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This chapter begins with the problem of Donald Trump on social media—both the propaganda that led to his election and the companies’ seeming inability to control his supporters while in office—leading up to the January 6 2021 coup attempt. It contextualizes these events in a broader narrative about social media “political bias,” which turns out not to be a problem of bias so much as an effort by politicians to intimidate companies into under-moderating their allies. Such efforts aim to leverage the inability of the companies to exercise self-control in the face of short-term temptations and threats. Platforms, like governments, have problems with internal governance, in which personnel have incentives that diverge from the interests of the overall organization or operate under suboptimal time horizons. In the literature on governments, the tools to mitigate these problems tend to travel under the rubric of “the rule of law.” This chapter defends the idea of dispersing power to independent institutions under the control or at least supervision of diverse groups of employees and nonemployees as a key tool to create a kind of platform rule of law.
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