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2 results

  • Chapter 4 - Property and Legitimacy

  • Jesse Spafford, Victoria University of Wellington
  • Book:
    Social Anarchism and the Rejection of Moral Tyranny
    Published online:
    19 October 2023
    Print publication:
    02 November 2023, pp 121-151
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  • Summary

    Chapter 4 provides an alternative argument for rejecting private property. While Chapter 3 derives this conclusion from the Lockean proviso, this chapter begins with the consent theory of legitimacy as its starting premise. It then argues that property ownership is a form of legitimate authority. Thus, if one accepts a consent theory of legitimacy, one must also maintain that ownership has consent as its necessary condition. However, given that no one has ever consented to such ownership, it follows that no one owns any natural resources. The chapter then considers three objections to this argument, namely, that (1) there is nothing problematic about imposing obligations on others, (2) legitimacy only requires consent when it conflicts with previously acquired property rights, and (3) there is a morally salient distinction between land and territory. It concludes with a discussion of what this argument from consent theory implies vis-à-vis self-ownership.

  • Chapter 3 - Self-sovereignty and paternalism

  • Edited by Christian Coons, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, Michael Weber, Bowling Green State University, Ohio
  • Book:
    Paternalism
    Published online:
    05 February 2013
    Print publication:
    14 February 2013, pp 56-73

  • Summary

    Mill's aim in using the metaphor of sovereignty was presumably to suggest that the government ought to respect the autonomy of each individual unless he poses a threat to others, just as a nation ought to respect the sovereignty of another nation unless it poses a threat to another nation. The choice to use illicit drugs involves important forms of discretionary control over one's own mind and body. Non-legalization might still violate the opportunity principle because the choice to use drugs involves important forms of control over mind and body, and this policy reduces the opportunities to make this choice. It is possible to respect self-sovereignty and to give a plausible theory of its boundaries without endorsing a general principle of anti-paternalism like Mill's harm principle. So, the importance of self-sovereignty provides no reason to think that paternalism is always wrong.