Certaines études suggèrent que le projet de Charte des valeurs du PQ et la loi 21 ont nourri un sentiment d'exclusion chez les membres des religions minoritaires. Cependant, aucune étude ne permet à ce jour de comparer le sentiment d'appartenance des minorités religieuses avant et après la mise à l'agenda de ces projets législatifs. Ancrée dans la recherche sur les « événements focalisateurs » et reposant sur des données de trois sondages réalisés en 2012, 2014 et 2019, notre étude examine l'impact des débats sur laïcité sur le sentiment d'appartenance des immigrants racisés au Québec. Nos résultats démontrent qu'un déficit d'appartenance au Québec par rapport au Canada existait déjà en 2012, mais qu'il était circonscrit à certains groupes, notamment ceux de dénominations non chrétiennes et les non francophones. Nos analyses montrent aussi qu'avec les débats sur la laïcité, le déficit d'appartenance au Québec s'est étendu aux minorités non religieuses et aux francophones.

L’interculturalisme québécois est un modèle de gestion de la diversité culturelle et religieuse qui, pour plusieurs, se distinguerait du multiculturalisme à la canadienne et ferait l’objet d’un large consensus au sein de la population québécoise. Résolument pluraliste, ce modèle distinct de gestion de la diversité aurait pu être opérationnalisé juridiquement dans le cadre constitutionnel canadien avant l’adoption de la Loi sur la laïcité de l’État. Or, le processus suivi par le gouvernement québécois pour faire adopter cette dernière, le 16 juin 2019, et tenter d’éviter que sa constitutionnalité puisse être contestée devant les tribunaux canadiens rend très difficile – voire impossible – la fondation juridique de l’interculturalisme québécois dans le contexte actuel.

In 2019, the province of Quebec and the canton of Geneva passed bills establishing their states as “secular.” While each law is, to a certain extent, context specific, both present noteworthy similarities. First, neutrality (the cornerstone of laïcité) is articulated around two elements: (1) restrictions that affect the religious practices of public servants belonging to minority religions and (2) protections for Christian symbols constructed as “cultural.” The article questions the implications for inclusive citizenship of formalizing regulatory regimes that differentiate between “religion” and “culture.” Second, a comparative lens enables an analysis of how, through whom, and why similar regimes of regulation travel from one area of the world to another. The article argues for the importance of considering transnational influences when analyzing the regulation of religion to better (1) understand why particular models of secularism gain traction and (2) capture power dynamics structuring these processes of traction.

Depuis plusieurs décennies, la laïcité subit en France une transformation profonde qui remet en cause sa dimension libérale. Le principe de séparation du politique et du religieux se dilue au profit de la promotion de la notion récente du « vivre‑ensemble », qui voudrait associer garantie de la liberté religieuse et défense des valeurs républicaines. Ce processus d’érosion s’appuie sur le développement d’une logique concordataire et sur l’émergence d’une conception « communautariste » de la laïcité.

Le présent article propose une analyse des transformations récentes de la laïcité française, observées à partir d’un changement dans la hiérarchisation des différentes normes laïques. Après un retour sur le dispositif juridique et historique de la laïcité et sur son interprétation comme « libéralisme ambigu » (Jean-Pierre Machelon), nous mettons en lumière le rapport particulier qu’elle entretient avec l’islam. Une deuxième partie est consacrée à la période 2002-2012 et particulièrement à l’action politique de l’ancien ministre de l’Intérieur puis Président de la République Nicolas Sarkozy. Nous reconstruisons trois étapes de transformation : de la « nouvelle laïcité » à la « laïcité falsifiée » en passant par la laïcité dite « positive ».

Over the last couple of years, France has built up the reputation of a staunchly secular society where, slowly but surely, signs of religious manifestation are being removed from the public space with an appeal to laïcité (French secularism) and other French values. This is why it came as a surprise that, after a long list of unsuccessful religious manifestation cases, in August 2017 the Dijon Administrative Tribunal ruled against a municipality that had decided no to longer accommodate Muslim and Jewish dietary prescriptions in school canteens. The reason for the sudden change appeared to be the approach taken in the relevant case: rather than basing itself on freedom of manifestation, the tribunal had chosen to decide the case solely on the basis of the best interests of the child. Although that approach offered some much-desired relief for the religious communities involved, following an overview of the case below, I will argue that it may not be a sustainable answer to the curtailing of religious manifestations in the name of laïcité.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of the term multiculturalism by Canadian justices. The goal is twofold. First, identify the context in which it has been used and delineate the meaning given to multiculturalism by Canadian Courts. Second, contrast the Federal State’s conception of multiculturalism with the courts’ implicit understanding. Although Canadian courts often refer to multiculturalism, their conception is much less unequivocal and its scope quickly widened, going beyond what had been planned at the time of its adoption in 1971.

This article offers a systematic analysis of the plenary Chamber of the French Cour de Cassation's final decision in the Baby Loup case which held that a private nursery had acted lawfully when requiring an employee to remove her jilbab at work, in accordance with the religious neutrality requirements of the nursery's policy. The article examines the decision in light of ECHR and French domestic legal requirements. First, it is argued that laïcité—rightly held to be irrelevant—still unduly taints the reasoning. As a result, proportionality and anti-discrimination provisions are not properly applied. Secondly, the decision is compared and contrasted with recent ECtHR cases, notably Eweida and Others v UK. It is argued that a Baby Loup-type restriction does not meet ECHR standards. Additionally the margin of appreciation, used by the ECtHR to save the French ban on the full-covering of the face in the SAS case, should not, as will be demonstrated, come into play in a Baby Loup context.

Education—and particularly public education—has become a crucible for the relationship between state and religious diversity, a principal site for contemporary debates about the meaning of secularism and the management of religious difference. This is so across a variety of national traditions, and despite wide differences in the historical and “emotional inheritances” surrounding the configuration of law, politics, and religion. Through an exploration of Hannah Arendt’s thought about responsibility and freedom in education, this article works towards a better understanding of why education is such a crucial and fraught field in the modern encounter between religion and law. The article turns to the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada to draw out the implications of these ideas, arriving ultimately at a claim about the nature and limits of the concept of state neutrality.

Comparing the treatment of Islamic veils and Christian crucifixes by the European Court of Human Rights, this paper re-examines the charge of “double standards” on the part of this guardian of the European legal order, which is seen as disadvantaging Islam and favoring Christianity. While this is proved partially correct, the paper calls for a more differentiated treatment of the issue. For one, there is a modicum of consistency in the European Court’s decisions, because they are all meant to further “pluralism”. Only, Islam and Christianity fare differently in this respect, as “threat” to and “affirmation” of pluralism, respectively. This distinction hinges on Islam’s compatibility with the liberal-secular order, on which the jury is out. A possible way out of the “pluralism v. pluralism” dilemma, I argue, is signaled in the European Court’s recent decision in Lautsi v. Italy (2011), which pairs a preference for “culturalized” Christianity with robust minority pluralism.

Analysis of the justifiability of general burqa bans in public – Comparative study of burqa bans in France, Belgium and concept legislation in the Netherlands – Evaluation of burqa bans in light of the Article 9 ECHR, the right to freedom of religion – Evaluation of grounds for introduction of bans, including public safety, public order and the protection of rights and freedoms of others – Conclusion: general burqa bans diffcult to justify in the light of ECHR standards