We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The burgeoning field of behavioral economics has produced a new set of justifications for paternalism. This book challenges behavioral paternalism on multiple levels, from the abstract and conceptual to the pragmatic and applied. Behavioral paternalism relies on a needlessly restrictive definition of rational behavior. It neglects nonstandard preferences, experimentation, and self-discovery. It relies on behavioral research that is often incomplete and unreliable. It demands a level of knowledge from policymakers that they cannot reasonably obtain. It assumes a political process largely immune to the effects of ignorance, irrationality, and the influence of special interests and moralists. Overall, behavioral paternalism underestimates the capacity of people to solve their own problems, while overestimating the ability of experts and policymakers to design beneficial interventions. The authors argue instead for a more inclusive theory of rationality in economic policymaking.
This chapter critically examines some different views about the content, strength, and justification of a right to autonomy. It explains some background assumptions about the right to autonomy, the concept of paternalism, and the soft/hard distinction. There are two basic approaches to spelling out the content of the right: choice-based and preference-based. Joel Feinberg's view that the right protects only self-regarding choices that are voluntary enough is one example of the former. The claim that the right is absolute vis-à-vis moralistic reasons mean that when moralistic interference infringes the right to autonomy, it is always wrong. If the right to autonomy is cashed out in terms of a hybrid current preferences account (CP) test, then an example of soft moralism might be one orthodox Jew's forcing a second to wait to eat till his craving for a delicious but non-kosher food passes.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.