According to normative pluralists there are no truths about what one ought simpliciter to do, only truths about what one ought to do according to some normative system or standpoint. In contrast with conceptual normative pluralists who argue for this conclusion on the basis that the concept of an ought simpliciter is somehow defective, non-conceptual normative pluralists defend this conclusion on first-order grounds. Non-conceptual normative pluralism has recently received a book-length defence by Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl. In this article I critique Sagdahl's defence of non-conceptual normative pluralism. Firstly, I challenge Sagdahl's attempt to motivate non-conceptual normative pluralism by appealing to Henry Sidgwick's work on the dualism of practical reason. Secondly, I criticise her response to the most prominent argument against non-conceptual normative pluralism in the philosophical literature, the argument from nominal-notable comparisons. Thirdly, I explore the possibility of a view similar to Sagdahl's position but which accepts the ought simpliciter.

Notwithstanding its defining feature of normative pluralism, the socialist state of Vietnam basically adopts a legal centralist approach to regulation. The judiciary is arguably the most illustrative of this approach, since it is the main forum where legal centralism encounters normative pluralism. Our research examines the choice of norms in judicial adjudication in Vietnam to check the effectiveness of its legal centralist approach. It finds that, despite lacking institutional support, judges managed to apply customary norms at their discretion against the state’s emphasis on top-down legal rules. A legitimacy-based analysis explains this phenomenon. It points out that judges conceptualized their legitimacy under the influence of both legal and extra-legal rules, thus making it apart from the legality. Judges attempt to bridge the gap between legitimacy and legality enabled de factor normative pluralism. In looking at the influence of customary norms over judicial adjudication, the article aims to make both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, it enriches the scholarship of normative pluralism by showing how legitimacy-building keeps normative pluralism effective, irrespective of the dominating legal centralism. Practically, it proffers insightful implications for the ongoing court reforms in Vietnam based upon the findings.

This paper suggests that Afghanistan’s fractured plural legal system is beginning to show some signs of cohesion and coherence. I briefly describe the aspiration set out in the Constitution of Afghanistan and its mandate to legislators and jurists to harmonize Islamic jurisprudence, the principles of justice, customary norms, and international treaty obligations. I then discuss some of the setbacks, obstacles, and more recent progress that have shaped the journey towards that aspiration. The paper specifically addresses the role of lawyers as they learn to navigate the more coherent landscape and the development and impact of a nascent adversarial system. Finally, the paper addresses the role of customary dispute resolution and the bifurcated legal-education system, and their impact on the development of a more unified legal system.