The framing of the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) in relation to the postwar Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region grafted a political geography onto a broad range of ecological areas. Planners, drawing on climate models, classified the region in agro-ecological terms devised in reference to the tropics. Functionally, their logic shored up a focus on rainfed, or unirrigated, agriculture in semi-arid and arid lands. But their rendering of dry areas masked the geopolitical framing of international agricultural research in the postwar period. Born of the Cold War, ICARDA emerged from exercises of European imperialism, Great Power rivalries, and the improvisation of modern nation-states in Western Asia and North Africa. The chapter charts the imperial origins of international agricultural research in Syria, the Cold War on hunger, and CGIAR’s classification of arid regions, towards an account of (1) the geopolitical logic of international agricultural research and (2) dryland agricultural science as the ground for technological and political intervention in decolonized lands.

Chapter 3 considers the development of the infamous martyrdom operations, or "suicide bombings," in the late twentieth century. Beginning by considering postcolonial experiences of Shi’i Muslims in 1980s West Asia, I argue for approaching two contexts of conflict—Lebanon and Iran—in tandem, due to their joint recognition of the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent Ayatollah Khomeini. Evaluating the ideological contributions of Shi’a history and Persian art forms, I trace the way the concepts of jihad—struggle in the way of God—and shahid—martyrdom—increasingly take martial shapes during the period, leading to the figure of the istishhadi who gives their life in an attack on the enemy. Both the explosive tactics of Hezbollah and the human wave attacks of Iran’s Basij forces are linked by the conception that willing self-sacrifice paves the way to realizing a divine kingdom on earth and filtered through the lens of Husayn’s battle at Karbala. Finally, I show the connection between the words of these martyrs and contemporary Shi’i authorities to the idea of commanding right and forbidding wrong, and the need to live life according to divine law regardless of the consequences.

This chapter brings to the fore a key theme across the second part of Mandatory Madness: the considerable agency exercised by families over the management of their mentally ill relatives. This chapter focuses in particular on the petitions that flooded the mandate government from the 1930s onwards, seeking the admission of relatives to the government’s mental health institutions. These petitions are read both for what they reveal about the often-complex therapeutic strategies pursued by families, and as carefully crafted arguments about mental health illness and the state’s obligations to its subjects. Petitions make clear that Palestinian Arab families in particular were much more actively engaged with questions of psychiatric care than has been often represented, incorporating the mandate’s processes, institutions, and indeed anxieties into their strategies for managing the mentally ill. Petitions reframe our understanding of the interactions between state and society in mandate Palestine, by revealing how these played out in the intimate stretches of people’s lives.

The fourth chapter gives a succinct historical description of the secular nationalist ideologies in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel and compares the secular political movements in these countries as they have different regime types and political cultures. The chapter also provides brief biographical accounts of the three top executive leaders from each country: Bashar al-Assad, Saad al-Hariri, and Benjamin Netanyahu. The authors also present and compare the operational code results of the leaders and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from secular nationalist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for MENA politics and for the international relations discipline.

The following chapter traces the history of Lebanese politics, reflecting on the structural factors that facilitate the involvement of external powers. It suggests that the structural organization of the state allows for external patronage in support of communal interests and, amid times of crisis, this patronage is seen to be a necessity. Moreover, the geopolitical significance of Lebanon means that external actors also seek local allies as a means of countering rivals who already possess influence across the state while local actors also seek to position themselves within broader regional currents. To understand the competition over Lebanon, we must trace the historical development of the Lebanese state which allows for identification of the structural factors conditioning – or limiting – the deployment of capital and foreign policy activities.

Tripoli, October 2019: Young people from various religious backgrounds and all walks of life sang and danced together in the city’s central al-Nour Square, shattering the myth of Tripoli as a ‘cradle of terrorism’ or ‘citadel of Muslims’. The Islamists who had often dominated Tripoli’s urban space retreated, and youths, families, and members of the educated middle class filled al-Nour Square during Lebanon’s revolutionary moment.

Why and how did Tripoli become the country’s prime centre of contentious politics in otherwise-peripheral Lebanon?

The introduction presents the main argument of the book, introducing the concepts of the dethronement of secondary cities, politics of autochthony, and erosion of city corporatism in Tripoli. It then discusses the broader lessons of the Tripoli case, which speak to three strands of literature: studies of Lebanon and the Levant; discussions on sectarianization in the Middle East; and debates on the ‘Sunni Crisis’ in the Middle East. Lastly, the research methods used for data collection are presented.

The Arab-Levant (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan) has long been at the center of cultural, social, and geopolitical changes in the region, which have been central in shaping the development of psychological practice and science in the region. The region has been at the cross section of multiple foreign influences (French, British, US, Arab), all of whom have impacted academia. This resulted not only in multiple ideologies and schools of psychological thought that remain until today, but also in a trilingual academic system that further deepens the disconnect among psychologists and test-takers in the region. Additionally, the Levant’s experience of occupation, trauma, diaspora, and political instability has led to an increased need and interest in mental health services and displaced populations, and hence the measurement of related constructs. More recently, with increased funding for research on such populations, non-Arab researchers have gained a renewed interest in the region, which has led the way to increased collaborative efforts in the development of psychometric tools. This chapter discusses how these contemporary historical developments have impacted testing-related practices academia, research, and practice in clinical, educational, and industrial/organizational practice.

Following the Torch operations, de Gaulle faced an escalating imperial crisis in the Levant. Indigenous nationalist groups demanded that de Gaulle follow through on his independence promises. These demands placed the British-Gaullist relationship under increasing pressure. This chapter explores the first of two major crises that erupted in the Levant between 1943 and 1945. Following nationalist victories in the November 1943 elections, French colonial official Jean Helleu arrested the newly elected Lebanese leadership in a bid to preserve French influence.

The arrests were criticised in the local, regional and global press. In the Arab world, the Egyptian press brandished the Atlantic Charter’s promises of the right of self-determination, much as anti-imperial nationalists had drawn on American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1919. In Britain, the press called on its own officials to back independence demands to uphold British honour, which had been compromised thanks to French intransigence.

This episode also highlighted the contradictions between maintaining British regional prestige and preserving the public face of the British-Gaullist relationship. British Foreign Office officials argued that intervening on the side of the Levantine nationalists would jeopardise British influence in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. Publicly backing the French position, however, would destroy British regional influence.

One of the most significant sources of Anglo-Gaullist tension throughout this period was the future independence of the French mandated Levant territories (Syria and Lebanon). Operation Exporter (June-July 1941) was the first protracted battle fought by Anglo-Free French forces to secure French territory loyal to Vichy. It also marked a resurgence of imperial rivalry that escalated over the next four years.

This chapter introduces another complicating factor into the Anglo-Free French relationship: anti-imperial nationalist movements and their demands for independence. It explores Britain’s policy of pressuring de Gaulle to endorse full independence for both states. British policy-makers attempted to manage the rhetoric of Arab nationalism in order to preserve Britain’s regional influence. They removed references to an inherent Franco-Levantine bond from official Free French statements. They also directed the British press to avoid any mention of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty due to its broad unpopularity. The Free French, reliant upon British monetary and military support, had to acquiesce to British demands to preserve their outward legitimacy.