Summary: The rural credit market in Madras remained unregulated until the mid-1930s. Drawing from credit reports in the 1920s and early 1930s, this chapter explores regional lending patterns. The chapter analyses variation in the challenges faced by South Indian farmers across major ecological zones. Peasants in the arid parts of Madras had few options to protect against seasonal volatility and drought. Rice farmers in the river deltas were better able to manage climatic risks. The chances of borrowers defaulting on loans followed these patterns, being higher in the dry than the wet districts. Credit was provided seasonally, in four- to six-month intervals, and creditors provided wider access to loans in the irrigated areas. Moneylenders selectively chose clients in dry zones, often excluding smallholders and tenants. Variation in credit access had implications for investment rates and development outcomes across districts. These findings suggest important connections between climatic risk, credit supply and inequality in colonial India.

Prior to the 2008–9 global financial crisis, regulatory and supervisory frameworks were not designed to manage the orderly failure of systemically important financial institutions. Governments were compelled to bail out these institutions to mitigate a deeper financial and economic crisis from developing. In response, the Financial Stability Board formulated an internationally endorsed financial institution resolution framework. The regulatory attributes of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority strengthen its role as the lead resolution authority in the banking sector. This chapter argues that supervisory gaps and underlap undermine the effectiveness of the resolution regime and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority acting as a resolution authority. Cross-border resolutions pivot on coordination and intent between jurisdictions. During a banking crisis, multiple bank subsidiaries entering into resolution will severely stretch the resources of Hong Kong’s resolution authorities. Moreover, small credit institutions, are not captured by the regime. Historically, small credit institutions have caused several systemic banking crises in Hong Kong. Moneylending markets have grown exponentially over the past decade with the emergence of FinTechs and TechFins. Consequently, Hong Kong’s moneylending market is becoming a financial stability risk because a substantial portion are inadequately regulated and fall outside the resolution regime.