The recognition heuristic assumes that people make inferences based on the output of recognition memory. While much work has been devoted to establishing the recognition heuristic as a viable description of how people make inferences, more work is needed to fully integrate research on the recognition heuristic with research from the broader cognitive psychology literature. In this article, we outline four challenges that should be met for this integration to take place, and close with a call to address these four challenges collectively, rather than piecemeal.

The idea of automatic decision making approximating normatively optimal decisions without necessitating much cognitive effort is intriguing. Whereas recent findings support the notion that such fast, automatic processes explain empirical data well, little is known about the conditions under which such processes are selected rather than more deliberate stepwise strategies. We investigate the role of the format of information presentation, focusing explicitly on the ease of information acquisition and its influence on information integration processes. In a probabilistic inference task, the standard matrix employed in prior research was contrasted with a newly created map presentation format and additional variations of both presentation formats. Across three experiments, a robust presentation format effect emerged: Automatic decision making was more prevalent in the matrix (with high information accessibility), whereas sequential decision strategies prevailed when the presentation format demanded more information acquisition effort. Further scrutiny of the effect showed that it is not driven by the presentation format as such, but rather by the extent of information search induced by a format. Thus, if information is accessible with minimal need for information search, information integration is likely to proceed in a perception-like, holistic manner. In turn, a moderate demand for information search decreases the likelihood of behavior consistent with the assumptions of automatic decision making.

The assumption that people possess a repertoire of strategies to solve the inference problems they face has been made repeatedly. The experimental findings of two previous studies on strategy selection are reexamined from a learning perspective, which argues that people learn to select strategies for making probabilistic inferences. This learning process is modeled with the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that people develop subjective expectancies for the strategies they have. They select strategies proportional to their expectancies, which are updated on the basis of experience. For the study by Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003) it can be shown that people did not anticipate the success of a strategy from the beginning of the experiment. Instead, the behavior observed at the end of the experiment was the result of a learning process that can be described by the SSL theory. For the second study, by Bröder and Schiffer (2006), the SSL theory is able to provide an explanation for why participants only slowly adapted to new environments in a dynamic inference situation. The reanalysis of the previous studies illustrates the importance of learning for probabilistic inferences.

The present study investigated skilled and adaptive strategy selection in risky decision making. We proposed that people with high objective numeracy, a strong predictor of general decision making skill, would have a broad repertoire of choice strategies andadaptively select these strategies depending on the importance of the decision. Thus more objectively numerate people would maximize their effort (e.g., invest more time) in important, high-payoff decisions and switch to a simple, fast heuristic strategy in trivial decisions. Subjective numeracy would, by contrast, be more closely related to interest in problem solving for its own sake and would not yield such an effect of importance. Participants made twelve high-payoff choices and twelve low-payoff choices in binary two-outcome gambles framed as gains. We measured objective and subjective numeracy using standard measures. Results showed that people with high subjective numeracy generally maximized the expected value (EV) in all decisions. In contrast, participants with high objective numeracy maximized EV only when choice problems were meaningful (i.e., they could result in high payoffs). When choice problems were trivial (i.e., choosing the normatively better option would not result in a large payoff), more objectively numerate participants made choices consistent with faster, more frugal heuristic strategies.

The authors review their own empirical work inspired by the adaptive toolbox metaphor. The review examines factors influencing strategy selection and execution in multi-attribute inference tasks (e.g., information costs, time pressure, memory retrieval, dynamic environments, stimulus formats, intelligence). An emergent theme is the re-evaluation of contingency model claims about the elevated cognitive costs of compensatory in comparison with non-compensatory strategies. Contrary to common assertions about the impact of cognitive complexity, the empirical data suggest that manipulated variables exert their influence at the meta-level of deciding how to decide (i.e., which strategy to select) rather than at the level of strategy execution. An alternative conceptualisation of strategy selection, namely threshold adjustment in an evidence accumulation model, is also discussed and the difficulty in distinguishing empirically between these metaphors is acknowledged.

Adolescence is an important stage for the development of emotion regulation skills, especially for adolescent girls who are at elevated risk for the development of depression and anxiety. Although some emotion regulation strategies are more effective at helping adolescents regulate negative affect on average, research indicates strategy effectiveness varies with the context in which a strategy is deployed. Yet less work has been done examining which contextual factors are associated with adolescents switching emotion regulation strategies in their daily lives. This study examined individual and contextual factors related to negative interpersonal events that are associated with strategy effectiveness, including age, emotional intensity, perceived controllability, and co-regulatory support, and their association with adolescent emotion regulation strategy switching in daily life via ecological momentary assessment. Results indicated that adolescent girls differed in the degree to which they altered their emotion regulation strategies throughout their daily lives, and that switching strategies was associated with age as well as individual and within-person differences in perceived controllability, emotional intensity, and co-regulatory support. This study provides critical proof-of-concept of the utility of emotion regulation strategy switching as a measure of regulatory flexibility and highlights regulatory processes that may hold clues to the mechanisms of developmental psychopathology.

Cognitive reserve (CR) has been proposed as a latent variable that can account for the frequent discrepancy between an individual's underlying level of brain pathology and their observed clinical outcome. A possible behavioral manifestation of CR is best strategy choice. Older adults have been shown to choose sub-optimal strategies for performing various tasks. The present study attempted to investigate whether greater levels of CR could predict greater strategy selection, particularly in older adults. A computational estimation task was administered to 20 healthy young adults (mean age = 24.7 ± 3.6; 20–31 years) and 18 healthy older adults (68.2 ± 4.5; 62–77 years) wherein participants needed to estimate the product of two two-digit numbers by using one of two strategies. The results revealed an effect of age group on strategy choice and supported the hypothesis that CR is associated with increased strategy selection abilities. (JINS, 2013, 19, 1–4)