Scholarship on global environmental assessments call for these organisations to become more reflexive to address challenges around participation, inclusivity of perspectives, and responsivity to the policy domains they inform. However, there has been less call for reflexivity in IPCC scholarship or closer examination of how routine concepts condition scholarly understanding by focusing on science and politics over other social dynamics. In this article, I suggest that scholarly reflexivity could advance new analytical approaches that provide practical insights for changing organisational structures. Through reflecting on my understanding of the IPCC, I develop actors, activities, and forms of authority as a new analytical framework for studying international organisations and knowledge bodies. Through its application, I describe the social order of the IPCC within and between the panel, the bureau, the technical support units, the secretariat and the authors, which is revealing of which actors, on the basis of what authority, have symbolic power over the writing of climate change. The fine-grained analysis of organisations enabled by this analytical framework reveals how dominance can and is being remade through intergovernmental relations and potentially, identifies avenues that managers of these bodies can pursue to challenge it.

How did the transition from a world of empire to a global international system organised around the sovereign state play out? This article traces the transition over the past two centuries through an examination of membership debates in two prominent intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). IGOs are sites of contestation that play a role in the constitution of the international system. Discussions within IGOs reflect and shape broader international norms, and are one mechanism through which the international system determines questions of membership and attendant rights and obligations. The article reveals that IGO membership policies during this period reflected different compromises between the three competing principles of great power privilege, the ‘standard of civilisation’, and universal sovereign equality. The article contributes to Global IR as it confirms that non-Western agency was crucial in bringing about this transition. States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America championed the adoption of the sovereignty criterion. In this, paradoxically, one of the core constitutional norms of the ‘European’ international system – the principle of sovereign equality – was realised at the hands of non-European actors.

Whether we look at constitutions of states or founding treaties of International Organisations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between delegates create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time for discussion. While the latter speeds up decision making, it risks reducing its quality and legitimacy by hampering the exchange and contestation of information and ideas. How are these competing elements balanced in IOs? Do IOs differ in this respect, and if so, how and why? The article draws on a unique and novel dataset and assesses variation in the extent to which institutional design fosters or inhibits diplomatic deliberation in more than 110 diverse IOs. To this end, the article uses a combination of theories of functionalism, rational choice institutionalism and liberal approaches on variation, fit, and mismatch of deliberative institutional design within and across IOs. The hypotheses are analysed with quantitative methods. The article shows that diplomatic deliberative institutional design elements are the most pronounced when IOs are small in size, deal in high politics, and are regional in character.

This article addresses a significant gap in the literature on legitimacy in global governance, exploring whether, in what ways, and to what extent institutional qualities of international organisations (IOs) matter for popular legitimacy beliefs towards these bodies. The study assesses the causal significance of procedure and performance as sources of legitimacy, unpacks these dimensions into specific institutional qualities, and offers a comparative analysis across IOs in three issue areas of global governance. Theoretically, the article disaggregates institutional sources of legitimacy to consider democratic, technocratic, and fair qualities of procedure and performance. Empirically, it examines the effects of these institutional qualities through a population-based survey experiment in four countries in different world regions with respect to IOs in economic, security, and climate governance. The findings demonstrate that both procedure- and performance-related aspects of IO policymaking matter for popular legitimacy beliefs. This result holds across democratic, technocratic, and fair qualities of IO procedure and performance. Disaggregating the results by issue area indicates that a broader scope of institutional qualities are important for legitimacy beliefs in economic governance compared to security governance and, especially, climate governance. These findings suggest that propositions to reduce the institutional sources of IO legitimacy to single specific qualities would be misguided.

In federal systems public authority is established by the people and exercised for the people at two levels. The treaties establishing the European Union may be conceptualised as the constitution of a supranational public authority, part of a federal system. And what the European Convention has submitted to the European Council to agree upon is an attempt to give this constitution a more coherent, more complete and more appealing form. The new ‘Constitution for Europe’ will be concluded, formally, by an international treaty. But governments and national parliaments will do this on behalf of the citizens of the Union, and insofar as national Constitutions provide for a referendum, the citizens will directly be involved. This Constitution will, therefore, like national constitutions, draw its legitimacy from the people, citizens of the polity, through their constitutional representatives. Legitimacy obtained is similar to that sought for a regular treaty but specific due to the contents and the explicit constitutional claim of the instrument.

Treaties — Interpretation — Miscellaneous — Interpretation of Term “francs effectifs” in International Postal Convention — Interpretation by Conduct — How far Binding upon the Contracting Parties.

International Organisation — Organs of International Administration — International Postal Convention — Payments between Postal Administrations — Currency of Payments — Meaning of the Term “francs effectifs” — Interpretation of Treaties — Interpretation by Conduct.

Interpretation of Treaties — Miscellaneous — Rejection of Principle of Reference to Authors of Document — Ejus est interpretare legem cujus condere.

International Organisation — Miscellaneous — Conference of Ambassadors — Decisions of — By Virtue of Agreement of Parties — Nature of — Quasi-Arbitral Capacity — Right to Interpret Decisions.

Arbitration — Award — Quasi-Arbitral Bodies — Finality of Decision — Decision of Conference of Ambassadors — Nature of the Decision — Right to Interpret the Award — Necessity for Special Agreement.