This chapter investigates the 2019 amendment of the Japanese leniency programme. The authors’ approach starts by observing that the old leniency programme may have substantially contributed neither to detecting nor to deterring cartels. The question, therefore, is whether the new leniency programme, whereby the amount of reduction of the leniency programme is drastically lowered for subsequent applicants but which can be compensated by entering a consultation process with the JFTC regarding the information to be submitted, is able to address the limitations of the old leniency programme. The chapter concludes that this may not be the case, since the changes to the leniency programme only address the potential of subsequent leniency applications. Nothing is done to attract better leniency applications from the start. To increase deterrence, the authors therefore investigate whether there is still some possibility of tweaking the sanctions in order to compensate for what the leniency programme cannot yet achieve.

The concluding chapter argues that the Asian leniency programmes only converge on the core elements of a leniency programme. The core elements are the building blocks of a leniency programme. However, the composition of these blocks is often different. Some of the differences are subtle. Other differences make the respective leniency programme distinct from the others. Some of the distinctive elements are not necessarily part of the building blocks any more and thus give a unique character to the respective leniency programme. This chapter further claims that these differences can be explained by either the political economy of a country, experimentation due to prior negative enforcement results and a desire to achieve better enforcement results, or foreign influence. Since the result of experimentation cannot always be predicted, the authors estimate that further amendments will be made to the Asian leniency programmes.