This Article interrogates the role of national constitutional courts within the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference mechanism from both descriptive and normative angles. First, I demonstrate that although a clear majority of the constitutional courts submit references to the ECJ on a more frequent basis, differences in individual approaches remain significant. Subsequently, I argue that the core normative attractivity of the questions submitted in the course of domestic constitutional review lies in their participative and deliberative potential. Compared to ordinary courts, constitutional courts are better suited to amplify the ‘unheard’ voices of immobile EU citizens. By counterbalancing the demands of the EU's functional constitution, which is primarily based on the ideals of market capitalism, constitutional courts’ questions may contribute to the EU's capacity to generate legitimate decisions. Finally, I put my theoretical claims in context and analyse the main ways in which such deliberative potential can translate into practice.

A wind of change is blowing through the European judicial landscape. During the past decade, the European Union (EU) judiciary has undergone its biggest institutional overhaul in generations, the rise of authoritarian populism in Central and Eastern Europe has prompted a Rule of Law crisis, several supreme and constitutional courts challenged the supremacy of EU law, while the Court of Justice re-articulated the scope of the duty to refer under Article 267 TFEU and, for the first time, found that domestic last-instance courts breaching it triggered state liability. This Article argues that these and similar developments, once looked at together, suggest that something fundamental has shifted in the EU’s judicial architecture. A new form of judicial federalism has emerged, which departs from the traditional way in which relations between EU and Member State courts used to be structured. Although this new federalism is multifaceted and is marked by both centripetal and centrifugal forces, its distinguishing feature is a stronger centralisation, which manifests itself in a considerably expanded federal judiciary, a greater emphasis on hierarchy, a more careful use of European judicial resources, as well as tighter supervision of national procedures and court structures.

This introductory Article sets out the background and summarises the content of the Symposium on ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as a Relational Actor’. Observing that the CJEU has been a key player in shaping European legal integration, the Symposium takes as its starting point that courts – and the CJEU is no exception in this regard – are unable to drive developments in isolation. For the Court to carry out its role as guarantor of the Treaties and guardian of the rule of law in the Union, it needs not to isolate itself but to interact with other European Union (EU) and national institutions. Relations, the Symposium argues, are not only unavoidable but also legitimate and even vital for the adequate execution of the judicial function. This introduction briefly explores six of the Court’s most important relationships: those with the other EU institutions; the courts of the Member States; the Member States themselves; the parties appearing before it; other international courts; and the general public. It then summarises the contributions and highlights how they complement each other in examining the CJEU as a relational actor.

According to Article 267 TFEU, a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ can make a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. The Court applies a single, homogeneous definition of a ‘court or tribunal’. This has allowed it to admit references from those specialised, independent, administrative bodies that in several Member States have been established instead of administrative courts to decide claims under public law, including EU law. Whether such a ‘dispute settling’ body is entitled to submit a preliminary reference normally depends upon whether it commands sufficient ‘independence’ vis-à-vis both the parties to the dispute and the public administration as such. The Court has tightened these requirements appreciably in connection with the threats against the independence of the judiciary in some Member States, and the consequent more prominent roles that Articles 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter have come to play. Whereas safeguarding the rule of law is of utmost importance, these provisions pursue objectives within the Union's legal order which are materially different from those pursued by Article 267. In this article, it is therefore argued that the Court should apply different constructions of the independence criterion with respect to these provisions.

In this article, I scrutinise the impact of the reform that will double the number of judges at the General Court. I examine the consequences of a wider use of a five-judge chamber, the continuation of generalist chambers, and the possible departure from the General Court’s minimal standard of review of legality. But greater efficiency at the General Court will have important consequences for the Court of Justice too. The Court of Justice must anticipate more appeals following the General Court’s increase in productivity; the transfer of jurisdiction to the General Court to hear preliminary references is considered. Profound changes at the General Court will lead to the Court of Justice becoming a very different institution to the one we know.

Belgian Constitutional Court beats all in referrals to EU Court – How come? – Origin and evolution of Belgian federalism – Permanent reform – Modest origins of present constitutional court – Use of Belgian and EC law to widen its channels – Identification of Belgian constitutional rules with EC rules – Statutory extension of Court's powers – Use of techniques in referral of Advocaten voor de Wereld – Translation of national constitutional issue into a European one – EC law-driven constitutional evolution in Belgium – Eventual undermining of Belgian constitutional principles