Most of the vast literature on Wittgenstein addresses what he fundamentally meant. And some of it goes on to consider whether or not his core ideas are correct. The main substance of Richard Rorty's 'Wittgenstein and the linguistic turn' is a comparison between two competing answers to this question: one that privileges Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical metaphilosophical remarks, his identification of philosophical problems with diseases of thought calling for a form of therapy; and the other response calls that privileges Wittgenstein's view of languages as instrumental social practices. This chapter spells out Rorty's distinction between the two outlooks. It summarizes his reasons for opposing the therapeutic one and favouring the pragmatic one and sketches a version of Wittgensteinian therapism that seems to be stronger than the version that Rorty criticizes. It bolsters the appeal of better version by sketching some considerations in favour of it and some arguments against the pragmatist alternative.