The grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (d. 1661) stands out as one of the most celebrated figures of Ottoman history, but despite his prominence, the basic contours of his earlier life remain largely unknown, and most of what is known derives from narrative accounts produced long after his death. This study utilizes archival sources to reconstruct Köprülü's career prior to his 1656 promotion to the grand vizierate. It reveals a major gap in the narrative sources: in 1653, when Köprülü is supposed to have been politically inactive, he was actually serving as a provincial governor in the sensitive region of Karaman in south-central Anatolia. At that time, a rebel faction was active in the area, and evidence indicates that Köprülü aligned with them. Elements of this faction, under Abaza Hasan's leadership, would later go on to rebel against Köprülü himself in 1658. Köprülü's ties to this rebel faction stand in sharp contrast to his later historical image as a paragon of order and central authority. An understanding of this period thus permits a reevaluation not only of Köprülü's political character, but also of how his supporters worked to construct his image in the aftermath of Abaza Hasan's rebellion.

How do subnational agents exercise policy discretion in the social welfare sphere? To what extent do they do so as a result of various bureaucratic and fiscal incentives? The literature has documented several explanatory frameworks in the context of China that predominantly focus on the realm of developmental policies. Owing to the salient characteristics of the social policy arena, local adaptation of centrally designed policies may operate on distinctive logics. This study synthesizes the recent scholarship on subnational social policymaking and explains the significant interregional disparities in China's de facto urban poverty line – the eligibility standard of the urban minimum livelihood guarantee scheme, or dibao. Five research hypotheses are formulated for empirical examination: fiscal power effect, population effect, fiscal dependency effect, province effect and neighbour effect. Quantitative analysis of provincial-level panel data largely endorses the hypotheses. The remarkable subnational variations in dibao standards are explained by a salient constellation of fiscal and political factors that are embedded within the country's complex intergovernmental relations and fiscal arrangements. Both a race-to-the-top and a race-to-the-bottom may be fostered by distinctive mechanisms. The unique role of provincial governments as intermediary agents within China's political apparatus is illuminated in the social policy arena.