A key component of regulatory imperialism was controlling the colonial government. While the crown accepted colonial assemblies as independent bodies, it attempted to regulate the laws they passed. In particular, imperial officials in London asserted the power to review all colonial legislation and declare acts void if they violated English law or imperial policy. This chapter examines royal legislative review from a strategic perspective as an auditing system. It shows that legislative review worked in part by inducing royal governors to exercise stricter scrutiny over colonial legislation before it ever reached London. At the same time, the analysis shows that legislative review was inherently imperfect. The cost of review to imperial officials ensured that colonial assemblies could pass laws that imperial officials opposed. As a result, legislative review was unable to eliminate the autonomy of colonial assemblies.

The crown’s pivot to regulatory imperialism accepted colonial institutions as they existed, and attempted to direct them more vigorously in the English state’s interest. This chapter explores the economic side of that regulation through the Navigation Acts, in particular a strategic perspective on their administration. It shows that the administrative structure of the acts evolved with a sophisticated understanding of the incentive problems of agents charged with their enforcement. The imperial customs bureaucracy in the New World and a crown court system were erected to deal with these problems. At the same time, the chapter explains how the acts were rarely administered so well in practice, which undermined their effectiveness.