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1 results

  • 5 - Ride-Hailing Platforms

  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book:
    Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
    Published online:
    30 June 2020
    Print publication:
    23 July 2020, pp 97-125

  • Summary

    This chapter reaches more ambiguous conclusions with regard to the natural monopoly features of ride-hailing platforms such as Uber. While ride-hailing service providers benefit from indirect network externalities between drivers and passengers, which therefore represent a potential source of natural concentration on the demand side, their force is not infinite, and is likely to taper off after a thick and sufficiently large network is reached. The possibility of natural monopoly is as a result largely dependent on the local conditions of demand in a given geographical market. Given these more ambiguous conclusions, this chapter evaluates alternative policy approaches that may be pertinent to ride-hailing depending on the strength of natural concentration, including regulation, franchise bidding, and competition policy enforcement.