Although markets are becoming increasingly transnationalized, the social question appears to remain firmly national. The aim of this article is to discuss under what circumstances, if at all, the social question ought to have a transnational dimension and what form it should take. As such, the article seeks to build a normative framework that abandons the conventional taxonomies of moral duties and instead links the concept of responsibility to governance, which takes place in the space of the polis through a reliance on questions of group agency. To this end, the article will draw on different aspects of responsibility. Having established a link between the social question and the concept of responsibility based on outcome and remedial responsibility, it will draw on collective and shared responsibility to consider what, if any, transnational dimension the social question should have.

Moral reasons take precedence over non-moral reasons either by outweighing non-moral practical reasons, or by excluding such reasons. Several prominent defenders of the moral argument for theism have incorporated the outweighing thesis. They claim we have categorically binding moral duties only if we always have most reason to be ethical. Furthermore, we always have most reason to be ethical only if theism is true. On the contrary, I argue that the excluding reasons thesis is correct and that this undermines a key premise in moral arguments developed by C. Stephen Evans, C. Stephen Layman, and William Lane Craig.