Policy makers should understand people’s attitudes towards opt-out nudges to smoothly promote and implement the policies. Our research compares people’s perceptions of opt-in and three improved versions of opt-out (transparency, emphasis on the low-cost opt-out option, education) in pro-social and pro-self policy domains, e.g., organ donation (N=610), carbon emission offset (N=613), and retirement saving (N=602). We found that people acknowledged more practical and societal benefits of opt-out than opt-in in organ donation and retirement saving but less so in carbon emission offset. Improved opt-out policies failed to address ethical concerns and most emotional discomfort concerns in organ donation whereas opt-out transparency and emphasis on low-cost opt-out were more successful than education at addressing concerns in retirement saving and carbon emission offset. Nonetheless, transparency and education may raise consciousness of policies’ aims. The results suggest that 1) acceptability of opt-out approaches may be more difficult to enhance in some domains than others; 2) policy makers should ensure the public understands that opt-out is a convenient choice and may consider combining all forms of improvement to increase people’s acceptance of opt-out nudges.

Residential energy efficiency programs play an important role in combating climate change. More precise quantification of the magnitude and timing of energy savings would bring large system benefits, allowing closer integration of energy efficiency into resource adequacy planning and balancing variable renewable electricity. However, it is often difficult to quantify the efficacy of an energy efficiency intervention, because doing so requires consideration of a hypothetical counterfactual case in which there was no intervention, and randomized control trials are often implausible. Although quasi-experimental econometric evaluation sometimes works well, we find that for a set of energy efficiency rebate programs in Northern California, a naïve interpretation of econometric measurement finds that rebate participation is associated with an average increase in electricity consumption of 7.2% [4.5%, 10.1%], varying in magnitude and sign depending on the type of appliance or service covered by the rebate. A subsequent household survey on appliance purchasing behavior and analysis of utility customer outreach data suggest that this regression approach is likely measuring the gross impact of buying a new appliance but fails to adequately capture a counterfactual comparison. Indeed, it is unclear whether it is even possible to construct a suitable counterfactual for econometric analyses of these rebate programs using data generally available to electric utilities. We view these results as an illustration of a limitation of econometric methods of program evaluation and the importance of weighing engineering modeling and other imperfect methods against one another when attempting to provide useful evaluations of real-world policy interventions.

On the one hand, default nudges are proven to strongly influence behavior. On the other hand, a number of consumer autonomy and welfare concerns have been raised that hinder public policy applications. Both nudge success and ethical concerns depend heavily on the design of defaults. We identify six taxonomic characteristics that matter to the ethical and the nudge success dimension. We review the default nudge literature (N = 61) and review ethical studies to assess both dimensions concerning the taxonomy. When designing a default, a choice architect inevitably makes a decision concerning the characteristics. Among others, the results show three main findings. (1) The initial choice architecture regularly imposes welfare losses and impedes consumer autonomy. Forced active choosing can mitigate both issues. (2) Empirical evidence suggests that transparent defaults are similarly effective as the non-transparent counterparts. (3) The framing of the choice in combination with a choice structuring default leads to greater nudge success and tends to involve the reflective decision-making patterns. Choice architects can trade-off nudge success for legitimacy but a design change may also benefit one without harming the other. We discuss further options of choice architects to legitimize a default.

Types of flexibility – Tension: demands for diversity v. logic of uniformity – United Kingdom and differentiation under Maastricht and Amsterdam – Court of Justice (77/05 and 137/05) on Articles 4 and 5 Schengen Protocol: a clear signal disapproving UK's ‘pick and choose’ approach – Lisbon Protocols: unparalleled possibilities for differentiation coupled with coercive procedural constraints and threats of ‘expulsion’.

Because of a failure to harmonize the regime of takeover defenses, the European Directive on Takeover Bids (DTB) has created broad dissatisfaction. In fact, two key features of the DTB, the board neutrality rule and the break-through rule (BTR), are not mandatory, but can be opted out by Member States. Since both rules were considered chief devices for increasing takeover activity, as they aim to neutralize the most significant anti-takeover defenses, the fact that their adoption will rely upon local choices by national legislatures puts into serious question whether the ultimate outcome of the DTB will be that of promoting a vibrant and efficient pan-European market for corporate control. Optionality is not alone in thwarting harmonization in the field of takeover defenses, as the European legislature has also introduced a reciprocity feature, according to which Member States can decide whether to relax the prohibitions and restrictions arising out of the board neutrality rule and/or the BTR in the event a bid is made by a company which is not subject to the same prohibitions and restrictions.

Although the DTB failed the goal of promoting a strong takeover market by limiting the availability of defensive tactics, both the optionality and the reciprocity features will represent an intriguing test of how Member States will address the underlying policy choices and, where they chose to opt out of the board neutrality rule and/or the BTR, of how companies will react to the possibility of deciding to opt into the pro-takeover EC default regime. The paper argues that optionality: (i) may very well be a sound approach with regard to the BTR, as its beneficial impact is still highly debated, and (ii) represents an acceptable compromise for the gradual implementation of the board neutrality rule. Quite plausibly, at this stage, an abrupt introduction of a mandatory board neutrality rule would have generated, at least in some Member States, a backlash in both national politics and corporate practice. The paper also stresses that reciprocity does not represent a sound policy to govern the regime of takeover defenses.