This chapter examines the generalizability of the book’s main argument. It synthesizes the conclusions of other studies on the consequences of three similar episodes of forced migration in the twentieth century: the Greek-Turkish population exchange, the Partition of India, and the repatriation of Pied-Noirs to France. It then considers ways in which the argument can be extended to other cases of forced and voluntary migration.

Part III centers on eastern Mediterranean places loosely designated as the “Holy Land” in British heritage discourse. Sites in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria were especially important within Christianity, generating new biblical historicisms in the face of geological deep time and a booming tourism industry. However, the same cultural heritage that underwrote British imperialism and articulated a mission to modernize the “East” maintained that some historically significant places should be preserved. This tension is central to the temporal forms of ruin and profanation, which I define in Part III. The desire to claim Eastern sites as the origin of Western culture conflicted with the simultaneous desire to distance current populations there as “Other.” Laying claim to the history of a place like Palmyra, an ancient Roman city in Syria still popular with Western observers, both complicated and facilitated the relationship with present life there.

This chapter examines how the refugee crisis was framed and portrayed by right-wing actors. Its main puzzle is how the initially sentimental, humanitarian approach to the coverage of the refugee crisis was gradually transformed to present refugees as an existential threat to European societies. We track the frames and themes utilized by mainstream and radical right parties in their official speeches, documenting that utilizing a framework focusing on security and identity, they slowly managed to shift the perceptions on immigrants arriving at European shores. Furthermore, their rhetoric aimed at actively downplaying the humanitarian element, claiming instead that the search and rescue operations had perverse effects, motivating immigrants to make the crossings into the EU and worsening the refugee crisis. Therefore, in Hirschman’s terms, a rhetoric of jeopardy and perversity dominated the right's reaction to the refugee crisis, slowly eroding sympathy toward migrants.

A series of events fueled the protests against the shah’s regime. The burning of Cinema Rex and the Black Friday riots mobilized large swaths of the Iranian public against the king. Religious groups operated through their networks to protest the Pahlavi state. The shah’s government went through a rapid succession of prime ministers, as Ayatollah Khomeini became anointed as the leader of the opposition, which included many different political groups. The revolution came crashing in. Within months, Islamic policies reversed decades of Pahlavi secular reforms as women were forced to reveil. The regime promptly executed Pahlavi diehards and political activists who embraced different ideologies. An Islamic Republic took shape and punished America for its ties to the shah by taking US diplomats as hostages. Meanwhile, Iraq seized on this moment of domestic turmoil to launch a devastating war against Iran. That island of stability became a harbor of volatility.

This chapter explores how the EU (European Union) managed the multiple crises that it confronted during the decade from 2010 to 2020, the extent to which these crises provoked its disintegration or closer integration and – primarily – how far the EU’s crisis management policies were structurally determined or shaped by agency. It argues that the decisions made by the EU in the Eurozone and coronavirus crises – decisions that forged closer political integration – were largely structurally determined, whereas those that culminated in political disintegration either involved a combination of structural and agency-related causes, as with the refugee crisis, or, as with the Brexit crisis, were the result of a sequence of decisions that were taken by political actors who possessed agency and that therefore could well have been different.

Part I is about the social origins of people who became fixers in 2010s Turkey and Syria. Some were refugees from Syria’s civil war or journalists ousted from Turkey’s domestic press as the Turkish state successively captured opposition outlets; these prospective fixers turned to work with the international media for the promise of stability. Others came from non-journalism backgrounds but, inspired by developments such as Turkey’s “Kurdish Opening” or the 2013 Gezi Park protest movement, found in fixing the opportunity to pursue adventurous and idealistic aspirations. Fixers of different backgrounds help foreign reporters in different ways: some provide insider access to local events and people, while others help their clients to make sense of phenomena from an outsider perspective.

This chapter examines two novels by Teju Cole and one by Rawi Hage to examine the intersection of race, class, and migrancy in the context of the psychoanalytic unconscious. The Cole novels have analysts as their city-walker protagonists, while the Hage novel gives us a character who is being analyzed (when he is not scuttling around the city like a cockroach). The chapter ends with the work of Abbasi, a migrant analyst.

The EU fundamental right to asylum, enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter, has always been a subject of scholarly debate. While some scholars have interpreted Article 18 as limited to a right to seek asylum, others have argued that it also confers an individual right to be granted asylum under certain conditions. Clarifying the scope and effects of the EU fundamental right to asylum is no longer of purely academic interest; courts across the EU are increasingly faced with complaints regarding its violation following the EU’s and Member States’ policy responses to the 2015 refugee crisis. The debate has been fuelled by the broad wording of the EU fundamental right to asylum, defined in relation to the rules of the Refugee Convention and EU Treaties. This chapter considers the scope of Article 18 of the Charter compared to the principle of non-refoulement guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee Convention; the extraterritorial application of the EU fundamental right to asylum and its content; and the main actors contributing to the normative clarification of the right to asylum. The chapter demonstrates the added value of the EU fundamental right to asylum as reflected in its various functions at EU and national levels.

Chapter 7 examines migration policy, diplomacy and security in the Mediterranean region as a whole in the wake of the 2015 European refugee ‘crisis,’ after which the stakes and power (im)balances between unwilling receiving counties in Europe and host countries of the Middle East were renegotiated and reconstituted. It argues that all host states in the Mediterranean region, as well as sending states further afield in sub-Saharan Africa, benefitted from Europe’s post-2015 political crisis and used migration diplomacy to extract more concessions than they were able to previously. Europe’s shirking of responsibility toward asylum-seekers who successfully arrived on its territory in 2015 also had global ramifications for the way in which Global South countries considered their own responsibilities. Chapter 7 considers Kenya’s 2016 decision to close Dadaab refugee camp, the ongoing issue of the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, and the amplification of the EU-Turkey model for outsourcing European refugee hosting responsibilities. It also examines the implications for individual migrants and refugees stuck on Greek islands, returned by boat to Libya, or residing semi-permanently in countries like Egypt, Morocco and Turkey.

This chapter examines the criminalization of migration through the lens of transnational legal orders (TLOs). By doing so, it seeks to explain dramatic episodes such as the Diciotti refugee incident in Italy, but also provide socio-legal analysis for far-reaching practices such as immigration detention, removal, and refusal of entry, all of which depend on the development of a formalizing legal order and specific regulation such as the EU Returns Directive that transcends national boundaries. It argues that affluent democratic societies of the Global North are in the middle of a major transformation of governance while transnational legal orders are at the center of it.

Chapter 4 focuses on the EU–Turkey Syrian refugee deal, which was activated on November 29, 2015. It makes the argument that Turkey used the urgency of the refugee crisis and its position as a major transit country for refugees en route to Europe as leverage to acquire visa liberalization with the EU and bring momentum to its accession negotiation talks. By using active diplomacy and issue-linkage bargaining, Turkey was also able to secure the EU’s commitment to modernization of the Customs Union Agreement and provision of financial support for the welfare and protection of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Upon realizing that the perquisites secured through the deal were not going to materialize due to a multiplicity of reasons, Turkey switched to compellent threats and blackmail and engaged in boundary challenging against the EU. The refugee deal between the EU and Turkey makes it very costly for the EU to ‘lose’ Turkey and will serve as a good litmus test on whether Turkey will switch from challenging to breaking its boundaries with the EU. If the threat of revoking the deal becomes reasonably credible, then it is possible to talk about a switch to boundary breaking.

This chapter is about how the concept of partial organization can contribute to our understanding of the specificity of organizing collective action through social media. Empirically, it is a story about how a small group of activists via Facebook could raise 9 million Swedish crowns (around 900 000 Euros) in just over a week to a private bank account, and also about the ensuing challenges involved in allocating the funds and packing and distributing the tons of clothes and other items they collected. Theoretically, we want to propose that the undecided order of a social media initiative may hold sufficient power to initiate it, but it may become too strenuous to manage in the long run without legitimate authority. In turn, pressures to incorporate standardized practices of membership, leadership, and monitoring may risk the very basis of the large-scale engagement that the partialness of the social media initiative has enabled.