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2 results

  • 2 - What's doing? Activity, naming and Wittgenstein's response to Augustine

  • Edited by Arif Ahmed, University of Cambridge
  • Book:
    Wittgenstein's <I>Philosophical Investigations</I>
    Published online:
    06 July 2010
    Print publication:
    13 May 2010, pp 30-48

  • Summary

    Activity is central to Wittgenstein's account of meaning, whether or not that account is a theory, description, therapy or, simply, an investigation. This chapter focuses on the activity: learning. There is disagreement about what can be provided philosophically in the absence of explanation. That disagreement marks the battle lines between the 'New Wittgensteinian' readings and the standard reading. The chapter explores an idea that challenges the common ground between them. The chapter aims to lay out where the reading stands in relation to the standard readingand to provide sufficient detail from the opening sections of the Investigations to make the reading plausible. The language learner activities are activities that already place them within the practice of language use. Getting clear about the nature of activity in the Investigations is also central to getting a coherent picture of Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy.

  • 6 - Dignity and the formula of humanity

  • Edited by Jens Timmermann, University of St Andrews, Scotland
  • Book:
    Kant's 'Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals'
    Published online:
    04 August 2010
    Print publication:
    24 December 2009, pp 102-118

  • Summary

    This chapter gives a reading of the formula of humanity and dignity that can do without a value as a foundation. It shifts the burden of proof to the defenders of the standard reading. The chapter argues that the absolute worth of a morally good will is neither a property all human beings possess, nor is it the reason why one should respect others. The chapter presents the alternative reading of the derivation and justification of the formula of humanity. It argues that ends-in-themselves are the ground of the categorical imperative in virtue of freedom, a conclusion that anticipates Immanuel Kant's justification of the imperative in the third section of the Groundwork. The chapter address Kant's conception of human dignity in Groundwork IV 434-6. Kant uses 'dignity' to express the elevated position morality has in terms of worth.