Professional sports teams commonly reevaluate their location decisions based on the prospect of building new, more attractive, stadiums. Even though a large economic literature warns about the modest (and possibly negative) effects on the local economy of hosting a professional sports team, the economic effects of professional teams and stadiums remain blurry for the general public, and cities in the United States continue to compete to lure teams with generous public subsidies. This article integrates several contributions of the literature into one cohesive and simple framework based on cost–benefit analysis, and provides estimations of the average local economic effects of teams in the four biggest professional leagues in the United States. If professional sports games do not attract visitors from other cities, or if players and owners do not spend a significant share of their income in the area, hosting a team can negatively affect the local economy.

Prior research has argued that public subsidies for parties matter for explaining electoral volatility, but the empirical results have been inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by examining how different rules for direct state funding affect different types of electoral volatility, using data from lower chamber elections in eighteen Latin American countries from 1978 through 2014. Focusing on volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (party replacement volatility) and volatility caused by vote switching among existing parties (stable party volatility), it finds that countries with less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies tend to have lower levels of party replacement volatility. However, the empirical analysis does not provide sufficient evidence that the eligibility thresholds for party subsidies matter for predicting stable party volatility. Overall, this article suggests that less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies help produce stable party systems by reducing risks associated with party replacement volatility.

The court in this case decided that state subsidy to political parties that discriminate against women is prohibited by international treaties, notably the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

This raises a number of issues. Where the discrimination is for religious reasons, does sex equality need to be balanced against religious freedom? Both are usually seen as fundamental rights. What about discrimination against men, in favour of women; is that also against the law? Finally, is the obligation not to discriminate only binding on the state, or also on the party itself? Could such a party be banned from politics? Some of these issues were touched on by the court, although not convincingly, and some of them, such as religious freedom, were scandalously ignored.