As in many other countries, shareholders in French companies have only those powers that are conferred upon them or upon the general meeting. Nevertheless, the general meeting is vested with important rights: it is in charge of the election of the board of directors, has a say-on-pay and a say on related party agreements as well as a number of ‘fundamental decisions’ of the corporation. Shareholders make active use of their (voting) rights. In practice, shareholder participation remains relatively stable over time, with higher participating rates of shareholders with double voting rights and an increasing number of shares voted by mail. Most voting items are approved with a large majority of the votes, although those on remuneration, related party agreements and share issuances are sometimes heavily contested. Engaged shareholders make regularly use of shareholder proposals and shareholder questions. Further, every year, a number of French companies are confronted with activist shareholders who want to effect changes in the strategy or governance of the company, albeit with varying degrees of success. To meet their requests, an increasing numbers of companies are appointing a director with special responsibilities vis-à-vis shareholders.

Under Danish law, the general meeting is omnipotent, meaning that it can decide on most issues, including issues that deal with day-to-day management of the company. Thus, in theory, shareholders are in a position to ensure that the general meeting decides most issues of concern to them, and the rules on calling a general meeting or proposing topics for the meeting agenda are also rather generous to shareholders. In practice, however, shareholders rarely call a meeting. Although they occasionally propose issues for the meeting agenda, those proposals are almost always voted down by a very high majority. Therefore, the potential for shareholder democracy and activism is not being exploited by shareholders in Denmark.It seems that in normal circumstances, a board will propose agenda items only when the law requires it to do so. We did find, however, that shareholders often ask questions and engage in debate at general meetings. We therefore conclude that shareholder democracy and activism are present in Denmark, although most likely it often takes place as interaction between the board and major shareholders before general meetings are held.