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Chapter 5 lays the groundwork for the discussions of role-based constitutional fellowship in Chapters 6–9. In addition to arguing that fellowship is a self-initiating brand of liberal democratic trust, this chapter shows that fellowship assumes different complexions in different contexts. First, when trust exists in the formal political sphere, political actors compete as adversaries with a sense of self-restraint. Such trust involves counteracting “the institutionalized enmity problem,” the tendency for political actors to compete as enemies. Second, when trust exists in the general citizenry, citizens treat one another in manners befitting their equal citizenship, despite their differences. Such trust involves counteracting “the social domination problem”: enough citizens must demonstrate that they take the persistence of undue social hierarchies seriously. Third, when trust exists between the political sphere and the general citizenry, citizens believe that political actors largely do try to further the public good. Such trust involves counteracting “the representative cynicism problem,” the tendency for citizens to believe that political actors are in it for themselves.
Chapter 6 discusses how trust can emerge in the formal political sphere. Engaging with arguments for “political friendship” and “salutary hypocrisy,” this chapter shows that a division of labour between “principled pragmatists” and “principled purists” can counteract the institutionalized enmity problem. Principled pragmatists can develop a sense of reciprocity by engaging in some forms of hypocrisy and by striking compromises; this reciprocity can counteract the tendency for political actors to compete as enemies. Meanwhile, principled purists can more stubbornly refuse to compromise in order to keep principled pragmatists honest. There are times, however, when the distribution of principled pragmatists across mainstream parties is unbalanced, just as there are times when some (former) mainstream liberal democrats have forged enduring alliances with autocratic political actors. Accordingly, the chapter argues that in these circumstances, those who stand outside of these “unholy alliances” must embrace contestation and show that participation in these alliances is politically disadvantageous.
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