This article explores the use of the systemic criterion in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law on judicial independence under Article 19(1)(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). It starts from the observation that ever since the Portuguese Judges judgment, the case law has moved towards a more abstract and general assessment of issues of judicial independence. Yet, despite that evolution, the Court—perhaps surprisingly—only rarely uses the systemic criterion in its judgments. There are only two strands of case law to be found, neither of which tell us much about how the Court understands the notion of “systemic” in this field. This article argues that this criterion nevertheless has an important role to play in the case law on judicial independence and that the Court should explicitly limit the finding of a violation of Article 19(1)(2) TEU to those issues that have a systemic impact on the functioning of the domestic judiciary. By limiting the effects of Article 19(1)(2) TEU in such a way, the Court would strike a balance between the protection of the independence of the domestic judiciary, which is crucial for the proper functioning of the European Union (EU), and respect for the autonomy of the Member States as to the organization of their judiciary.