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1 results

  • Against Kripke on Unrestricted Exportation

  • SAJED TAYEBI
  • Journal:
    Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie / Volume 59 / Issue 1 / March 2020
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    06 May 2019, pp. 145-156
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  • This paper defends the doctrine of Unrestricted Exportation (UE) against Saul Kripke’s attack on it. According to UE, the exportation step from the de dicto belief report, S believes that α is F, together with the premise that α exists, to the de re report, S believes of α that it is F, is valid. By presenting an alleged counterexample, Kripke tries to show that UE has much more implausible consequences than its advocates would accept. By going through the details of Kripke’s scenario, I argue that UE does not commit us to the consequences Kripke associates with it.