Proponents of restrictions on the wearing of religious symbols in public institutions in Quebec have often framed their support in the language of liberalism, with references to “gender equality”, “state neutrality” and “freedom of conscience”. However, efforts to account for support for restrictions on minority religious symbols rarely mention liberalism. In this article, we test the hypothesis that holding liberal values might have different attitudinal consequences in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Our findings demonstrate that holding liberal values is associated with support for restrictions on the wearing of minority religious symbols in Quebec, but it is associated with opposition to such restrictions in the rest of Canada. Moreover, this difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada in the relationship between liberal values and support for restrictions on minority religious symbols can explain Quebecers' greater support for restrictions.

Why is shariʿa the taboo of modern law? This article examines the “spread of halal” controversy in China as a window to assess how nativist public opinion influences state law and policy whereas state law is foreclosed to providing protection to rights provided for in shariʿa. Among Chinese Muslims (Hui), qingzhen (lit. “pure” plus “true”) or “halal” is the kernel of their localized shariʿa, and one that prohibits consuming pork. The symbol qingzhen has proliferated in the course of China's economic modernization such that it pervades the public sphere, creating anxiety among Han Chinese that Chinese society and government is becoming “Islamicized.” Hui fear that the profusion of qingzhen foments food insecurity and endangers truth in labeling. In response, they have sought greater protection for their diluted core symbol in national legislation—attempts which have only exacerbated Hui-Han relations. Based on observations from over seven years of field research and interviews with Hui legal entrepreneurs, and drawing from the anthropology of taboo, I explain the debate in China by taking the Hui idea of shariʿa as a taboo to reflexively think about how secular non-Muslim states regard shariʿa as the taboo of modern law.

In the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey of 29 June 2004, the European Court of Human Rights decided in favour of Turkey. The banning of headscarves at the University of Istanbul did not violate Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Some years before the European Court already declared inadmissible a complaint by a Swiss teacher of younger children who was fired because she was not willing to leave off her headscarf while teaching. The complaint was manifestly ill founded. In other European countries the wearing of headscarves by teachers and pupils has lead to political and legal discussions and actions as well. In France, new legislation based on the so-called Stasi-report forbids pupils in primary and secondary state schools to wear clearly visible religious symbols. The reasons behind this act of parliament were problems allegedly caused by the wearing of headscarves. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that a ban on headscarves for teachers needs a basis in an act of parliament of the German states. It is up to the legislatures of the Länder to decide if such a ban should be issued. In the Netherlands, existing equal treatment law has been interpreted in such a way that teachers and pupils in state schools are allowed to wear headscarves.