This chapter offers a historical and introductory overview of contemporary virtue ethics. It suggests that many of the criticisms from which contemporary virtue ethics emerged as an alternative approach are less apt as criticisms of utilitarianism or Kantian ethics than as criticisms of the current state of moral philosophy. The chapter provides a map for the novice, situating virtue ethics in relation to care ethics. It analyzes the obstacles to addressing the question of whether Kantian ethics and virtue ethics are compatible, and examines some threads of the critique of modern ethics. Christine Swanton's Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View spares one the task of working through the now vast literature to figure out whether the various theories or approaches that their authors call virtue ethics have something in common, something that warrants saying there is indeed something that constitutes virtue ethics.

Immanuel Kant's criticisms of the spurious principles of morality are best understood as parts of a sole survivor argument. Criticisms of mistaken views can be part of an argument to support a philosopher's own position. Henry Sidgwick is credited with having shaped a widely held view of the main difference between ancient and modern ethics. In the Groundwork Kant argues that a formal moral law is the basic law of morality. In the Groundwork (G IV 442-3) Kant divides heteronomous principles in two ways. One division is between empirically-based principles and rationally-based principles. The other division is between principles based on something internal to us and principles based on something external to us. Kant concentrates on principles about perfection, and begins by objecting to the ontological conception of it. Kant's basic argument against empirical views rests on the argument that moral principles must hold universally, for all rational beings.