The aim of this study was to assess welfare outcomes of electrical stunning as a means of restraint in farmed grower saltwater crocodiles (Crocodylus porosus). Physical handling of a stunned, unconscious crocodile is far safer for the operator than handling a fully conscious animal. Electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded before and after the application of electrical stunning at 50 Hz or 400 Hz using an electrical stunner applied to the cranial plate (Position 1: P1–50 Hz; n = 31, P1–400 Hz; n = 29) or immediately behind the skull (Position 2: P2–50 Hz; n = 29; P2–400 Hz; n = 30). For all electrical stuns, percentage total EEG power in a 10-s epoch decreased in the alpha and beta frequency bands; and increased in the delta and lower frequencies bands. All electrical stuns resulted in increased strength of signal, based on the quadratic mean EEG power in all frequency bands of the EEG. Greatest change in power occurred in the delta frequency band, with P1–50 Hz. This was greater than with P2–50 Hz; while decibel change using 400 Hz at either position was intermediate and not significantly different from either. Application of either electrical stunner at position 1 resulted in seizure-like activity and activation in low frequencies, but at position 2 this was not consistent across all animals. The ability of the electrical stunning equipment to consistently induce recoverable unconsciousness could be ranked in decreasing order as: P1–50 Hz > P1–400 Hz = P2–50 Hz > P2–400 Hz. Based on behavioural observations, all animals in the study appeared to stunned however evaluation of duration of EEG changes indicates that use of the electrical stunning equipment at 50 Hz would allow some margin for inaccuracies in tong placement, while achieving a consistently reliable stun.

Muslims derive their dietary laws from the Quran (Islamic Holy Book) and other Islamic scriptures. These religious scriptures prohibit them from consuming meat from animals that die before they are bled-out. Some Muslim authorities have interpreted this to mean that, in addition to the animal being alive, it must also be conscious prior to neck-cutting. This has led to a section of the Muslim community rejecting pre-slaughter stunning for halal meat production with the belief that all forms of stunning lead to instantaneous death. It must be noted that some jurists have debunked claims that animals must be conscious before they are bled-out because it does not appear to be mentioned anywhere in the scriptures. This paper reviews literature on the role of the brain in the control of conscious perception and death and considers the different scholarly definitions of death and how they impact the interpretation of halal slaughter rules and the impact on animal welfare.

Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one’s experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

Assessing unconsciousness is important to safeguard animal welfare shortly after stunning at the slaughter plant. Indicators that can be visually evaluated are most often used when assessing unconsciousness, as they can be easily applied in slaughter plants. These indicators include reflexes originating from the brain stem (e.g. eye reflexes) or from the spinal cord (e.g. pedal reflex) and behavioural indicators such as loss of posture, vocalisations and rhythmic breathing. When physically stunning an animal, for example, captive bolt, most important indicators looked at are posture, righting reflex, rhythmic breathing and the corneal or palpebral reflex that should all be absent if the animal is unconscious. Spinal reflexes are difficult as a measure of unconsciousness with this type of stunning, as they may occur more vigorous. For stunning methods that do not physically destroy the brain, for example, electrical and gas stunning, most important indicators looked at are posture, righting reflex, natural blinking response, rhythmic breathing, vocalisations and focused eye movement that should all be absent if the animal is unconscious. Brain stem reflexes such as the cornea reflex are difficult as measures of unconsciousness in electrically stunned animals, as they may reflect residual brain stem activity and not necessarily consciousness. Under commercial conditions, none of the indicators mentioned above should be used as a single indicator to determine unconsciousness after stunning. Multiple indicators should be used to determine unconsciousness and sufficient time should be left for the animal to die following exsanguination before starting invasive dressing procedures such as scalding or skinning. The recording and subsequent assessment of brain activity, as presented in an electroencephalogram (EEG), is considered the most objective way to assess unconsciousness compared with reflexes and behavioural indicators, but is only applied in experimental set-ups. Studies performed in an experimental set-up have often looked at either the EEG or reflexes and behavioural indicators and there is a scarcity of studies that correlate these different readout parameters. It is recommended to study these correlations in more detail to investigate the validity of reflexes and behavioural indicators and to accurately determine the point in time at which the animal loses consciousness.

Background and objective: Parallels exist between the coma associated with cerebral malaria and general anaesthesia. They both produce reversible loss of consciousness. In the case of cerebral malaria and in the absence of other complications, patients recover without sequelae. General anaesthetics are so designed that patients recover from their anaesthetics very quickly and show no ‘after effects’. This study compares brain function in these two clinical conditions by examining auditory- (AEPs) and median nerve somatosensory-evoked potentials (SEPs). The AEPs studied (waves Pa and Nb) are thought to arise from the primary auditory cortex and the median nerve SEPs (waves P15, N20, P25, N35, P45) from the pons, thalamus and primary somatosensory cortices.

Methods: Six comatosed patients with malaria (three males, three females) aged between 19 and 38 yr were studied in Zimbabwe. Their Glasgow Coma Scores on admission were 4, 3, 6, 7, 7 and 11. Their AEPs and median nerve SEPs were recorded daily over 4 days. The data were compared with those previously collected in the UK on patients and volunteers anaesthetized with desflurane, isoflurane, sevoflurane and propofol.

Results: In general, patients with cerebral malaria showed AEPs and SEPs similar to those of light to moderate anaesthesia i.e. 0.5–1.25 measure of anaesthetic potency (MAC), where 1 MAC is the minimum alveolar concentration necessary to prevent movement to surgical incision in 50% of patients. The appearance of the AEPs and SEPs bore no relationship to the degree of coma. The auditory brainstem-evoked response was retained in all degrees of coma, as would be expected. Otherwise, it would not be possible to interpret the waveform. In most instances, the early cortical complex Pa/Nb/Pb of the AER was present. When comatose patients emerged from malarial coma or were stimulated by talking loudly to them, they showed changes in the Pa/Nb/Pb complex similar to those seen on awakening from anaesthesia. The somatosensory-evoked response showed clear P15, N20 and P25 peaks at the expected latencies, and in some instances the waveforms of cerebral malaria and lightly anaesthetized volunteers were very similar.

Conclusions: The sensory-evoked responses of the cerebral malaria patients recorded in this study were not markedly different from those seen in light-to-moderately anaesthetized patients and volunteers. The profound depression of the AEPs and SEPs associated with deeper levels of anaesthesia were not seen, with the exception of one patient several hours before death.

We surveyed anaesthetists working in North-West England and in North Wales concerning episodes of vasovagal syncope encountered in their practice. Eighty-eight anaesthetists described 109 such events occurring in either patients or their relatives and the estimated frequency of syncope was 1 in 5000 anaesthetic episodes. The patient syncopal episodes were triggered by venous cannulation in 16 instances and regional or local techniques in 20 instances. Thirty-three of the 53 patients were in the upright position when syncope occurred. Thirty-nine of the 56 relatives were male partners of female patients and four of these partners suffered some morbidity. The results of the survey are consistent with our current knowledge of the pathophysiology of vasovagal syncope, which is summarized, and also highlight the common anaesthetic scenarios where fainting is most likely to occur. Given this information anaesthetists will be in a better position to avoid such potentially harmful episodes in the future.