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Experiences of combat and the type of warfare experienced also bolstered the extant loyalties of black Rhodesian soldiers. It is clear from the testimony of black veterans that they felt that they had triumphed during their clashes with the liberation forces, and this informed their understanding that they were militarily on top throughout the conflict. Although not strategically accurate, these perceptions reflected the unique perspective of elite infantry troops. escalation of the war altered the perception black troops held of the liberation forces. ir exposure to incidents of guerrilla violence against civilians, and the widespread targeting of off-duty soldiers and their families, meant that many came to despise elements of the liberation armies. This also served to solidify a notion that the RAR and the wider army were on the ‘right side’ of the war, and that they protecting civilians against the violence of guerrillas. In this manner their regimental loyalties were boosted, as they came to deem the RAR a more moral actor than guerrilla forces.
In chapter 4, I examine the debates of 1965–66 over Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. In 1965–66, the UN Charter regulated the use of force by states but the success of international legal arguments in the public debates did not depend on the ability of the speaker to characterise an argument as a ‘legal’ one. Successful use of international legal language in the 1965–66 debates depended on the ability of the speaker to cast international law as something more than merely law – as either a standard of morality or a manifestation of an alliance. The legality or illegality of Australia’s actions was not enough, on its own, to provide a persuasive justification for war in 1965–66.
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