Chapter 3 covers national criminal law on terrorism worldwide. A total of 188 States (of the total of 197 recognized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as treaty depositary) have domestic legislation in place specifically criminalizing acts of terrorism. Despite certain commonalities, the definitions of these crimes are unique to each individual State. At the time of writing, only one State, Micronesia, had no dedicated legislative provisions on terrorism of any form in its domestic law. A further seven States – the Republic of Congo, Dominica, Eritrea, Kuwait, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Yemen – repress the financing of terrorism with criminal sanction but do not also establish the perpetration of an act of terrorism as a distinct criminal offence.

Regional collaboration between states is increasingly vital to address the challenges of our time. Yet many regions struggle to collaborate effectively. Comparative regional law can contribute to effective regional collaboration. But it can also make a valuable contribution to the discipline of (comparative) law more generally, especially to rethinking the connection between law and the state, and better connecting our legal discipline to empirical methods. This contribution first sets out some key challenges for comparative regional law. For example, how to validly compare regions with vast and vital differences in history, (legal) culture, geography, language, and economies, and avoid pitfalls like EU-centrism or colonialism. As always in comparative law, no single perfect answer or method exists to address these challenges. Yet this contribution aims to help stock the comparative toolbox, so that researchers can pick and combine the proper methodological tools for the research questions they want to pursue. The main claim therefore is that, considering the nature of regional law, a functionalist method, complemented and checked by more critical methods, might often be a suitable approach. If done carefully, like two hedgehogs making love, comparing regional law can then produce academically and practically valuable results.

This chapter begins by exploring the causes of the uneasy relationship between cultural heritage and law and the relationship that has developed between law and other non-law initiatives to care for cultural heritage in the UK. In developing an integrated approach to the care of cultural heritage, by considering both legal and non-legal instruments, the terminology of ‘nested practices of care’ (drawn from the work of Joan Tronto) is adopted. These different practices of care form the corpus of study for this book and demonstrate the varied way in which care is provided in the UK. In addition to cultural heritage frameworks consisting of multiple nested practices, other sources of law and non-law dealing with general principles provide care and are therefore treated as nested practices of care. The analysis adopted in this book does not lose sight of the hierarchy of norms and enforceability of the different legal and non-legal instruments, but nevertheless does treat these different elements as contributing to the communities of care across the UK.

Chapter 7 discusses the law applicable to shareholder treaty claims. It argues in favour of an integrated approach to the applicable law, that is, one that gives proper weight not only to the applicable IIA provisions but also to general international law and national law. The reason for this is, first, that IIA provisions, including applicable law clauses, commonly require the application of the three sources of law. Second, overlaps between international and national law claims call for consideration and application of this latter legal system. And third, admissibility determinations are not focussed on the scope of treaty provisions containing consent to international jurisdiction but on the content of specific claims (thus often involving substantive aspects).

An enduring contribution of Jessup’s Transnational Law is his critique of “international law” and his case for a functionalist concept of “transnational law” defined as rules—international, national or private—that offer solutions to transnational problems. Extending Jessup’s argument, this chapter critiques the concept of the “international legal system,” proposes an alternative concept of the “global legal system” and offers an analytical framework for understanding that system. The global legal system consists of not only rules, but also courts and other institutions, that provide legal solutions to transnational problems. These institutions are national, international, private and sometimes hybrid. Among the solutions provided are three generic governance functions: prescription, adjudication and enforcement. More than one institution may provide solutions to a given transnational problem, creating a need for choice across three dimensions: national-national, national-international and public-private. The global legal system uses three types of principles to guide these choices: principles of authority, allocation and party autonomy. This chapter’s concept of a global legal system aims to provide a coherent way of thinking about the multiple transnational problem-solving functions of legal systems and the multiple levels at which those functions are performed.