Chapter 8 focuses on the enforcement of a final and binding award. It discusses the difference between orders and awards and when each is used in the arbitration proceedings. There are different types of awards that can be granted by tribunals, such as final awards, partial and interim awards, consent awards, and default awards. A tribunal has an obligation to make best efforts to produce an enforceable award. It is important that a tribunal make clear whether an award isa final award, and if so, that it ensures that the award deals with all issues in dispute between the parties. A lack of clarity could lead to requests for interpretation or even to attempts to vacate. In sum, to ensure the validity of an award, arbitrators need to take the time to craft the award carefully, to meet the legal requirements as to form and content, to make a clear representation of the substance of the award, and to ensure that the award does not exceed the scope of their authority. A highly valued aspect of international arbitration is that once an award is granted, it is enforceable and is not subject to being vacated or refused enforcement on the merits.

The German army recognised before 1914 the importance of communication to the third command task, reducing uncertainty, and evolved organisational, personal and technical means to handle it. Realities of battle in 1917 confirmed some pre-war ideas and disproved others. Headquarters expanded and were forced to the rear by firepower. Bureaucratic burden continually increased despite attempts to reverse it and partly because of failure to adopt modern methods of information handling. Personal contact remained essential to command, though 1917 conditions made it more difficult. The same conditions led to ever-greater reliance on technical communications means and organisations, which were continually developed. Performance of the communications system in the spring fighting was at least adequate, including because of the attackers’ slow tempo. Subsequent developments of doctrine and organisation. Unstoppable growth of bureaucracy and linked problem of falsified reporting were danger signals that the urge to reduce uncertainty had got out of hand.

The extent to which a country succeeds in enforcing its competition legislation is dependent as much on the interaction between the adopted competition system and the pre-existing legal system of the country as it is on the performance of the competition authority established by the adopted legislation. This chapter examines the extent and nature of interactions between the adopted competition enforcement systems and pre-existing legal systems in India and Pakistan by evaluating the petitions filed from orders of the CCI and CCP before the general courts in their countries. The chapter demonstrates that the nature and quality of these interactions has a discernible impact on competition enforcement in these countries. It argues that the interactions between the Indian and Pakistani competition legislations and the pre-existing legal systems in India and Pakistan are largely shaped in part by the strategies, mechanisms, and institutions through which the countries had initially adopted their respective competition legislation and the compatibility and legitimacy generated in the process. It further argues that the nature of these interactions determines the extent of competition enforcement in the country and the pace at which the adopted legislation integrates with the country’s pre-existing legal system.

After formally adopting their competition laws, India and Pakistan were faced with the task of implementing them. However, although both countries established their national competition authorities, the CCI and the CCP, almost immediately after adopting their respective legislations, the enforcement of these legislations has not been without complications. This chapter compares the structures, mandates, and compositions of these authorities and their decision-making strategies, and provides a comparative overview of implementation of competition laws in the two countries by reference indicators derived from the orders issued by the CCI and CCP in respect of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance. The chapter also links the performance of the CCI and CCP and their interactions with their countries’ pre-existing legal systems to the mechanisms and institutions employed by the countries in the adoption stage and the compatibility and legitimacy generated through them.

Chapter 1 explains why policymakers have an incentive to engage in attenuation by situating the politics of the hidden state within America’s three foundational identity struggles: age-old, divisive, and recurrent contestation over race, religion, and civic institutions. The racial struggle pits a white supremacist order against a racial egalitarian order. Secularists and accommodationist orders comprise the religious struggle. The public–private struggle is the clash between communitarian and individualist orders. Elites use attenuated governance to pursue their policy goals amid intensive contestation when more visible programs would be struck down as unconstitutional. Sometimes these programs are also electorally unpopular, but policymakers’ chief fear is a legal one – that opposition groups will mobilize, and hostile judges will strike their programs down.

I conclude that the hidden state grows because elites find it useful, strategically, to attenuate their policy designs and communications when their side in America’s foundational struggles is temporarily dethroned by rival ideas and institutions. Policymakers face strategic decisions about the combination of policy design and presentation most conducive to passing and sustaining their policy reforms, decisions with consequences for the shape and scope of the state. By choosing attenuated governance – publicly distancing government from politically contentious purposes – those elites commodify public services and complicate lines of democratic accountability. Understanding the origins, operation, and effects of attenuated governance helps illuminate the contours of state development and the strategies policymakers adopt to deal with its tensions and contradictions.

This chapter uses a range of records of grants and other documents of order to introduce the protagonists and to trace the story of their accmulation of entitlements related to land, agrarian revenues, and state offices. It discusses how such grants were received from emperor, princes, and nobles, as reward for a variety of services – military, fiscal, and administrative – provided to those higher authorities. As such, the protagonists are shown to be part of a ubiquitous and diverse social class, referred to in Mughal parlance as zamindars – holders of land. All this is used to show how the Mughal state was actuated and even inhabited, and turned into family property – not just at the top, but also the bottom of the regime's hierarchy.