This chapter analyzes the major problem of corporate-political corruption in more detail, using case studies of Bo Xilai and the Shide Group ("white gloves"), Zhou Yongkang and CNPC ("protection umbrellas"), and Zhao Zhengyong in Shaanxi Province ("predatory corruption" and "symbiotic parasitism") to illustrate the key types of collusive corruption between officials and corporations and their harmful impacts on Chinese society and politics. At the same time, the chapter introduces the case of Shenzhen's gray property market to show that sometimes a degree of symbiotic corruption is necessary to overcome inflexible and outdated regulations in a rapidly developing economy.

This chapter lays out the argument that Leninism, under the conditions of reform, decays in a predictable manner. With reform, the mass movements that had focused the attention of cadres ceased, thus causing them to pay less attention to instructions from above. The result was that networks – factions – formed at the local level. It became increasingly difficult for leaders in Beijing to control local cadres. The result was that local cadres formed groups that were interested first and foremost in their own political and material gains. Under Hu Jintao, these networks extended right into Zhongnanhai (the leadership compound in Beijing) and often took a predatory turn with regard to the people they governed. In an effort to break up local networks, Beijing began to experiment with local elections within the party. These elections were tightly controlled, but they nevertheless violated the central governing principle of Leninism, namely that the “party controls the cadres” – in other words that power must flow from the top down.