Chapter 1 offers historical context and an overview of the intellectual and political history of Classical Liberalism during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century in the region. The focus of the chapter is on how classical liberals approached questions of despotism, civil freedoms, rights and democracy, and on how they have conceived of political change. These questions have been ignored within most of the academic literature, which has tended to focus on these intellectuals and politicians’ pan-Arabist and nationalist agendas instead of on their liberal and democratic outlooks. Overall, the chapter provides an essential historical and analytical background about the region’s earliest liberal intellectual and political history; it shows that liberal concepts were not “foreign concepts” imposed suddenly on an unsuspecting public. The chapter informs the rest of the study and sets the boundaries of the movement.

The idea of capacity is central to Godwin’s political theory. In spite of his assurance that equality is unrelated to physical or intellectual ability, Godwin makes individual and social liberty contingent upon the types of contributions one’s capacities allow. His political system inevitably produces exceptions (those who do not or cannot contribute to the general good) for which he needs to devise additional measures. People who lack the right kinds of mental and physical capacities prove to be an intractable difficulty. In his fiction, Godwin centralizes the idea that the mind should work in concert with the body, and sees incapacity in either of these as socially and personally problematic. We see this in his repeated use of automata, dolls, and characters who disengage from their bodies in various ways; and in his fictional use of rejuvenation and cure. Godwin speculates that when reason governs society, illness and incapacity will no longer be present. His attitude towards deformity is quite separate from his views on capacity. Deformity, in Godwin’s fiction, is usually a visual sign of an evil character, and he does not articulate the prodigious phase of disability.

The introduction discusses the development and substance of transitional justice theory. It shows the main assumptions embedded in this theory, which posits a direct and necessary link between criminal trials for past atrocities and post-authoritarian transitions to democracy. In a nutshell, the theory assumes that better trials lead to better democracy. Transitional justice theory has three main presuppositions. First, the theory assumes that criminal trials have a deterrent effect that prevents new authoritarian atrocities. Second, it asserts that trials offer democratizing lessons in history. Finally, it assumes that trials for past atrocities are necessarily and inherently democratizing because they promote liberal due process rights. The German case calls into question all three of these assumptions. In western Germany, liberalization occurred, but mainly as a way to avoid justice for Nazi crimes. And in the east, fair trials led not to democracy, but to a new authoritarianism.

William Godwin’s condemnation of all law in Political Justice is explored through his novel Things As They Are; or Caleb Williams. Caleb’s failure to hate the law reasonably and well is his very point—as a character. Lawyer-reviewers of the novel were more than unkind about Godwin’s knowledge and understanding of the law; Godwin had the troubles that most historians experience with the law.