Gollier proposed in 2008 a model for the analysis of pension schemes that is helpful to focus attention on the impact of intergenerational risk sharing and on the role of the participation constraint. He uses the model to analyze the relative attractiveness of a collective scheme with respect to schemes that may be implemented by individuals for themselves. The analysis makes use of an assumption concerning the ownership rights of investment returns realized by generations that are between career start and retirement at the time of the transition from an individual to a collective system. The present paper investigates the consequences of adopting an alternative assumption. In a calibration exercise, the increase of the effective rate of return obtained by switching from an existing ‘autarky’ scheme to an infinite-horizon ‘collective’ scheme is found to be 8 basis points, as opposed to 72 basis points as reported by Gollier. Additionally, the effects are considered of changes in the specification of agents' preferences, aiming to express the specific nature of retirement income provision in the second pillar. The Black–Scholes assumptions are used to model the economic environment, so that many results can be obtained in closed form.

We study the effects of introducing taxation in classical continuous-time optimization problems with utility from consumption, bequest and retirement savings. Inspired by actual tax favoured retirement savings programs, we formulate and solve the optimization problem for various tax regimes, and compare tax effects on consumption/savings contributions, investment and purchase of life insurance under the regimes. The optimization problems have analytical solutions, which allow for easy comparison of tax effects under the different regimes. To substantiate the results we also present a numerical analysis of the results based on realistic parameter values and regimes. Based on American and Danish tax regimes we estimate the values of existing retirement saving favouring to be 1 – 2 percent of lifetime income.

We present the first step in a program to develop a comprehensive, unified equilibrium theory of asset and liability pricing. We give a mathematical framework for pricing insurance products in a multiperiod financial market. This framework reflects classical economic principles (like utility maximization) and generates pricing algorithms for non-hedgeable insurance risks.

This paper deals with optimal investment and redistribution of the free reserves connected to life and pension insurance contracts in form of dividends and bonus. Formulated appropriately this problem can be viewed as a modification of Merton’s problem of optimal consumption and investment with a very particular form of consumption and utility hereof. Both are linked to a finite state Markov chain. We distinguish between utility optimization of dividends, where a semi-explicit result is obtained, and utility optimization of bonus payments. The latter connects to the financial notion of durable goods and allows for an explicit solution only in very special cases.