In the context of a difficult transition from war to peace, arrangements aimed at achieving peace (such as power-sharing, including autonomy) may come into tension with human rights (such as non-discrimination or indigenous rights). When this happens, peace and human rights are often unhelpfully characterized as binary or even mutually exclusive. The aim of this chapter is to query this binary characterisation, using three case studies where a particular tension was contested before a court: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Philippines and El Salvador. The chapter shows that since neither peace, nor (most) human rights are absolute, it is possible to weigh the two against each other; and the tension can be framed in a way that is more conducive to its resolution, by conceptualising peace as a fundamental public purpose, a legitimate aim, and/or a human right, thus internalising it in human rights reasoning, rather than treating it as external.

This chapter uses the case study of Colombia to argue that there is an emerging right to justice born out of the aspirations of international criminal law. This right comprises several elements, each finding its own unique realisation in the context of Colombia’s transition to peace. More specifically, the chapter discusses the right to see perpetrators of mass atrocities held accountable, the right to peace and reconciliation, the right not to face repetition of collective violence, victims’ right to justice, the right to truth, and, finally, the right to local administration of justice. The International Criminal Court (ICC) plays a role in enforcing these various elements of the overarching right to justice but with clear limitations dictated by the nature of international criminal law as a discipline relying on State cooperation and its own moral appeal. Such process is best understood if one sees the ICC as the enforcer at the domestic level of the generic right to justice.