the unpopularity and perceived illegitimacy of continued military rule shown in polls conducted by IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística), Gallup, and the *Folha de São Paulo* between 1980 and 1986. Many of the elite decided to support a moderate opposition leader in indirect elections as a compromise. The candidate who emerged, Tancredo Neves, was acceptable to many government party politicians and members of the military, especially after he accepted as his running mate José Sarney, former leader of the government party.

But TV Globo seems to have gone beyond merely following the elite coalition. Unlike some other elements of the elite, TV Globo could not follow its own interests and still participate in an attempt to oppose a mass movement by the majority of the population (and television audience). *Veja* observed that "Globo certainly did not become converted to the movement calling for direct elections. What it did was recognize the journalistic importance of the events and simultaneously recognize that to remain outside the movement could be highly prejudicial to its larger strategic interests."²⁰

Television and the Nova República

The process discussed above indicates substantial elite continuity between military and civilian governments. The questions that arise are these: does essentially the same authoritarian effort continue, or does a transition occur into a different style of hegemony, a more pluralistic mass politics? This researcher found strong continuities in the role of television. That is to say, political support is being mobilized by the civilian regime through media in a manner similar to the military's use of television but one that reflects a different coalition of elites.

A critical starting point in defining the current situation is the structural position of television vis-à-vis the state. TV Globo's economic power, based on the vertical and horizontal integration outlined above, has not been broken up by the new regime. Perhaps its power remains untouched because TV Globo represents a tool, albeit a potentially double-edged tool, that the state does not want to diminish. Regardless of regime changes, the continued increase in urban population and in middle and working classes translates into a continuing growth in mass society in Brazil, which is largely shaped by mass media, particularly television and TV Globo. Continuing to incorporate TV Globo into the hegemonic apparatus for perpetuating ideologies favorable to elite interests (including those of TV Globo) makes as much sense under civilian regimes as under military rule. An interesting trend to watch, however, is the countertendency for the general audience dominated by TV Globo to be segmented into smaller audiences defined by social class. Although the Sistema Brasileira de Televisão (SBT) was not a major factor in the political transition, it has become a major factor in the current audience segmentation because it is drawing the lower-middle-class and lower-class audience away from TV Globo. This trend has the longer-run potential to diminish TV Globo's dominant role in programming for virtually the entire Brazilian audience.

Although media critics in the 1970s began to believe that the Globo group was a committed ally of the military, it seems more accurate to characterize Globo as a major element of the Brazilian power structure, which for a time tended to favor military rule. Indeed, TV Globo promoted the Sarney government's recent economic plan, the Plano Cruzado, as ardently as it ever promoted plans of the military regimes. Several persons interviewed for this study noted that in order to assure TV Globo's support, the government apparently informed Marinho of the plan before many administration figures or state governors were told.

Moreover, some real benefits have accrued to TV Globo under the civilian government. Overt controls on television, like censorship, have definitely lessened under the new civilian regime. The authorities do not seem to be exercising any political censorship, although self-censorship and an ingrained disinclination to offend authorities probably still limit criticism of government. Relatively little "moral" censorship is occurring now, although debate continues on this issue. A poll taken by the *Folha de São Paulo* in February 1985 in São Paulo showed 41 percent of the general public favored some censorship, but of sex (57 percent) or violence (38 percent) rather than politics (4 percent). It should be pointed out, however, that as in the past, some of TV Globo's competitors are bolder in exploiting new openings in censorship. For

example, TV Manchete moved first to show more nudity in telenovelas like *Dona Beija* and in miniseries, then TV Globo followed suit.

Both news and entertainment programming on the various networks have responded to the decline in censorship. The most important news episodes were probably those shown during the campaign for direct elections. Since the transfer of power, news programs have also featured more open criticism in the form of commentaries and editorials. Even TV Globo recently announced the debut of a group of "essayists" or commentators. News coverage of elections and campaigns has also expanded greatly, first in the 1984 elections but particularly in the 1986 gubernatorial and congressional campaigns. Another innovation in 1986 was free, uncensored television time for candidates' views and debates. An increase in televised information on candidate choices is also demonstrated by analyses of polling data before and after the initiation of daily, hour-long slots for campaign messages and debates. For example, the rise of certain candidates, such as Oreste Quércia in São Paulo, has been attributed by analysts, candidates, and pollsters to the effective use of increased television coverage.²¹

Equally dramatic has been the opening up of social criticism in the telenovelas (prime-time serials). In this area, TV Globo has led the way. According to television critics, Globo offered more direct political criticism during the transition in the telenovela *O Bem Amado* than in its main news program. *Journal Nacional* was instead judged more likely to portray "reality in accordance with government policy."²² In producing telenovelas, Globo has frequently chosen authors with critical perspectives. For example, Dias Gomes, who wrote *O Bem Amado* and is currently directing the creation of new novelas for TV Globo, is a former member of the Partido Comunista do Brasil.

Perhaps the most noticeable intrusion of political and social commentary into the telenovelas came after the transition with the airing of *Roque Santeiro*, a series that was completely prohibited by government censors ten years earlier. Written by Dias Gomes and Aguinaldo Silva, the telenovela's screenplay describes life in an old-fashioned Northeast Brazilian town dominated by a corrupt "colonel," whose rivals are a liberal priest and an enigmatic newcomer. The novela's director, Paulo Ubiratan, described *Roque Santeiro* as "Globo's way of marking the passage from the Old to the New Republic." Minister of Government Reform Paulo Lustosa found it "a critical appreciation of Brazilian society, of elite behavior and the vices of the political process."²³ Another novela author called it "a fable about the difference between official reality and factual reality, a celebration of the end of the lies of the old regime."²⁴ Opinion research has shown that middle-class interviewees in all regions of Brazil welcomed *Roque Santeiro* as proof of the liberaliza-

tion of censorship and wanted more Brazilian productions to be “realistic” and “critical” about Brazilian life.²⁵ In fact, *Roque Santeiro* was popular with virtually everyone, averaging an unprecedented 80 percent of the audience for eight months and over 90 percent for key episodes.

Some instances of “moral” censorship continue nevertheless. The first Minister of Justice under the Nova República, Fernando Lyra, reduced censorship except in the cases of Jean-Luc Godard’s film *Hail Mary* and two episodes of *Roque Santeiro*. The new Minister of Justice, Paulo Brossard, is described by subordinates as “wishing to enforce the law” that prohibits offenses against “good morals” (*bons costumes*). Cuts have been required in sex scenes in at least two episodes of *Selva de Pedra* and others in *Corpo a Corpo* and *Um Sonho a Mais*.²⁶

Corporatist Opposition, Old Media, and New Media

Unlike models of mass politics in which competing groups form opposition political parties, the mechanism for opposition in corporatist states is problematic. There is a lingering effect of the “concession theory” of interest groups, taken from Roman law, which holds that all groups must be charted or even initiated by the state. This approach conflicts with the notion that political movements should articulate the interests of the constituents.

Other models view corporatism as coming up from society instead of down from the state or Iberian tradition or both.²⁷ In this model, even without efforts by the state to force interest groups into a corporatist mold, some groups in current regimes may elect to pursue traditional models of corporatist representation with which they have succeeded in the past.

Thus Brazilian “corporate” institutions such as unions, the Catholic Church, neighborhood organizations, and landowners associations may continue to use vertical or corporatist channels for articulating particular demands even under the Nova República. The new regime, however, seems to prefer the model based on mass politics and mass mobilization of support for key policies through the media. The hypothesis argued here is that this continued hegemonic use of mass media has an exclusionary effect on opposition groups. Although such groups try to gain access to mass media, the more activist labor unions and the Church, for example, are also beginning to use more limited or “little media” to build support for corporatist expression of demands or for more confrontational class politics, such as strikes, land occupations, and boycotts. These groups also use “little media” to oppose the current *massificação* (“massification”) of Brazilian society on the grounds that the mass media facilitate the continued hegemony of existing elites.²⁸

The first major indicator of the use of alternative "little media" is the increase in the number of small, local periodicals in Brazil. Between 1981 and 1986, at least a thousand new periodicals have sprung up, the majority since 1984.²⁹ Most are published by groups like labor unions, church-sponsored "base communities" (*comunidades de base*), and neighborhood associations, with relatively few published by mass politics groups such as political parties.

Another case in point is the growth of groups experimenting with "popular video" in Brazil. According to Luis Santoro, coordinator of the national popular video association (the Associação de Vídeo no Movimento Popular), most of these groups first attempt to articulate their own issues and problems on video, generally using inexpensive cameras and home recorders. Then groups may try to exchange their videos with individuals or groups in other areas in order to communicate their ideas.³⁰

The primary sponsors of such efforts to date have been the Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos and the Catholic Church. Both groups urge local branches to make videos, then become part of an organizational communication network for exchanging and distributing tapes. The union's efforts are quite sophisticated. Professional video producers have been hired as advisors to train union personnel to make videos. The unions have also been the first to produce tapes centrally of events like speeches by union leaders and to produce alternativistic documentaries covering news events. These tapes are then distributed nationally as an adjunct of the unions' communication system.

Other video producers, including the Church base communities, seem to have a less structured exchange system so far, although the national popular video association hopes to expand that function. At this point, the association is loosely coordinating disparate groups, including the unions, various Church-sponsored groups, women's groups, musical or cultural heritage groups, indigenous (Indian) groups, and various community associations.³¹

One group, Olhar Eletrônico de São Paulo, has been improving the technical quality of video production and arranging to have them broadcast on independent television stations in São Paulo. This group and the Metallurgical Workers Union apparently intend to develop the capacity to produce broadcast-quality material as well as "alternative" video. Thus if they are permitted greater access to broadcasting in the future, they will be ready to seize the opportunity.³²

Conclusions

Brazil seems to be developing a new model of media-state relations, one that is not described well by any of the four classic theories of

the press. In order to comprehend the role of media in Brazil, one must understand its particular corporatist heritage, which is commingled with elements of populist manipulation of media and mass politics. In analyzing Brazilian television, the corporatist framework helps explain how TV Globo has achieved more autonomy and power in government decision making than one might expect in a media system usually described simply as authoritarian. The mixture of corporatism with mass politics is necessary, however, for understanding how TV Globo's hegemony, combined with that of the state, could still be temporarily undermined by a mass campaign for direct elections and civilian rule.³³

The corporatist model may also be helpful in analyzing the current use of alternative media, particularly video cassette recorders, by opposition groups. These groups seek an entree into mass politics and mass media through the reformed allocation of broadcast licenses, which has been a major issue in the 1986–87 deliberations of the constitutional convention. Currently, however, opposition groups find it necessary to create alternative media channels of production and distribution. Their needs are now easier to meet not only because of reduced censorship and repression under the Nova República of José Sarney but also because video cassette recorders and small-scale printing and copying are now increasingly accessible to small opposition movements or minority interest groups.

NOTES

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9. *Voto de Desconfiança: Eleições e Mudança Política no Brasil, 1970–1979*, organized by Bolívar Lamounier (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980), 17.
10. Stepan, *State and Society*, 46.
11. *Ibid.*, 86.
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13. Interview with David Fleischer, chair of the Departamento da Ciência Política, Universidade Nacional de Brasília, 29 July 1986. Interview with Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, Managing Editor of the *Folha de São Paulo*, 4 Aug. 1986.
14. "Capricha, Garoto: Osmar Santos Vira o Próprio Símbolo das Diretas," *Veja*, 14 Mar. 1984, 54–60.
15. Interview with Fleischer. See also Guimarães and Amaral Vieira, *Televisão Brasileira na Transição*; and interview with Amaral Vieira.
16. Interview with Alvaro de Moya, staff member of *O Estado de São Paulo*, 4 Aug. 1986, São Paulo.
17. *Veja*, "Se Da Ibope, a Globo Faz," 12 Aug. 1981.
18. Interviews with Fleischer, Lins da Silva, and Moya.
19. Straubhaar, "Transformation of Cultural Dependency."
20. *Veja*, "Diretas no Vídeo," 18 Apr. 1984, pp. 93–94.
21. This interpretation is based on a series of multistate public opinion surveys conducted by LPM-Burke for *Veja*. See "O Calor da Reta Final," *Veja*, 22 Oct. 1986.
22. Interview with Lianne Alves, television critic for *O Estado de São Paulo*, 5 Aug. 1986, São Paulo.
23. "Mania Nacional," *Isto É*, 14 Aug. 1985, pp. 32–35.
24. Carlos Lombardi, "Novela Também É Política," *Folha de São Paulo*, 6 Jan. 1986.
25. The survey cited was "Brasil Vídeo," which polled three hundred individuals in upper-class and upper-middle-class neighborhoods (classes A and B). See "Um Novo Consumidor Gerado pela TV," *Journal da Tarde*, 27 June 1986.
26. Censorship under Justice Minister Fernando Lyra is discussed in "Dias Gomes no Convívio Diário com a Censura," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 25 Aug. 1986. Censorship under Minister Brossard is reported in "Censura Proíbe Duas Cenas de 'Selva de Pedra,'" *Folha de São Paulo*, 5 Mar. 1986; and in the same paper in "A Censura Continua Co-autora das Novelas," 22 June 1986.
27. On corporatism as rising from society, see Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring, *Does Political Development Exist? Corporatism in Old and New Societies* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971). On corporatism's basis in Iberian tradition, see Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development*, 51–72.
28. Cohn, "Uma Grande Caixa de Resonância"; and interview with Muniz Sodre, director of the Programa de Comunicação Social, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 14 July 1986.

29. This estimate in the increase in periodicals in Brazil came from the Rio de Janeiro office of the Library of Congress, as reported by Eugene Bigler in an interview in Washington, D.C., 16 Apr. 1986.
30. Interview with Luis Fernando Santoro, coordinator of the Associação de Vídeo no Movimento Popular, 20 July 1986; see also *Vídeo Popular: O Boletim da Associação de Vídeo nos Movimentos Populares* 3, no. 5 (June 1986):1-2. This periodical is published in São Paulo.
31. Interview with Santoro.
32. Ibid.; and interview with Regina Festa, journalism professor at the Universidade de São Paulo, 20 July 1986, in São Paulo.
33. Riordan Roett, *Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).