This chapter explores possible differences between powerful qualities and pure powers, argues for the Pure Powers Model, and discusses the problem of being for pure powers. It is argued that powerful qualities are modally indistinguishable from pure powers but have a denser nature. Since pure powers are ontologically simpler than powerful qualities yet equally explanatorily relevant to modality, we should reject powerful qualities. After rejecting the Powerful Qualities Model, the reality of pure powers is defended. If pure powers are to provide a stable basis for physical modality, the problem of their being or grounding during periods of nonmanifestation needs resolution. It is argued that pure powers are self-grounded. A regress argument advanced by Stathis Psillos, which challenges the self-grounding of pure powers, is deflected. Lastly, Point Theory is developed to explain the self-grounding of pure powers.

Prevalence of disease, risks, impact on fertility, Medical Eligibility Criteria 3 and 4, advantages, disadvantages, special considerations

In this chapter, I consider whether we can solve the problem of negative action by insisting that intentional omissions, refrainments, and the like aren’t really actions at all, but ‘mere manifestations of agency’. I argue that the distinction between actions and mere manifestations of agency is more difficult to draw than it may appear, and that drawing such a distinction requires us to abandon plausible claims about the relations between powers and their manifestations, and between intentional behaviour and practical reasons. We must find some other solution to the problem.