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re-election strategy

European Political Science Review (1)

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1 results

Geographically targeted spending: exploring the electoral strategies of incumbent governments
Margit Tavits
Journal:

European Political Science Review / Volume 1 / Issue 1 / March 2009

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

01 March 2009, pp. 103-123
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Pork-barrel politics is traditionally associated with presidentialism, strong parties, candidate-centered elections, and/or developing democracies. This paper argues that vote-purchasing behavior by incumbent governments analogous to pork-barreling is likely to be universal. This paper develops a rationale according to which incumbent governments use their partisan ties to lower levels of government to pork-barrel effectively. This argument is tested and corroborated with original data on local government grant allocation from four Nordic countries – traditionally considered to be systems that are least prone to localism. Furthermore, the study also provides preliminary evidence that pork-barreling by incumbent governments is electorally rewarded and thereby a fully rational electoral strategy.