This chapter explores the link between eternity clauses and electoral democracy by looking at two instances of unamendable democracy: party bans, both direct and indirect, and the protection of parliamentary mandates. These two approaches are illustrated via a range of case studies: the ban of anti-democratic parties in Germany; bans of ethnic, separatist, and religious parties in Turkey; indirect unamendability and its chilling effect on party competition in Israel; and the judicial protection of parliamentary mandates as unamendable in Czechia. Whereas such measures are adopted in the name of protecting democracy, the analysis here indicates that courts will not always strike the right balance between safeguarding and unduly narrowing democratic commitments. In some cases, they may even unintentionally undermine multipartyism itself or significantly influence electoral outcomes. Thus, the bluntness and open-ended nature of unamendability risks having a chilling effect on electoral democracy in both fragile and more stable democratic contexts.

Gary Jacobsohn’s work on constitutional identity was an early exemplar of constitutional theory, testing and refining broad theoretical claims against a deep analysis of constitutional developments in diverse constitutional systems. One aspect of Jacobsohn’s rich and multi-textured theory is the claim that constitutional identity constrains amendment powers. This chapter explores that claim through the lens of the two seminal Irish cases with which Jacobsohn engages. These cases, while rejecting unamendability, illustrate Jacobsohn’s central distinction between generic constitutional identity and particular constitutional identity. The chapter argues that while Jacobsohn is correct to claim that generic constitutional identity – conformity to the moral values of constitutionalism – constrains constitutional amendment, it is problematic to assign moral salience to a country’s distinctive constitutional identity. The chapter interprets Jacobsohn’s particular constitutional identity not as a substantive constraint on amendment but rather as an argumentative frame for debate about the legitimacy of amendments. This argumentative frame, however, lacks a sound normative basis and encourages an excessive focus on the constitutional past, diminishing the potential of constitutional amendment as a site of democratic deliberation.