Political technology is defined, not as Russians define it as a synonym for politics, but as the 'supply-side engineering of the political system for partisan advantage'. Such manipulation is now common across many types of regimes: deteriorating democracies, so-called smart authoritarianisms and hybrid regimes, but particularly the latter. Manipulation techniques spread through various types of globalisation. Political manipulation can no longer be orientalised: corruption, judicial capture, propaganda and artificial structures to spread it are also increasingly prevalent in the West.

Chapter 8 assembles for the first time the available information about performance histories of earlier popular opera between 1714 and 1790, aiming to discover whether a ‘core’ or ‘canon’ of these works may legitimately be talked of. The introduction explains sources and methods, followed by tables showing for exactly how long the most-seen works held the stage. ‘The Crisis of 1745’ details the economic difficulties of the Comédie-Française, Comédie-Italienne and Fair theatres which lay behind anticompetitive strategies. Favart’s Acajou was one flashpoint, followed by Anne-Marie Du Boccage’s published attack on the Opéra Comique in 1745. ‘Theatre Politics and the Bouffon Legacy’ concerns the backstage history of rivalry between the Opéra Comique and Comédie-Italienne during the final decade of competition, centred on their responses to a revolution in public taste: enthusiasm for comic intermezzi at the Opéra during 1752–54. The Opéra is shown to have played an increasingly defensive game. ‘Creating a Repertory’ is based on close analysis of revivals of popular opera, seen together with Favart’s new role as programming manager at the Opéra Comique. A distinct core of repeatable works is finally identifiable, though revivals can be shown to have involved updating.