The conclusion situates the politics of legal pluralism within a comparative perspective by contrasting Chechnya with other Russian regions and other contexts of postcolonial and post-conflict political development. The concluding chapter discusses the broader implications of this study for our understanding of the “dark side” of legal pluralism as an instrument of domination and of state law as a “weapon of the weak.” It outlines a future research agenda on the role of international law in legally pluralist environments and legal pluralism in diasporas. Finally, the chapter reflects on the implications of the findings for post-Soviet Russian politics and asks why the Kremlin allows Kadyrov’s lawfare.

This chapter investigates the instrumental use of non-state legal systems in postwar Chechnya by the Kremlin-imposed ruler Ramzan Kadyrov. It argues that Kadyrov has been promoting legal pluralism in order to win legitimacy among segments of the population, increase his autonomy from the federal center, and better accommodate former rebels, who became state bureaucrats in the postwar period. This chapter casts doubt on alternative explanations. The evidence that Ramzan Kadyrov’s policy towards non-state legal systems is radically different from the policy of his father, who was a cleric and traditionalist, yet strengthened Russian state law and abstained from promoting Sharia and custom, is troubling for the path-dependence argument. Meanwhile, the narrative of how Ramzan Kadyrov was able to effectively “cancel” the customs of bride kidnapping and blood revenge – the most notorious Chechen customs – indicates that the state capacity explanation is also limited. The second part of the chapter compares lawfare in Kadyrov’s Chechnya with legal politics in the neighboring regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan. These comparisons further support the idea that local leaders in the North Caucasus promote non-state legal systems not because of ideological commitments, but as a way to ensure their political survival.