UN Charter Art. 2:4 aims to protect states from forcible encroachments by other states, but it does not stand in the way of the Security Council taking or authorizing states to take enforcement actions under Art. 42 and did so in the case of Korea 1950 and Iraq in 1991.It may take or authorize enforcement actions – even inside states – under Art.2:7 and 42. It may also under Art. 53 authorize the use of force by regional organizations – and has done so. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine envisages the use of force to remedy extreme internal situations, such as genocide or massacres, but only within the rules cited requiring approval by the Security Council. The veto is often criticized as hindering action by the Council. It may, indeed, be excessively used but may sometimes be only a signal from one of the permanent members that it may be ready to use its power to resist an action proposed. Post WWII, force has been used by states – but only rarely – to acquire territory while ignoring the Security Council, notably by North Korea in 1950, Iraq against Iran in 1980 and against Kuwait in 1990, Russia against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

This chapter adds a regional perspective to the study of rule in the international system by exploring the region as a site of rule, formalized in the growing authority of regional organizations to define governance principles for their member states. Concretely, the chapter analyzes the connection between international authority and authority in/of states, thus offering a relational reading of authority which focuses on the constitutive connections between different sites of authority. With a case study on the African Union’s (AU) anti-coup policy, the chapter analyzes how the authority to define what counts as legitimate authority in states both reproduces the state as a locus of legitimate authority and denies it that very authority. Unlike most of the existing literature, which studies the authority of international organizations by focusing on the sources of IO authority, the chapter offers a reading of IO authority through the practices of enacting authority and the effects this has in specific locations.

This chapter considers the interaction of the Security Council with other international organizations in relation to the use of force and the role that international organizations may play in implementing Council authorizations to use force. This is an area where the Security Council, the international organizations concerned, and member states have shown great flexibility, with the provisions of the UN Charter (both Chapter VII and Chapter VIII) and of the constituent instruments of the regional and other organizations being developed through extensive practice. A difficult question, however, arises where member states grant regional organizations the authority to carry out such interventions without the target state’s consent to the specific action and without Council authorization, in particualr in light of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The chapter concludes that it cannot be said that Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act or similar provisions allow for the use of force without Security Council authorization. The Council remains the body vested by member states with the power to authorize ‘enforcement action’.

Chapter 6 investigates human rights, the rule of law, as well as participatory institutions. Democratic governance is possible, even if state capacities to enforce rules and decisions are weak or absent. We start by addressing the human rights problematique in areas of limited statehood. Strengthening state capacity might do human rights and the rule of law more harm than good, resulting in autocratic and repressive statehood. We explore the effectiveness of regional organizations (RO) and of (I)NGOs and non-state justice institutions to provide fair and transparent access to justice as a crucial component of the rule of law. They can accomplish these goals, the more their institutional design enables deliberative negotiations through fair and transparent procedures. The remainder of the chapter discusses the effectiveness of companies and rebel groups to engage in human rights and democratic governance. It is one thing to expect from companies to comply with human rights norms. It is quite different to ask them to promote human rights and the rule of law beyond their premises. Rebel groups are more likely to provide effective human rights and inclusive governance, particularly if they require international and domestic legitimacy and if they are faced with trust-based communities.