Since the rules of civility are often abandoned for the sake of the goals activists are pursuing, this chapter considers whether these goals – rather than a set of universal rules – might themselves suggest moral constraints. To illustrate this point, I analyze two authors who believe that how one communicates is integrally related to what one actually conveys, and thus morality and effectiveness cannot always be separated. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues women must be free to reflect on their own experiences rather than being subjected to authoritative interpretations. Even when done in the name of women’s liberation, telling women how they should feel ironically stifles women’s voices. Thus, a dialogical, consciousness-raising style of communication is integrally related to the pursuit of women’s liberation. Paulo Freire likewise argues that propaganda for the cause of liberation ironically perpetuates oppression. Liberators need to be committed to dialogue because the task of liberation itself demands dialogical engagement.

Martin Luther King Jr. argues that means and ends must be commensurable. If one wants to bring about a more equitable society, one must do so by equitable means. This means-ends principle is reiterated in the writings of Gandhi and King, but it has often been treated as something mysterious. A pragmatic case can be made for it if we pay attention to the dynamics of communication. Gandhi and King argue for an approach to social conflict that combines compassion for the needs of their opponents with a resolute opposition to the injustices these opponents perpetrate. Respect and respectability without challenge and protest will not contribute to the development of a more equitable society. But neither will challenge and protest without respect and respectability. By attending to how nonviolent direct actionists combine these two pressures, I develop an alternative to the dominant perspectives in communication ethics, but one that shares their concerns for morality, effectiveness, and nonviolence.

After earning a commerce degree, Will got a corporate job and wore a suit to work every day, then came home to a rental condo in the city he shared with his girlfriend. After about a year he started to wonder why he wasn’t happy. Maybe if he took more time off or got a dog? But after another year of his job, a bit of travelling with his girlfriend, and a year of going on jogs and throwing sticks for their puppy, he still felt miserable. Will realized he had been doing all the things that mattered to others without knowing what truly mattered to himself. In a flurry of decisions, Will quit his job, broke up with his girlfriend, and moved back in with his parents. That’s when he ran into an old family friend, Leah, and, in a rush of details, told her about his life since graduation.

Nelems argues that today’s democratic morbidity can be located in the ways it reproduces an individualist ontology to undemocratizing effects. Viewed through this lens, the growing backlashes against democracy appear as a symptom, not a cause of democracy’s crisis. However, the boundaries and enactments of representative democracies have long been troubled, stretched and shaped by democratizing processes and movements that reference an ontology of intra-being. Nelems proposes the “ecocycle” within the living ecosystems of tree canopies as a relational model of intra-being through which we might re-examine and re-imagine democratizing and undemocratizing processes. The ecocycle’s two “traps” of poverty and rigidity offer critical insights into the points of connect and disconnect between these processes, as well as the relationship between the lifeways they generate. In their porous, dynamic, entangled, and grounded relationality, tree canopies offer pathways by which the roots of a constellation of democracies might be deparochialized with a view to leveraging the transformative potential of other/wise democracies.

This chapter discusses Aquinas’s account of the freedom of the judgment of choice. It claims that, on his view, this judgment is free because it is up to us whether or not we assent to its propositional content, which Aquinas takes to be a means-end-relating precept. It examines what explains our ability to freely assent to a precept. It argues that this is explained by the logical structure of the precept that the agent assents to. In particular, the precept in question must fail to establish a necessary relation between a given means and the ultimate end. A precept fails to do this if it (1) relates an expedient, but non-necessary means to a non-ultimate end, or (2) a necessary means to a non-ultimate end, or (3) an expedient, but non-necessary means to the ultimate end. It also argues that the logical structure of the precept alone is not enough to guarantee our freedom of assent. An agent must also understand that a precept fails to establish a necessary relation between a means and the ultimate end in order to freely assent to it. To grasp this structure, the agent has to engage in a kind of higher-order judgment.

This chapter is the first of four investigating Aquinas’s view that choice is a hylomorphically structured act that inherits its preferential character from a previous judgment of reason. This chapter deals with the judgment preceding choice. The hallmark of this judgment is that it is free. It does not yet investigate this judgment’s free character in this chapter. Rather, here the groundwork is established for its discussion in Chapter 3 by clarifying what a practical judgment generally speaking is, for Aquinas. It argues that, on his view, a practical judgment involves two components, namely, a propositional content and an attitude of assent. It shows that the propositional content in question is an ought-statement or what Aquinas calls a “precept,” where the force of the ‘ought’ is not deontological, but rather means-end-relating. Thus, on Aquinas’s view, the chapter argues, to say that X ought to be done is to say that X ought to be pursued as a means for the sake of some end Y. It also shows that Aquinas draws a distinction between two types of means, expedient and necessary ones, and two types of ends, ultimate and non-ultimate ones, which yields four different types of precepts.